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Abstract
The dominant academic and practitioners’ perspective on security evolves around
law-abiding referent objects of security who are under attack by law-breaking
threat agents. This study turns the current perspective around and presents a
new security paradigm. Suspects of crime have threat agents as well, and are
therefore in need of security. The study takes cyber criminals as referent objects
of security, and researches their technical computer security practices. While
their protective practices are not necessarily deemed criminal by law, security
policies and mechanisms of cyber criminals frequently deviate from prescribed
bonafide cyber security standards. As such, this study is the first to present a
full picture on these deviant security practices, based on unique access to pub-
lic and confidential secondary data related to some of the world’s most serious
and organized cyber criminals. Besides describing the protection of crime and
the criminal, the observed practices are explained by the economics of deviant
security: a combination of technical computer security principles and microe-
conomic theory. The new security paradigm lets us realize that cyber criminals
have many countermeasures at their disposal in the preparation, pre-activity,
activity and post-activity phases of their modi operandi. Their controls are not
only driven by technical innovations, but also by cultural, economical, legal
and political dimensions on a micro, meso and macro level. Deviant security is
very much democratized, and indeed one of the prime causes of today’s efficiency
and effectiveness crisis in police investigations. Yet every modus operandi comes
with all kinds of minor, major and even unavoidable weaknesses, and therefore
suggestions are made how police investigations can exploit these vulnerabilities
and promote human security as a public good for all citizens. Ultimately, the
findings of this socio-technical-legal project prove that deviant security is an
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In February 2015, the daily newspaper The New York Times reported how an
automated teller machine (ATM) in Kiev, Ukraine, had started dispensing cash
two years earlier whilst no one had even put in a card or touched a button [1].
When a private security firm was called to investigate the case, it discovered
that the cause was not a failure or mistake, but an intentional act of crime.
The obvious thought was that malicious software was planted on the operating
system of the dispensing machine. The security researchers were shocked when
they found out that criminals gained unauthorized access to the bank’s internal
computing systems. Moreover, the attack was not an isolated incident. Over
a 100 banks in 30 countries were hacked as well. Besides a malware dubbed
Carbanak, the organized crime group installed off-the-shelf remote access tools
to learn every move of the bank employees. Therefore, cash outs did not only
occur via ATMs, but also through the financial message network of the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and personal
banking accounts. In short, the criminals monetized whatever internal computer
accounts and systems they could get their hands on. By the time of publica-
tion, private and public agencies in various countries were alarmed as well, and
national computer emergency response teams (CERTs), law-enforcement, the
private security industry and the financial sector were working hard to mitigate
the threat, prevent further damage, and identify new victims and the perpe-
trators. What really scared both private and public researchers was that the
criminals managed to gain access to the database with the internal financial
balance sheets of some banks. Fortunately, the individuals behind the attacks
did not harm the availability, confidentiality or integrity of these statements
as the consequences to today’s globally networked financial system would have
been incalculable.
Like similar successful breaches on protective controls of financial institu-
tions, we generally understand this case as an attack by malicious actors on the
computing systems of law-abiding entities. From this security perspective, the
‘good guys’ are the banks that received help from a consortium of private and
public agencies, read: the cyber security community. They protect themselves
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against attacks from constructed ‘bad guys’, i.e., suspects of crime that belong
to the cyber criminal community. The law-abiding entities are portrayed as
(potential) victims who are predominantly on the defensive side, while the bad
guys are seen as malicious attackers who are on the offensive side. The entities
that are threatened and therefore the recipients of security - states, businesses
and citizens - own legitimate assets safeguarded according to industry standards
and/or civil law. The constructed bad guys follow the opposite direction. They
are defined as threat agents because of their intentional trespassing of substan-
tive laws, while their attacks do not comply with any law or industry standard.
A consequence of this current dominant discourse is that considerable academic,
corporate, and governmental efforts are made to improve the security of (po-
tential) victims of cyber crime who are under threat of attacks carried out by
cyber criminals (see, for example, [2][3]). In short, the current security discourse
evolves around law-abiding referent objects who are threatened in their security
by threat agents with bad intentions. So the referent object determines our sub-
sequent view on security including who we regard as threat agents [4, p.1163][5,
pp.7, 17].
There is, however, a so far less addressed side of this story. The group mem-
bers behind Carbanak continued to make victims in various corporate sectors
until at least late 2017 [6], while a first but important arrest of one of the main
coders was only made in April 2018 [7]. Yet the criminal profits remain missing
while other groups are successfully using modifications of the Carbanak mal-
ware [8]. How is it possible that such a sought after criminal organization was
active and its crimes went unpunished for such a long time? For one, criminal
investigations are facing heavy weather as too few crimes are currently solved.
The Dutch national police even speaks of an effectiveness crisis which affects the
legitimacy of the police [9][10][11]. It names the complexity of today’s society as
one of the underlying causes, most notably how information technologies create
new opportunities to commit crime [12, pp.15-20]. However, would it be possible
that information technologies not only promote the commission of crime, but
also the protection of crime? In other words, might the security of the bad guys
also be one of the causes of the effectiveness crisis in criminal investigations?
The answer to this largely rhetorical question is indeed: yes, cyber criminals
too can be very much referent objects of security, and this subsequently poses
a continuous challenge to legitimate law-enforcement efforts, now and in the
future [13, p.6]. Encryption usage for criminal purposes is, for example, central
in the ‘going dark’ debate that currently takes place in the United States (US).
Former Federal Bureau of Investigation director James B. Comey explained in
2014 how:
‘Those charged with protecting our people aren’t always able to
access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent terrorism
even with lawful authority. We have the legal authority to intercept
and access communications and information pursuant to court order,
but we often lack the technical ability to do so’ [14].
In other words, technologies of a protective nature like encryption are used by
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cyber criminals, rendering technical investigative powers as lawful intercept,
preservation and seizure of both data in motion and data at rest useless [15,
p.5][16]. As a result, these technologies cause problems for the core investiga-
tive process of attribution: determining, and subsequently linking responsibility
of a certain who to a particular what of attacks [17][18][19]. The problems related
to who refer to the protection of the suspect’s identity, and law-enforcement’s
efforts to determine who is behind an attack (also named the identity problem
[20]). The what problems refer to protective measures that hinder obtaining ev-
idence relevant to the suspect’s criminal activities and thus to determine what
kind of attack was carried out [20, p.206][21]. Legal scholar Ian Walden even
suggests that the focus in prosecutions will shift to corroborating evidence be-
cause cyber criminals will place primary evidence permanently beyond reach
of investigators [20, p.393]. If this prediction is true, security practices of cy-
ber criminals not only have far-reaching consequences to today’s investigations,
but to the criminal justice system and even society as a whole: ‘doing [attribu-
tion] poorly undermines a state’s credibility, its effectiveness, and ultimately its
liberty and its security’ [19, p.4].
What is needed, according to US officials, are backdoors in encryption tech-
nologies to provide law-enforcement agencies authorized access to evidence [22].
This standpoint has been criticized, most notably by the academic world and pri-
vate technology sector. Some bring forward the various encryption workarounds
for law-enforcement to reveal an unencrypted version of a target’s data that has
been concealed by encryption [23]. Others argue that the debate is largely tak-
ing place without reference to the full picture as ‘the “going dark” metaphor does
not fully describe the future of the government’s capacity to access the commu-
nications of suspected terrorists and criminals’ [24, pp.3, 15]. Law-enforcement
would have many substitutes to collect evidence in today’s Information Age
such as vast amounts of unencrypted metadata that were unavailable before
criminals used widespread information technologies. Therefore, academics have
suggested that this is in fact the golden age of surveillance [25]. The other side of
that ‘full picture of governments’ capabilities’ is, however, that cyber criminals
also have many substitutes beyond encryption at their disposal for evading legit-
imate efforts of law-enforcement to collect evidence and conduct attribution [26].
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The security practices of the Carbanak group
So what helped the Carbanak group to stay out of hands of law-enforcement for at least
five years? Command-and-control servers (C&Cs) were located in multiple jurisdictions
and only active for a short period of time, while secure deletion was applied to limit the
amount of information on these C&Cs. These servers were rented from a criminal hosting
provider (also known as bulletproof hoster), and credentials for the registration of these
servers proved to be fake. Moreover, the group was located in China, Europe and Russia
while making victims in Asia, Europe and North America. Indeed, formulating a joint
investigative response by all affected jurisdictions was near to impossible in times of rising
geopolitical tensions. Money mule handlers applied counter-observation techniques, while
rumor had it diplomats were allegedly deployed to transfer cash. Notably, one might suspect
that the cyber criminals also used encryption. Besides encrypted data in motion (read:
secure communications on a data link and network layer), the fact is that the full extent of
encryption usage by the group remained unknown to the cyber security community. The
security practices were so good that law-enforcement never came close to the application
layer of the other group members - read: seizure of their personal computers and the
hypothetical encounter of encrypted data at rest.
1.1 Research Direction & Objectives
The Carbanak case suggests that i) cyber criminals apply security controls,
ii) these controls deviate - at least, in the nature of their purpose - from law-
abiding entities, and iii) these controls are affecting the effectiveness of legitimate
responses. Yet a reversed security perspective, that we refer to in this study
as deviant security, is largely absent from the literature as a topic in itself in
several relevant disciplines. As visualized in Figure 1.1, deviant security has so
far not been researched in a systematic and structured manner, and therefore we
do not have a full picture of the protective practices of cyber criminals that are
thwarting the legitimate investigations of law-enforcement agencies. The focus
of the public debate is mostly on encryption usage for criminal purposes, but
other deviant controls and their interconnectedness are largely known unknowns
to both academics and legal practitioners.
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Figure 1.1: Besides defensive measures against attacks from bad guys, law-abiding enti-
ties might strike back by launching - amongst others - police investigations. In turn, cyber
criminals have to defend themselves as well. While there is academic, corporate, media and
political attention for attacks by cyber criminals and defences and attacks by law-abiding
entities (read: known knowns), the security practices of cyber criminals are largely known
unknowns.
Research direction Against this background, this study is organized around
the following central research direction:
What are deviant security practices of cyber criminals?
Objectives Although cyber criminals are referent objects of security as well,
current dominant security discourses do not explicitly name them as such: as
entities that are apparently under attack and, therefore, in need of protection.
As such, it remains the question what deviant security exactly entails, and when,
where, how, why and by whom, it is applied. Fabian et al. state that:
‘Unless we know what to secure, against whom, and to what
extent, it is obviously very hard to construct a secure system or to
make a substantial statement about its security’ [27, p.7].
This statement is also very true for deviant security. Many scholars have stressed
the importance of proving the need for expansion of investigative powers in the
field of cyber crime [28][29][30][31]. Unless we know what cyber criminals secure,
against whom, and to what extent, formulating effective offensive countermea-
sures is not only a challenge, but also comes at a cost. Ineffective responses -
such as governmental requests for system backdoors - absorb scarce resources
to identify few perpetrators, which subsequently decreases the security of all
(potential) victims [32, p.289]. As cryptographer Bruce Schneier puts it, ‘you
can’t build a [system] back door that only the good guys can walk through’ and
keeps the bad guys out [33]. For these reasons, the overall goal of this study is
to:
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– Present a new security paradigm, i.e., a first full picture on deviant security
to an academic and legal practitioner audience.
The specific objectives in support of this overall goal are to:
– Describe and explain the technical computer security practices of cyber
criminals; and
– Explore investigative responses against these protective practices.
1.2 Significance of Study
Because so little is still known about cyber crime and the public stakes are
so high - intrusive investigative powers might affect the liberty of law-abiding
citizens - scientifically collected data should prevail in the public debate above
anecdotes or selective data provided by, for example, commercial parties [20,
pp.124, 393]. Otherwise, we are indeed confusing the rhetoric with reality [34].
Deviant security practices have the ability to affect human rights when incident-
driven measures are launched in response, only to show that ‘something is being
done’, rather than evidence-based law and policy-making [13, pp.6, 9]. So any
academic model on deviant security (in this study abbreviated to DevSec) should
not only generate ideas for future, more in-depth research, but also connect to
the world of legal practitioners, i.e., those legitimate threat agents that have a
public mandate to attack the security of cyber criminals. Formulating compre-
hensive cyber security policies, evidence-based criminal procedure, and effective
police investigations that stop and/or disrupt cyber crime is therefore very much
the terminus for researching deviant security. An explicit framework capturing
the multiple dimensions of deviant security practices will help academics and le-
gal practitioners in liberal democracies governed by the rule of law to overcome
the current effectiveness crisis in investigations. Thus, the study intends to sit
between an academic and practitioner work. More specifically, the outcomes of
this study aid:
– Prosecutors and law-enforcement officers, including data analysts and sci-
entists, digital investigators and software developers, to conduct effective
investigations. This study provides insights how to determine and identify
suitable targets, how vulnerabilities of suspects can be exploited, and how
multiple investigative outcomes can be delivered that go beyond attribu-
tion.
– Legislators to write evidence-based criminal procedural and substantive
laws. More specifically, the findings help to understand which deviant se-
curity practices are criminalized in substantive law, and which practices
are recognized as such in explanatory reports of procedural law. Addition-
ally, the research extends our knowledge about the criminogenic aspects
of criminal law.
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– Policy makers to formulate comprehensive cyber security strategies that
take the multifaceted nature of deviant security into consideration. This
includes the geopolitical dimensions and key players in the cyber criminal
and cyber security communities, and related responses such as investments
in resources and fundamental rights and freedoms.
– Technical computer security researchers, social scientists and legal scholars
to understand the socio-technical-legal interplay between deviant security
practices and investigative responses.
1.3 Approach
This study researches the security practices of cyber criminals. The definition
of deviant security is (further explained in detail in Section 5.1):
all technical computer security controls of natural and legal per-
sons who are criminally liable for the commission of crime, in order
to protect the criminal and his/her crimes.
Their protective practices are described and understood from a technical, or
in other words, computer science perspective on security (known as technical
computer security [30]). Permission was given by relevant academic and gov-
ernment authorities to have access to confidential secondary data sources from
police investigations on predominantly financially-driven cyber crimes, while a
total of five years was spent within the cyber security community. Used data
sources relate to those who conduct deviant security as well as those who are
confronted by it, respectively participants from the cyber criminal and cyber
security community. Grounded Theory is subsequently used to generate high
abstract categories from the encountered technical computer security policies
and mechanisms, while microeconomics is applied to explain the encountered
practices. Grounded Theory and microeconomics are also used to explore out-
comes that will benefit public policy, criminal procedure and police investiga-
tions, and as such affect the protection of cyber criminals. This legal end point,
in combination with the study’s legal starting point - i.e., a problem witnessed
by law-enforcement agencies - shows the multidisciplinary nature of researching
deviant security. In other words, social science methods and techniques are used
to research the computer science understanding of security of those individuals
who trespassed substantive law.
1.4 Novel Contributions
The main contribution of this research project is to present, to the best of
our knowledge, the first structured, systematic and multidisciplinary study on
the deviant security practices of cyber criminals and investigative responses.
The final result is a model that has conceptual density, explanatory power and
durability over time, based on - amongst other things - unprecedented access to
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unique data sets. In addressing the objectives outlined above, this thesis further
makes the following novel contributions that include but are not limited to:
– Formal definitions for modus operandi and deviant security practices;
– The introduction and development of the economics of deviant security,
and the outline of other socio-technical(-legal) disciplines such as the an-
thropology, linguistics and psychology of deviant security, and empirical
legal scholarship on deviant security;
– Taxonomies for criminal assets, deception, distrust and phases of interna-
tional collaboration between law-enforcement agencies;
– New (deviant) security-related concepts like bulletproof connectivity providers,
double whammy effect of deviant security, intercultural communicative se-
curity, points of attack linkage and inherent (i.e., unavoidable) weaknesses;
– The application of existing technical computer security and microeconomic
concepts to the worlds of cyber criminals and legal practitioners to under-
stand the protection of crime and police investigations.
1.5 Outline of Study
The study has the following structure:
– Part I Literature Review:
◦ Chapter 2 - Current ‘Good Guy’ Perspectives on Security starts with
an overview of our current understanding on security in which law-
abiding entities are referent objects. Using an adapted security pro-
cess cycle of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Se-
curity Evaluation, this chapter shows how a computer science per-
spective on security (i.e., technical computer security) and a border-
centric and borderless socio-legal view on cyber security and cyber
crimes each have their own referent objects, threat agents, attacks,
vulnerabilities, risks, assets and countermeasures.
◦ Chapter 3 - Touching upon Security Controls of Cyber Criminals uses
the security process cycle again to review deviant security-related lit-
erature from computer science, more specifically anti-forensics, bot-
net protection, authorship analysis and attacker economics. A liter-
ature review on relevant social science studies provides input for a
new definition for modus operandi that emphasizes the need for the
criminal to protect him/herself and his/her crimes. A review on legal
scholarship concludes that police investigations breach deviant secu-
rity, criminal law is essentially disruptive, and investigative powers
should be seen as legitimate attacks by law-enforcement agencies.
– Part II Methodology:
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◦ Chapter 4 - A Multidisciplinary Approach for Deviant Security ex-
plains how and why the computer science understanding of technical
computer security concepts is central in this study, but enriched with
social science and legal scholarship. More specifically, the chapter
points out why the qualitative methodology of Grounded Theory is
used to describe, and microeconomics to explain, the deviant security
practices of predominantly profit-driven computer-focused criminals
in the Information Age. The chapter further elaborates on used sec-
ondary data sources from participants of the cyber criminal and cyber
security community, and associated limitations and ethical issues.
– Part III Research Findings:
◦ Chapter 5 - What? - Basic Qualities of Deviant Security; Chapter 6
- Who? - Interactive Qualities of Deviant Security; and Chapter 7
- When & Where? - Temporal-Spatial Qualities of Deviant Security,
present the first full picture of deviant security practices. Amongst
others, the basic normative and empirical qualities are described and
explained, more specifically definition, meaning, provision, function
and form of deviant security. The interactive qualities consist of a
description of referent objects, providers and threat agents of deviant
security, why these key players are nodes in intertwined networks and
face information asymmetries as a vulnerability, and how deception,
trust and distrust work as deviant security controls. The temporal-
spatial qualities of deviant security are categorized as countermea-
sures against data volatility and retention, intercultural communica-
tive security, distribution as a countermeasure, and physical deviant
security.
◦ Chapter 8 - Investigative Responses Against Deviant Security presents
investigative approaches against deviant security that legal practi-
tioners could explore. Based on the findings of the previous chapters
and additional empirical research, this chapter explains why inves-
tigations on profit-driven computer-focused crimes should become
security-driven, regard Internet as a global public good and provide
human security. Within that normative framework, investigations
should be developed following a public service model with multiple
outcomes, while technical harmonization between law-enforcement
agencies is needed to fix a broken global investigation system. Lastly,
this study indicates which profit-driven computer-focused crimes should
be targeted by law-enforcement agencies, and how to approach these
investigations.
– Part IV - Conclusions:
◦ Because most chapters have interim conclusions and discussions, Chap-
ter 9 - The Outlook of Deviant Security finalizes this study by reit-
erating the thesis objectives, filling in the security process cycle with
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cyber criminals as referent objects, and summarizing the research
findings as well as providing the reader some general directions for
future academic work.
A last remark is that italic characters are not only an invitation to focus the








In order to describe and explain the new security paradigm of deviant security,
we first have to understand what current academic and practitioners’ perspec-
tives are on security as an ongoing process. Literature reviews are subsequently
conducted on the computer science understanding of technical computer secu-
rity and the legal and social science understanding of cyber security and cyber
crimes. As such, this chapter fulfills three purposes for the overall study, namely
to i) point out that current studies evolve around law-abiding referent objects -
‘good guys’ - who are threatened in their security by law-breaking threat agents,
i.e., ‘bad guys’; ii) explain why the computer science understanding of technical
computer security is used to research the deviant security practices of cyber
criminals, and why the legal and social science understanding of cyber security
and cyber crimes is applied to explore appropriate responses against these prac-
tices; and iii) familiarize the reader with the security terminology and language
that is used throughout this study .
Good guys and bad guys?
The labels good guys and bad guys are a simplification of reality, but are used by this
study, other studies and the larger cyber security community to make an argument (see for
example [35, p.197][36, p.xxviii][37, p.226][13, p.6]). This study acknowledges that society
cannot simply be divided into good guys and bad guys, and that criminals are not the only
cause of crime. The nature and extent of the commission of crime depends on many factors,
and is not proportional to the number of good guys and bad guys [38, p.1]. As Section
2.3 explains, states and businesses may also be the bad guys, and become threat agents
to the security of law-abiding citizens [39]. The same reasoning about the commission of
crime can be extended to security of crime. Cyber criminals are not solely responsible
for the protection of crime. The security of cyber criminals also depends on various other
factors such as micro, meso and macro conditions. In fact, the way we view and react to
the bad guy cyber criminals may be rooted in cultural factors - such as popular media
representation of computer hackers - rather than scientific evidence [40].
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2.1 Security as an Ongoing Process
This chapter begins by explaining an important feature of this study: the dis-
tinction between the computer science understanding of technical computer se-
curity and the social science and legal understanding of cyber security and
cyber crimes. Despite their differences, the two views also have an overlap.
They both regard security as an ongoing process, a cycle that consists of six
security components derived from the general model of the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation - an internationally recognized
standard for technical computer security products [41, pp.40-43], and depicted
in Figure 2.1.
Distinguishing technical computer security from cyber security Se-
curity is a ‘promiscuous concept’, ‘slippery and contested term’, and ‘too big
an idea’ to be left alone to a single academic discipline [31, pp.3, 9-10]. Un-
derstanding security traditionally involves disciplines such as international rela-
tions, public international law and war studies, and further includes the social
sciences, especially related to crime control such as security studies and crimi-
nology [31, p.1-3][42, p.xi][43]. Due to dominant role of information technology
(IT) in present-day society [44][45][46], computer science (CS) has entered the
security arena as well with the discipline of technical computer security and its
influence on the social science and legal understanding of cyber security [30]. To
describe and understand these new security objects of technical computer secu-
rity and cyber security [47, p.3], scholars from both computer and social science
conduct security analyses that take a closer look at the practices of those who
‘do’ security [48, pp.21-47]. Security is - amongst others - a social practice and
continuing activity of those involved [31, p.21], which means that security is a so-
cial process of protecting us from them, i.e., the ‘threatening Other’ [49, p.4][50,
p.54]. It is not merely a technical phenomenon, but embedded in social context;
thus very much a social product as well [51, pp.320,338]. The non-discursive and
discursive practices of security actors such as security professionals, and their
interactions with criminals and crime, shed light on what security encompasses
[4, p.1165][52, pp.98-100]. The security terminology in computer science litera-
ture is often similar to the language of these social scientists [5, p.5]. When the
shared language between both disciplines is identified, a process cycle emerges
that consists of referent objects, threat agents, threats, vulnerabilities, risks,
valuables and countermeasures (see next paragraph). This socio-technical secu-
rity cycle is used in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 to determine what the specific meanings
of these components are in respectively technical computer security and cyber
security. Section 2.4 concludes that a security analysis on the deviant security
practices of cyber criminals should incorporate insights from both discourses.
The security process cycle Firstly, security analyses are written from the
perspective of a certain entity that is in need of security. While most computer
science literature implicitly assumes this recipient of security (Fabian refers to
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recipients of security as the security stakeholder [27, p.8]), security studies and
criminology explicitly refer to this entity as the referent object. Referent objects
are entities that are (existentially) threatened and have therefore a legitimate
claim for survival ([48, pp.36-37]). Subsequently, this us must be protected
from a certain them: the threat agent, a term mainly found in computer sci-
ence [53][27][54]. This threat agent gives rise to a threat (both disciplines, e.g.,
[43][41]). Intentional threats - the focus of this study, as compared to accidents,
failures and mistakes - that become real are called attacks (both disciplines
[55][34][36]. The attack may exploit a vulnerability (both disciplines, e.g., [27,
p.13][43, pp.53,269][56, p.408]). The possible exploitation of a vulnerability
leads to a risk (both disciplines, [43][27][57]) that valuables or assets will be
damaged (both disciplines, [58, p.20][59][54]). This causes an instance of being
exposed to losses, and therefore countermeasures, safeguards or controls have
to be installed to mitigate the potential risk and protect the assets (both dis-
ciplines, [27][4][34][41]). In turn, these countermeasures of the referent object
affect the threat agents as well which makes security very much a social process.
The interplay between entities (us versus them) and their offensive and defensive
activities affect the security of all key players involved [35, pp.234-236], whether
law-breaking or law-abiding/enforcing. Security is therefore understood in this
study as an ongoing, circular process as depicted in Figure 2.1. The next sec-
tions show that although the security terminology of the components is similar
in both disciplines, they indeed have very specific meanings [5, p.5], based on
which referent object is chosen. We therefore add referent object as a new com-
ponent to the general model of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, and put it at the centre of the security process cycle.
Figure 2.1: The relationship between various components of the security process cycle.
The cycle is based on the general model of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation [41, pp.40-43][59, p.27], and adapted by creating the new component of
referent object, adding the term attack to the existing component threat, and removing the
component exposure.
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2.2 Current Perspective on Technical Computer
Security
Considerable consensus exists in computer science literature on what techni-
cal computer security encompasses. These studies are written by academics
and computer experts who are concerned about malicious attacks on the con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability of computing systems and information of
law-abiding entities. The terminology of this perspective is very much the lan-
guage of those with advanced technical academic and/or skills background, such
as computer scientists, digital investigators, (information) security officers and
private security researchers, but also cyber criminals. As a consequence, techni-
cal computer security language is found in - amongst others - academic papers,
court documents, cyber threat analyses and indeed, postings on cyber criminal
fora. This perspective devotes less attention to understand the behavior of those
who try to breach technical computer security, and place their actions within
criminal law.
Referent objects, threat agents, attacks & vulnerabilities The com-
puter science literature addresses technical computer security [30, p.63], i.e,.
the sum of security areas such as communications [36][53], computer [60][36],
information [61][53], Internet [62], and network security [63][64]. The common
denominator in these different but related fields (and what distinguishes secu-
rity in computer science from other disciplines such as social sciences) is the
centrality of technology [62, p.2]. The referent objects of security in computer
science literature are personal, business or government users of commercial, mil-
itary or public computing systems [27, p.11][5, pp.7-8][65, p.4][36, pp.4-8]. The
threat agents of these computer users are those who - intentionally or uninten-
tionally - breach technical computer security. The literature generally does not
use criminological typologies or legal categories, nor comprehensively elaborate
on offender characteristics, but commonly refer to them as ‘computer crimi-
nals’. Those include ‘amateurs’, ‘career criminals’, ‘crackers/malicious hackers’
and ‘terrorists’ [53][54]; and ‘agents of hostile governments or organisations’,
‘corrupt insiders’ and ‘vandals’ [66, p.7]. Their threats and attacks - also known
as attack vectors or exploits - are labeled on a high level of abstraction in tech-
nical terms of ‘interception, interruption, modification, and fabrication’ [54][67,
p.378], and in terms with a more legal connotation such as ‘espionage’ (e.g., il-
legal access and interception), ‘theft’ (computer-related forgery and fraud), and
‘sabotage and vandalism’ (data and system interference) [53, p.44]. On a lower
level of abstraction, attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the security of computing
systems of the referent object [65, p.6][54], and are labelled with technical clas-
sifications such as malicious software (also known as malware such as Trojan
horses, viruses and worms), hoaxes, back doors, password cracks, spoofing or
social engineering [64, pp.65-74]. Vulnerabilities consist of software, hardware,
procedural, and - to a lesser extent - human weaknesses to enter the referent ob-
ject’s computing system and have unauthorized (thus unlawful) access to assets
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and/or make assets unavailable [68, p.54].
Risks, assets & countermeasures The probability that the system will
not be able to enforce its security policy and for harm to occur is called risk
[54][65, p.6]. Referent objects generally perform quantifiable risk assessments to
determine the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of a vulnerability
and the corresponding business impact [68, pp.54, 85-89]. The business impact
is objective and measurable, and expressed in financial losses [69]. For example,
there might be reputation damage after a security breach in a company which is
shown by a drop on the stock exchange. The exploitation of vulnerabilities may
damage the confidentiality, integrity and availability of assets of the security
recipient (also called the CIA triad : a fundamental concept within technical
computer security [64, p.16][66, p.2]). Valuables of any computer system are its
hardware, software, data [54][67, p.378] and users [53, p.9]. For instance, miscon-
figured web applications might not validate user input before using it to query
a relational database in web sites. A successful structured language language
(SQL) injection puts actual database commands into the input fields to have
unauthorized access to data which may result in the loss (availability), public
leak (confidentiality) or alteration (integrity) of valuables such as user IDs and
passwords [59, p.1163][53, p.79]. To prevent such an exposure from happening,
referent objects put countermeasures in place to control any potential vulnera-
bility and protect assets. The proposed controls consist of security policies and
security mechanisms. The policies are a description of security requirements,
and prescribe which actions are allowed by which entities in a system. This secu-
rity strategy is subsequently enforced by mostly technical security mechanisms
such as access controls and encryption, but may also consist of administrative
and physical security controls [36, p.11][67, p.379]. Security tradeoffs are made
between the costs of applying security countermeasures and the benefits realized
from the operation of secured, available systems [53, p.119], and are expressed in
positive economic statements about what occurred or will occur (as compared to
normative economic statements which involves value judgements [70, pp.7-8]).
The controls may further be subjected to industry standards [57, pp.34-35], and
increasingly civil and even criminal liability as well (because of due diligence
and due care, respectively the assurance that the responsible legal and natural
persons did everything to understand threats, and the assurance that he/she
took all necessary countermeasures to prevent or respond to these threats [36,
pp.375, 388][59, pp.1022-1023]). The key actors of these policies and mecha-
nisms are predominantly computer experts, such as system administrators, and
the private security industry like antivirus vendors [5, p.7].
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2.3 Current Perspectives on Cyber Security &
Cyber Crimes
Cyber security and cyber crimes are terms articulated in a range of legal, policy
and other texts of academics, businesses, governments and media. The docu-
ments are, compared to computer science literature, more ambiguous when it
comes to filling in the various components of the security analysis. The first
section explains why not only literature about cyber security is reviewed, but
also literature about cyber crimes that do not affect cyber security, such as
the distribution of child sexual abuse material ( CSAM - also known by the
legal term of child pornography, see article 9 of the Budapest Convention of
the Council of Europe). The security analysis of the second section shows that
the current border-centric view on cyber security/cyber crime discourse is more
extensive in scope and involves more actors than the technical computer secu-
rity discourse. Law seems more dominant in the cyber security/cyber crime
discourse in which substantive law defines threat agents, threats and attacks,
and procedural law governs countermeasures by law-enforcement agencies. The
last section describes an alternative borderless view on cyber security and cyber
crime derived from political science and security studies in which the threat
agents are not cyber criminals, but states and the private sector to the security
of citizens (which underlines that the distinction between ‘bad’ cyber criminals,
and ‘good’ states, businesses and citizens, is indeed oversimplified).
2.3.1 Why Cyber Crime is (not) Cyber Security
Social sciences - most notably criminology and security studies - have been
relatively slow in studying the reasoning of the cyber security debate. A coherent
body of literature on cyber security seems therefore absent in social sciences [5,
pp.2-3]. There is little agreement among academics and policy makers what
cyber security exactly entails, and there is little on what cyber security does
not cover [71, pp.587, 591, 593]. Cyber security generally includes the protection
of the totality of national critical infrastructures (NCI): those assets and systems
necessary to preserve national security [58][5, pp.7-8][72, p.54]. As such, cyber
security links the above mentioned technical computer security to traditional
notions of national interests [30, pp.63-64]. Yet cyber security has a wider scope
and different key actors than the computer scientific perspective on security such
as the use of the military, intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies -
i.e., mandated breachers of deviant security - as countermeasures [55, p.156],
see Figure 2.2. The focus in this section is on i) the cyber criminal attacks
that affect the national critical infrastructure (i.e., risks to cyber space), and
ii) crimes that involve the use of computer technology but are not part of the
cyber security discourse because they are not directly related to the protection
of national critical infrastructure. The associated attacks within this discourse
include crimes that pose a risk through cyber space, such as but not limited to
the distribution of child sexual abusive material [73, p.660][58].
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Figure 2.2: The Venn-diagram shows the differences and overlap between the cyber security
and cyber crime discourses in the social science literature. The focus of this study is highlighted
in green. The terms computer-assisted and computer-focused crimes are explained in the next
section.
The distinction between the cyber security and cyber crime discourses is,
however, blurred. According to Dunn Cavelty, the two discourses are no longer
separate, but have become one and the same:
‘With the growth and spreading of computer networks into more
and more aspects of life, the object of protection changed. Whereas
it had previously consisted of limited government networks, it now
compassed the whole of society’ [55, p.159].
For example, it is argued that cyber security conceptualizations of the European
Union (EU) are painted in ‘any colour they like’, including child sexual abusive
material and piracy [74], see Figure 2.3. For this reason, and because the com-
ponents of a security analysis may also apply on cyber crimes that do not affect
critical information infrastructure (such as the production and distribution of
child sexual abusive material), the cyber crime discourse is added to the security
analyses of the next paragraphs.
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Figure 2.3: The Venn-diagram shows the incorporation of cyber crimes into the cyber
security discourse. In this conceptualization, all cyber crimes, including the possession of
CSAM and intellectual property violations, are considered cyber security issues.
2.3.2 Border-Centric View on Cyber Security & Cyber
Crimes
Social science scholars (especially criminologists and sociologists) and legal schol-
ars have analyzed the criminal practices of cyber criminals, and the responses
of legislators, policy makers and the private sector. They take what this study
calls a border-centric view on cyber security and cyber crimes as all entities
within a certain jurisdiction are regarded as referent objects of security.
Referent objects, threat agents & attacks As mentioned above, the dis-
tinction between the cyber security and cyber crime discourses is blurred. Be-
cause technological infrastructures provide the way of life that characterizes
today’s societies, and because the well-being of individual and corporate ac-
tors is often regarded as equal in importance to the well-being of the state
[75, pp.10-11][5, p.7], referent objects - labeled as (potential) victims of cyber
attacks [29] - are not restricted to computer users, but include collective, macro-
level entities within society that relate to national interests [30, p.69], namely
the state, corporate sector and general public. Classifications on threats and at-
tacks by threat agents in both discourses evolves around the role that technology
plays in the commission of crime, namely object, instrument and environment
of crime [76, p.738]. In the cyber security discourse, threats and attacks fall in
three socio-technical categories, namely i) the use of networked computers as
a medium or staging ground for antisocial, disruptive, or dangerous organiza-
tions and communications, ii) threats/attacks against critical societal infrastruc-
tures, and iii) threats/attacks against the networked information system itself
[30, p.64]. These attacks are executed by a range of malicious threat agents
such as hacktivists, hostile states, disgruntled employees, professional criminals,
terrorists, and thrill seekers [77]. The cyber crime discourse follows a more
clear criminological classification, and distinguishes computer-oriented/focused
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criminals and offenses such as unauthorized hacking from computer-assisted
criminals and offenses such as the production, distribution and possession of
child sexual abusive material [78, pp.3-4][28, pp.10-11][79, pp.3-5][29, pp.527-
538] (for more criminological classifications, see [80][81, pp.7-8] and the text
box below). The Convention of Budapest of the Council of Europe (also known
as the Cybercrime Convention) is considered the main international legal in-
strument in fighting cyber crime [57][82, p.215], and categorizes cyber crimes as
offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems; computer-related offenses (fraud and forgery); and content-related
offenses of unlawful production or distribution of child sexual abusive material
by use of computer systems (see also [34, pp.49-50][83, p.52]).
Computer-focused, assisted and enabled crimes
This study distinguishes three types of cyber crime. The first are computer-focused crimes
(also known as computer-oriented crimes [84]). These malicious acts could not exist without
information technologies, and are, as such, ‘new crimes, new tools’ like malware, botnets
and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Computer-assisted crimes are those acts
that could occur in the physical world but can also be replaced by means of IT. Examples
are child sexual abusive material, forgery, harassment and identity fraud. In the past,
child abusive material was on print, but nowadays predominantly resides as data files on
computer systems. Lastly, computer-enabled crimes are analogue acts that can only exist
physically, yet parts of the modus operandi of these traditional crimes are supported by IT.
While illegal substances and fire arms are offered for sale on online cryptomarkets - also
called Dark Markets - and paid for by cryptocurrencies, the drugs themselves cannot be
virtually consumed, nor can machine guns be shipped and used in a digital manner.
Vulnerabilities, risks & assets Similar to technical computer security,
these cyber threats exploit vulnerabilities of the referent objects. Besides tech-
nical weaknesses, considerable attention is also paid to human weaknesses. Pro-
ducers of child sexual abusive material may target toddlers and babies whom
are vulnerable because they are defenseless against the abuse, and unable to
disclose the abuse [85, p.76]. Groomers may exploit technical vulnerabilities to
install remote access tools to spy on their victims. The sum of both technical
and human weaknesses may lead to the conclusion that certain groups of referent
objects are vulnerable, hence labels as vulnerable children [86, p.96] or vulner-
able citizens [57, p.55]. The possible exploitation of a vulnerability leads to a
risk that valuables of referent objects are harmed. Because the cyber security
community has since long acknowledged that absolute security is impossible [55,
p.161], public and private parties conduct risk assessments. These assessments
help to determine the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of a vulner-
ability by calculating factors such as the propagation and longevity of each type
of attack and the corresponding impact [57, p.13]. The impact goes beyond the
scope of the technical cyber security perspective in which only business impact
expressed in financial losses is incorporated. It may include losses that are not
easily quantified such as emotional harm [87][57, p.48], and subjective issues
such as perceived security feelings of (potential) victims [88][31, pp.16-19]. So
risk in the cyber security and cyber crime discourses encompasses objective and
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subjective damages, expressed both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Compared to the computer science literature, valuables in the cyber security
and cyber crime discourses are more broadly defined and normatively enriched
[62, p.2]. They basically include everything that effects society’s survival and
well-being at large. In cyber security, scholars include ‘cyberspace and critical
infrastructure’ [58, p.20], ‘national economies’ [17, p.659], ‘the stability and
order of a society necessary to survive’ [73, p.668], and ‘public interest and
order, property or the person’ [89]. In the cyber crime discourse, valuables that
are affected by cyber crimes also include the emotional, physical and mental
well-being of individuals [87]. For example, the rationale behind criminalizing
child abusive material is the protection of the child, because the production and
distribution of the material harms the well-being of the child, even after the
physical abuse has stopped [85, pp.49-50].
Countermeasures There seems little consensus what countermeasures ex-
actly encompasses, and what the roles and responsibilities are of those who
should provide these safeguards. It is, however, apparent that proposed and
implemented controls in the cyber security and cyber crime discourses have
a wider scope and involve other actors than in the technical computer secu-
rity discourse. Because liberal democratic states have limited control over the
Internet infrastructure [90][34, pp.210-211], responsibilities for security are dis-
tributed [31, pp.49-66][91], especially to the corporate sector [55, pp.160-161][58,
p.18][92][73]. Simultaneously, the cyber security and cyber crime discourses still
place great control in the hands of centralized public authorities, and rely more
on strategies that involve scrutiny, individual accountability, transparency and
identifiability [30, pp.71-72]. Because security is about survival and well-being,
the use of extraordinary measures and the legitimized use of force by states are
justified to control threats [48, p.21]. Where technical computer security controls
are less concerned with identifying and stopping attackers before they act, and
more focused on strengthening protections for potential targets, much attention
is paid in the cyber security and cyber crime discourses in determining the iden-
tity and intent of the malicious actor. Criminal law is used for that purpose and
as a countermeasure as law defines misdemeanor and enables arrest and pros-
ecution [55, p.160][5, p.10][71, p.588][93, pp.727-728]. Thus, countermeasures
against cyber threats from both discourses may be divided in a broad range of
preventative measures (safeguards before an offense has happened, such as in-
creasing awareness through education and surveillance) and reactive measures
(controls after the offense occurred, such as police investigation and prosecu-
tion) by states, businesses and individuals [29, pp.542-543][34, pp.186-192][93,
pp.725-729]. Security tradeoffs are both positive and normative. An example of
the former are policy decisions about focusing police investigations on either the
bulk of easily identifiable viewers of CSAM, or the small group of producers of
abusive material which is considerably harder to identify [85, p.168]. Normative
tradeoffs are made when countermeasures (such as investigations) affect legal
rights and related concepts of suspects and the general public, such as privacy
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versus security [94][95].
2.3.3 Borderless View on Cyber Security & Cyber Crimes
A border-centric view on cyber security and cyber crimes implies there is also a
borderless view with other referent objects of security. Scholars from criminology
and security studies - especially Dunn Cavelty, Hansen and Nissenbaum from the
Copenhagen School, and Loader, Walker and Zedner from the Oxford School,
see [96] - have also analyzed the practices of legislators, policy makers and the
private sector related to respectively security and information technology, and
cyber security and cyber crimes (for an overview of other schools and their
approaches to security, see [43, pp.35-38]). From their view, citizens should be
referent objects of security, regardless of location and/or nationality.
Referent objects, threat agents, threats and attacks These scholars
with a borderless view on cyber security and cyber crime conclude that there
is too much emphasis on states and businesses as referent objects of security at
the expense of citizens within and outside national borders. This emphasis can
cause the general public to feel threatened rather than protected by the state
and/or the private sector. Instead, the general public ought to be the basic
referent objects of security [97][98, pp.17-18], as governments and the private
security industry may become threat agents of the general public, especially as
governments are clients and pilot laboratories for much of the security industry
[99, pp.46-47]. Threats - the potential dangers that these threat agents pose to
the security of citizens - are the process of securitization and the commodifi-
cation of security. Securitization is the (undemocratically) political process in
which events, issues and/or groups are framed as potential security problems to
enforce extraordinary powers [48, pp.23-26][100], much what happens, accord-
ing to some researchers, in the going dark debate on encryption usage [101].
The launch of extraordinary powers includes, for example, indiscriminate mass
surveillance in which all citizens are seen as potential suspects [102, pp.458-464].
The threat of commodification of security means that security becomes a private
good, thus a tradable commodity for a happy few [103][104]. In short, both secu-
ritization and commodification make security an exclusive private good, rather
than an inclusive public good.
Vulnerabilities, risks, valuables and controls The threat agents exploit
human vulnerabilities such as the citizens’ fear of crime and terrorism [98, p.2],
or the inability of citizens to exercise democratic control over the threat agents
[105]. These threats lead to a risk that citizens’ valuables are damaged. Scholars
criticize the perception of risk as defined by the border-centric view on cyber
security and cyber crimes [75, p.144]. Absolute security is unattainable and the
limitless pursuit for security only benefits the private security industry, while
legislating for uncertainty leads to indiscriminate mass surveillance and the ex-
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tension of criminal liability [31, pp.126-134, 145, 151-155]. Objective security
assessments - whether a threat is real - are beyond means of analysis. Rather, se-
curitization is intersubjective and socially constructed [48, pp.29-35]. Valuables
of citizens are public access to security [106, p.162], fundamental/human rights
[107, pp.55-56], democratic principles [98, p.2], and/or civil liberties [31, p.2].
To prevent harm to these valuables, scholars suggest controls such as desecuri-
tization (i.e., finding ways to politicize issues in non-security ways [48, p.29][4]),
and civilized security (i.e., security as a ‘thick’ public global good provided by
states that, according to Loader, must themselves be civilized - made safe by
and for inclusive democracy - to release the civilizing potential of security [98,
pp.4-8]). Some scholars are even ‘against security’ at all [108]. These controls
are not put forward as mutually exclusive tradeoffs. On the contrary, security is
reinforced by normative conceptions of, for example, privacy and liberty. Thus,
more privacy for citizens will the increase their security against the threats of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4 Interim Conclusion and Discussion
Although current security analyses on technical computer security and cyber
security/crimes have different referent objects, threat agents, threats, vulner-
abilities, risks, valuables and countermeasures, both are written from the per-
spective of good guy referent objects who are threatened by attacks from bad
guy threat agents. As summarized in Table 2.1, the good guys protect their
valuables against malicious acts of these threat agents. The law-abiding entities
are portrayed as (potential) victims who are predominantly on the defensive
side, while the bad guys are portrayed as malicious attackers who are only on
the offensive side. The assets of these referent objects - states, businesses and
citizens - are legitimate, and preventative and reactive safeguards comply with
industry standards or public law. The bad guy cyber criminals follow the op-
posite direction. They are defined as threat agents because of their intentional
trespassing of substantive laws, and their attacks do not comply with any public
law or industry standard.
One of the countermeasures within the cyber security and cyber crime dis-
courses are investigations by law-enforcement agencies. Their legal actions focus
on identifying cyber criminals and gathering evidence about criminal activities.
This means that cyber criminals are in need of security as well to avoid arrest
and prosecution. So besides private, public and state security, there is also de-
viant security, namely: the security controls of criminals. Nonetheless, current
security analyses do not take cyber criminals as referent objects of security. No
academic studies from both discourses are found that explicitly ask what their
threat agents, threats, vulnerabilities, risks, valuables and countermeasures are.
In other words, there is a research opportunity to apply a reversed security per-
spective which combines components of both technical computer security and
cyber security/cyber crime discourses.
In this reversed security perspective as depicted in Figure 2.4, the referent
objects are the threat agents of the cyber security/cyber crime discourse, more
specifically computer-focused criminals - e.g., criminal hackers who exploit vul-
nerabilities in the security of law-abiding entities - as well as computer-assisted
criminals like viewers and possessors of CSAM who usually do not have to breach
any security system to commit their crimes. Such a perspective further takes a
look at the cyber criminals’ technical computer security policies and mechanisms
that protect computing systems, software, data and their malafide users. The
focus on finding and understanding both technical and human vulnerabilities is
derived from both discourses. The same goes for identifying objective and sub-
jective risks and related cost-benefit analyses such as deviant security tradeoffs.
This deviant risk analysis should initially be expressed in a qualitative matter
as a full picture on deviant security is currently absent. Therefore, qualitative
research first has to identify, construct and categorize protective practices of
cyber criminals, before more quantitative approaches can be conducted. These
insights will benefit the cyber criminals’ threat agents and attacks as defined by
the cyber security/cyber crime discourses, namely: law-enforcement practition-
ers and their investigations that serve the general public and operate within the
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legal boundaries of democratic states governed by the rule of law.
Figure 2.4: The components Computer-assisted & computer-focused criminals, Law-
enforcement agencies and Cyber crime investigations are derived from the cyber secu-
rity/cyber crime discourses. The components Systems, software, data & their users and
Security policies & mechanisms are derived from the technical computer security discourse.
The two components about weaknesses and risks are derived from both technical computer




Controls of Cyber Criminals
Although deviant security is not a well-identified domain in the academic liter-
ature, scholars and industry experts have discussed different aspects of security
controls of cyber criminals. The empirical foundations for the tenets of this
study are therefore already largely in place. This chapter uses the security pro-
cess cycle to structure existing security research literature in computer science
and engineering that touch upon the controls of cyber criminals. Deviant se-
curity perspectives are sometimes adopted in the literature, yet some potential
areas of research are left unexplored and/or would benefit from an explicitly
deviant security approach. The chapter then considers research in social sci-
ence and legal scholarship respectively, particularly those studies that focus
on understanding how the security of cyber criminals affects legitimate polic-
ing activity. This review is indeed not exhaustive and only discusses literature
that relates to social processes of deviant security practices (compared to more
psychological approaches that focus on cyber criminals’ individual experiences
about security). However, besides other purposes of literature reviews like iden-
tifying knowledge gaps [109, p.55], the goal of this chapter is especially to i)
point out that cyber criminals probably have many more threat agents, threats,
vulnerabilities, risks, valuables and countermeasures than the reviewed litera-
ture considers; ii) fine-tune the methodological direction of this study (Chapter
4); and iii) identify content area, themes and foci for the normative and em-
pirical research part of this study (Part III). In short, these findings indicate
that deviant security and appropriate investigative responses are challenging
but promising fields of study, that will benefit from a more multidisciplinary
approach to develop a comprehensive understanding of what deviant security
exactly entails, and when, where, how, why and by whom, it is applied.
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Extensive research on the security of traditional criminals is absent as well
There are very few studies that explicitly take cyber criminals as referent objects of security.
Notable studies are, for example, Van Hardeveld et al. who explored the predominantly
technical tools of anonymity used by carders - e.g., cryptocurrency mixers, remote desktop
protocol, Tor and VPNs - and in a second study types of operational security by cyber
criminals in general, and used as data sources respectively carder tutorials and expert in-
terviews [110][111]. Sundaresan et al. researched the network behavior of cyber criminal
forum members, exploited several technical vulnerabilities and provided their likely loca-
tions, work habits and other dynamics [112]. Yet these studies are either of a respectively
very explorative or specific (i.e., technical) nature. Studies about the security of traditional
criminals do not offer a helping hand either. There are academic papers within social sci-
ence that directly refer to the security of traditional (i.e., offline) covert organizations, such
as terrorist (e.g., Al-Qaeda) and criminal networks (e.g., Italian mafia). These scholars
highlight security related issues such as secrecy and trust, and apply social network anal-
ysis and game theory to describe, explain and predict the security tradeoffs that terrorists
and traditional criminals face, especially the tradeoff between efficiency and security (for
example [113][114][115][116][117][118][119][120][121]). Protective controls are recognized by
these scholars as being vital to criminals and terrorists to evade counter-attacks by fellow
criminals and/or avoid detection and arrest by law-enforcement agencies. Yet deviant secu-
rity itself is not an object of study. Security of traditional criminals seems to be a given in
these papers; as something that is understood to be really obvious which does not require
any further explanation.
3.1 Computer Science & Engineering Literature
This section presents four representative examples of technical research that
discuss aspects of deviant usage of security by cyber criminals: i) anti-forensics,
ii) botnet protection, iii) authorship analysis and iv) attacker economics. Many
of the reviewed studies on the first three themes are exploratory or descriptive
in nature. They shed light on how cyber criminals apply - i.e., practice - deviant
security. These reviews present what each theme is about, how the literature
fills in the various components of the security cycle, what the methodological
strengths and weaknesses are in some approaches, and implications for this
study. Because these themes are not explanatory in nature, a fourth theme
is added to this review. Research on attacker economics implies a new sub-
discipline - the economics of deviant security - which adds explanatory power
to this study as to why cyber criminals make certain deviant security-related
decisions.
3.1.1 Anti-Forensics
Studies on anti-forensics are limited compared to the total body of research on
digital forensic research [122]. In this section, papers have been reviewed that
are labelled as anti-forensics or use anti-forensics in their list of key words or
text. Confusingly, in much of the literature the referent object is ambiguous: it
is either a private investigator who are confronted with anti-forensics (AF), or an
undefined security recipient who is threatened by digital forensics and therefore
in need of anti-forensics (see Figure 3.1). As a result, many components of the
security cycle are unclear or even unknown.
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What is research on anti-forensics about? In the past, digital foren-
sics was relatively easy and even named the ‘Golden Age of Digital Forensics’
because of - amongst others - little encryption and storage, and few file for-
mats and operating systems [123, p.66]. Digital forensics have become much
harder due to technologies that deny investigators to access case data. The
long and rather broad list of techniques and tools that thwart investigators,
forensic tools and investigations are collectively called anti-forensics or counter-
forensics [124][125][126][127][128][129][130][131][132]. These anti-forensics at-
tempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability - thus use-
fulness - of evidence in the forensics process [133, p.45][134, pp. 67-69]. In
this sense, most of these studies are multidisciplinary in nature as they link
computer scientific challenges to the legal world in which digital forensic re-
searchers and investigators operate. Proposed taxonomies include categories
as data hiding (e.g., encryption, steganography), artefact wiping (disk-, log-,
and metadata wiping), trail obfuscation (data fabrication, IP-spoofing), analy-
sis prevention (anti-reverse engineering, program packers), and techniques that
complicate and/or delay digital forensics (data pooling, dummy hard disk drives)
[135][134][132].
Security cycle on anti-forensics How should these counter-forensics be un-
derstood in terms of security? Let us take child sexual abuse material as an
example as there are many papers that analyze anti-forensic techniques which
target visual information (such as [136][137][138]). Using the security language
from Section 2.1, we would expect that literature about anti-forensics sees police
investigators as threat agents whom attack the computing systems of computer-
assisted CSAM users with digital forensic tools. To avoid an instance of being
exposed to losses on their computing system, such as a valuable CSAM collec-
tion, anti-forensics are deployed to mitigate the potential risk that the abuse
images are destroyed or become incriminating evidence against the CSAM user
(see court cases like [139]). That is, however, not the scope of much of the
literature on anti-forensics.
Not criminal-centric... The current perspective in anti-forensics is not criminal-
centric (thus taking cyber criminals as referent objects) but digital forensic-
centric in the sense that digital forensic tools tend to be point of focus. However,
approaching anti-forensics from the viewpoint of the cyber criminal reveals sev-
eral gaps in our knowledge about anti-forensics. Counter-forensics are indeed in
themselves neutral security mechanisms, used by individuals and organizations
with either good or bad intentions [125][140, p.137]. Although scholars have
stressed that AF like secure-deletion must be evaluated with respect to the
adversary [141], most studies - with exceptions like [142] - do not place counter-
forensics within a larger deviant security context. They give little information
about the:
– deviant security policies on which these mechanisms are based;
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– malicious referent objects who deploy anti-forensics (computer-assisted
criminals, computer-focused criminals, or also traditional criminals?);
– threat agents that attack anti-forensics (only bonafide investigators or also
other criminals?);
– vulnerabilities that these counter-forensics have to control, and the assets
they have to protect.
These papers thus imply that the situations in which anti-forensics are deployed
do not differ between cyber criminals and law-abiding entities. Timestamp
modification, however, is solely focused on affecting the integrity of data to
prevent information from becoming evidence in court, and/or even provide ex
culpa evidence. It is not an effective technique for legitimate enterprises to
defend themselves against criminal attackers without damaging their own daily
business proceedings.
...and not police investigator-centric Anti-forensics do not rely on a sin-
gle countermeasure, but on a large collection of constantly evolving techniques
to defeat computer forensics [124, p.21]. However, studies about anti-forensics
generally do not describe the coherence between various counter-forensics, nor
the interplay with the deviant security mechanisms that are thwarting the in-
vestigative steps prior to, and after, the deployment of digital forensic tools (see
[143] for an overview of the different phases of the digital investigative process).
For example, a CSAM offender used the anonymous communication network
Tor (also known as The Onion Router), regularly changed nicknames, and in-
stalled a virtual machine (VM) on his laptop for the sole purpose of storing
encrypted abusive content, but completely deleted the VM, wiped his hard disk
and cleaned his house after a co-conspirer was arrested by law-enforcement [144].
This example illustrates that threat agents of cyber criminals encounter more
deviant controls than just attacks on their tools during their investigations.
However, these issues are not addressed since mandated breachers of deviant
security are not the audience of most anti-forensics studies. So, although it has
been suggested that anti-forensics are an indicator of malicious intent (i.e., a
prime goal for police investigators to establish) [145], the reviewed papers are
also not police investigator-centric (thus taking police investigators as referent
objects) [146]. The focus is very much on AF that private investigators discover,
namely anti-forensics against data at rest encountered in an offline environment
or private network which is subsequently examined in digital forensic labora-
tories [20, p.207]. Studies that provide empirical evidence for anti-forensics
against data in motion and in Internet environments and related vulnerabilities
and exploits - such as preservation or interception of data which is the exclusive
terrain of public law-enforcement agencies - are scarce, with notable exceptions
like [147].
Little attention for vulnerabilities in anti-forensics Moreover, the dig-
ital forensic-centric approach holds in essence a negative perspective. Anti-
30
forensics indeed exploit vulnerabilities in the security of the digital forensic
process. This viewpoint, however, puts investigators and forensic examinators
always on the defense. It ignores that security controls, including anti-forensics,
have vulnerabilities as well. This negative perspective in the literature might be
the reason that exploits in AF - known as anti-anti-forensics [148], and counter
anti-forensics [142] - are sparsely explored [145].
Figure 3.1: The referent object in AF literature is ambiguous. Irrespective whether referent
object A. or B. is adopted, many components of the security cycle remain unclear.
3.1.2 Botnet Protection
Compared to literature on anti-forensics, studies about botnet protection are
able to fill in most components of the security cycle. Yet these studies have
a narrow focus, and therefore miss out on alternative threat agents of, and
attacks on, botnets and subsequent deviant countermeasures by botnet herders
(see Figure 3.2).
What is research on botnet protection about? Another field of study
that discusses aspects of deviant security, but which is written from a more
criminal-centric perspective, is applied research about botnet detection and
monitoring. Botnets consist of infected computers under control of a botnet
herder, and are named as the preferred tool for cyber criminals, because of -
amongst others - their ‘nearly impenetrable shield of anonymity for [the botnet
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herders] themselves’ [149]. Scholars have addressed various protective measures
of botnets that hinder detection, sometimes even exploiting vulnerabilities in
botnets [150], and formulated countermeasures against botnet infrastructures.
These papers mention ‘defensive skills’ of botnets (e.g., command authentica-
tion, encryption and obfuscation) [151][152][153][154][155]; ‘botnet enhancing
techniques’ such as ‘resiliency’ and ‘stealth’ [156][157]; ‘anti-recon[naissance]
techniques’ namely deterrence, passive attacks (i.e., black-listing), active disin-
formation and retaliation attacks [158]; and vulnerabilities in botnet infrastructures
while referring to technical computer security concepts such as the CIA triad
[159][160][153][155]. In general, these studies combine the formulation of high
abstraction deviant security policies categories with empirical evidence that
these policies are implemented by countermeasures.
Security cycle on botnet protection These botnet studies have a well-
defined referent object in mind: the botnet operator (also called the bot herder).
The following line of reasoning is found in most botnet studies. The tools to
commit cyber crime are assets to the herder. In this case, the malicious software
and botnet architecture including infected systems and command-and-control
(C&C) servers represents a financial value. The operator either invested time
and efforts to develop the botnet him/herself or bought components on the cyber
crime-as-a-service economy like infected hosts. To protect the availability of the
botnet against takedown by threat agents, the botnet operator opts for security
policies based on e.g., resiliency and business recovery which are - amongst
others - enforced by hosting not one, but several C&C servers. Because referent
objects are clearly defined, the focus and scope of botnet studies is more security-
oriented than AF studies. Still, the way that botnet studies fill in components
of the security cycle reveals several research gaps that are discussed in the next
two paragraphs.
Beyond botnet disruption Because these studies have a strong focus on
botnet activity (as compared to the individual, i.e., the botnet operator), many
papers focus on disruptive interventions. The threat agents that have to execute
these attacks - i.e, botnet infiltration, sinkholing or infection notifications [161]
- are cross-sectoral public-private consortia [162], to the extent that universities
participate in takedowns [158]. Some multidisciplinary studies also take legal
practitioners as their the audience, and explain how proposed attacks against
botnets translate to investigative powers. Despite the crucial role of the private
sector in botnet takedowns [163], only law-enforcement agencies (LEA) have
the legal mandate to exploit the vulnerabilities of botnets and ability to over-
come cross-jurisdictional challenges. Moreover, few studies consider offensive
exploitation of C&C vulnerabilities [155], while attribution of the botnet herder
- another exclusive domain of LEA - is often not considered at all. Ultimately,
botnet activities will only stop when the operator is identified, arrested and
successfully prosecuted. As the first botnet takedown analyses - very much out-
come evaluations - show that takedowns are not always effective [164][165][166],
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process evaluations - how takedowns were executed - are still absent. Simi-
larly, there is little attention for infected machines of victims - known as bots
- which are an important asset of any botnet and therefore in need of deviant
security. While sinkholing botnets is helpful to redirect infected machines away
from the botnet herder, studies on follow-up issues are absent such as about
the identification, differentiation and notification of victims. There is a need
for evidence-based methods and techniques that filter out false positives and
identification high-value botnet victims.
Botnets as offensive countermeasures With the exception of [158], botnet
studies generally focus on the defensive capabilities of the botnet infrastructure
without exploring botnets as offensive countermeasures. Yet the list of botnet
attacks for protective purposes is long. There are reports about DDoS attacks
against banking fraud victims to hinder investigation [167], against websites
of investigative journalists who report about botnets and their herders [?], or
against competing online pharmaceutical affiliate programs [168, p.3]. These re-
ports of botnets as tools for offensive countermeasures provide another argument
that deviant security practices may differ from law-abiding security practices.
Determining whether a botnet attack is launched as a pre-activity for the com-
mission of crime - i.e., a stepping stone - or as a post-activity for the protection
of crime is important to the cyber security community.
A last observation about research on botnet protection is the strong focus
on security failures of botnets, rather than successful instances of deviant se-
curity. What are successful re-occurring security features of botnets on a high
level of abstraction, and are they consistent through time? Moreover, are the
majority of botnet vulnerabilities caused by accidents, failures and mistakes, or
by increasing capabilities of the cyber security community in a larger cat and
mouse crime game?
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Figure 3.2: While most components can be filled in by the literature on botnet protection,
the scope of these studies could be broader. There is, for example, little focus on botnets as
offensive countermeasures and alternative interventions against botnets.
3.1.3 Authorship Analysis
Compared to the two previously reviewed themes, studies on authorship anal-
ysis have the most broad and rich deviant security approach, and hold several
methodological lessons for this study (see Figure 3.3).
What is research on authorship analysis about? A third theme in com-
puter science that evolves around deviant security is authorship analysis (also
called stylometry), which relies on machine learning, statistical analysis and
text mining techniques for criminal identity tracing. Authorship analysis has,
for instance, been applied for attribution purposes on online communications
[169][170][171], malware code [172][173][174], and phishing websites [175]. Not
only does authorship analysis serve attribution in police investigations. Stylo-
metrics are even considered evidence in courts around the world [176].
Security cycle on authorship analysis This field of study fills in the de-
viant security components as follows. All hardware, software and data that lead
to the criminal’s true, offline identity are important assets that are in need of se-
curity. Written texts - such as the presence on a cyber criminal forum, usage of
chat services, development of malware code - are necessary to commit crime. To
avoid attribution, cyber criminals apply - amongst others - security policies on
a metadata level, like deception (e.g., usage of multiple online monikers). They
might also try to withhold personal details during communications from other
criminals on a content level. However, written texts - whether data or software
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- work as a unique fingerprint of its author, and reveal much about gender,
age, ethnicity, occupation, intelligence, skills, and, ultimately, offline identities.
Therefore, criminals might deploy additional security against authorship anal-
ysis (also known as adversarial stylometry) such as obfuscation, imitation and
machine translation to control this vulnerability [176]. While hardware configu-
ration might be subjected to authorship analysis [177], deviant countermeasures
against it have yet to be discovered.
The need for empirical data & perspectives of research participants
Framing authorship analysis in a wider deviant security perspective reveals im-
portant insights for this research project. For example, circumventing author-
ship recognition is a deviant security policy that does not ensure but affect the
integrity of data. In such a situation, criminals essentially decrease the assurance
of the accuracy and reliability that texts are written by them. This significantly
differs from security policies that are prescribed by industry standards. Al-
though we know about the existence of legitimate software to evade authorship
analysis, ground truth data of cyber criminals actually deploying these tech-
niques is absent in the reviewed academic literature. Research on malware code
re-usage in the cyber criminal underground is still in its infancy [178], and how
to detect and distinguish multiple individuals working on the same malware is
still unknown. Moreover, information from police investigations shows us that
cyber criminals, besides machine translation, deploy human translators to write
texts for phishing websites or advertisements on cyber criminal fora [179, pp.31-
32]. This practice increases the accuracy of the grammar in texts and thus the
conversion rate of attacks, but also holds defensive qualities, especially from the
viewpoint of those who investigate these crimes: authorship analysis would not
point to the suspect but to e.g., an ignorant, but bonafide translator. So, the
conceptualization of DevSec is not only shaped by those who apply security, but
also by those who are confronted by it.
Multidisciplinary approach & new academic disciplines The strength
of authorship analysis research is its multidisciplinary approach between com-
puter science and linguistics, testing of tools, mixed criminal and investigator-
centric perspective, and focus on the criminal individual and his/her conduct.
While some have briefly addressed the importance of cultural dimensions in au-
thorship analysis research that will benefit police investigations [169], much of
the research evolves around computer-mediated English instead of computer-
mediated communication [180, pp.4-5]. This touches upon explanatory theories
for deviant security. The anthropology of deviant security (research on e.g., how
security culture changes over time and space) and the linguistics of deviant se-
curity (research on e.g., the form and meaning of cyber criminal language usage)
might well be new academic disciplines to study these dimensions. Cyber crim-
inals communicate via short chat and forum messages, sometimes exclusively in
Cyrillic alphabet, and/or contain specific hacker argot to keep rookies and law-
enforcement out. Would authorship analysis also work on short conversations in
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Russian, littered with argot? Such insights into the (inter)cultural dimensions
of cyber crime in general, and deviant security specifically, contribute to effec-
tive police investigations. Text in the English language written by non-English
speakers, or in dialect, might reveal the criminal’s country or region of origin,
and subsequently help LEA to identify potential subjects of interest and pri-
oritize cases. There are other unexplored disciplines that will explain DevSec
practices and improve police investigations, the economics of deviant security
being one of them. The next section explains this discipline in more detail.
Figure 3.3: The multidisciplinary literature on authorship analysis has a broad scope and is
rich in insights on DevSec. Moreover, these studies also hold various methodological lessons
for this study.
3.1.4 Attacker Economics
The literature of the last theme - attacker economics - is not of a descriptive, but
of a more explanatory nature. Attacker economics studies currently have law-
abiding referent objects as a focal point who are under attack by malafide threat
agents. Just like the previous themes, this section begins with explaining what
the topic is about, but then proceeds with presenting an important sub-theme
within attacker economics for this study: the economics of deviant security that
focuses on the cost-benefit analyses of cyber criminal referent objects about
their technical computer security practices.
What is research on attacker economics about? Economics of informa-
tion security is a synthesis between computer and social science, and combines
microeconomic theory, and to a lesser extent game theory, with information
security to gain an in-depth understanding of the tradeoffs and misaligned in-
centives in the design and deployment of technical computer security policies
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and mechanisms [181, p.610][182, p.358]. Most papers within this discipline are
written from the good guy perspective on security. For example, Van Eeten
and Bauer studied the incentives of legitimate market players - such as internet
service providers (ISPs) and software vendors - when confronted with malware
[183]. Papers that are written from the bad guy perspective - so called at-
tacker economics - are gaining importance as well (for example, [184][185][150]).
Attacker economics exposes cost-benefit analyses of attackers to exploit vulner-
abilities in the security of the victim target, to subsequently formulate protec-
tive countermeasures for law-abiding entities [186, p.3]. The strength of these
socio-technical papers is their acknowledgement that security is very much a
human problem, and the combination of behavioral science with technical com-
puter security is currently one of the most thriving and fast-moving disciplines
to increase our understanding of the law-abiding entities’ and cyber criminals’
decisions to respectively secure their systems or optimize attacks [181, p.610].
The identified cost-benefit analyses in these papers are not related to deviant
security, but to the offensive side of committing cyber crime, namely the attack
itself such as [168].
Economics of deviant security Several of these attacker economics papers
imply that there are also economics of deviant security. Herley, for example,
has written about the fundamental tradeoff that Nigerian spammers must make
between the gain from true positives and the cost of false positives [187, p.13].
He proposes to add false positives to reduce the attacker’s return, and mentions
scam-baiter sites whose visitors intentionally lure Nigerian scammers into time-
wasting conversations. The unnoticed link to deviant security lies in the fact
that scam baiters breach the security of spammers by social engineering their
criminal ‘victims’. Basically, scam baiters try to exploit the spammers’ vulnera-
bility of being greedy, see Figure 3.4. Another example is Herley and Florencio’s
study about the low tier underground economy on IRC channels that are ‘oc-
cupied by those without skills or alliances, newcomers, and those who seek to
cheat them’ [186, p.1]. This suggests that the cyber criminals who operate in
this market have to protect their valuables against other cyber criminals such
as rippers. Although these papers have been criticized for lacking empirical
data, and applying an economic meta-analysis to make their case [188, p.2],
they prove an important point. Attacker economics currently tends to focus
on the commission of cyber crime to formulate protective responses for (the
computing systems and information of) law-abiding referent objects. However,
attackers are also in need of security which previous papers have overlooked.
Attacker economics should therefore also encompass the economics of deviant
security that focuses on the tradeoffs related to the protection of cyber crime
and offensive responses of law-enforcement agencies.
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Figure 3.4: While attacker economics generally takes law-abiding entities as referent objects
of security, Herley’s paper on scam baiters fits within the deviant security process cycle [187].
The cycle reveals that effective deviant countermeasures against scam baiters are largely
unknown to academics.
3.1.5 Interim Conclusion & Discussion
This section reviews deviant security related themes within computer science
and engineering to understand how cyber criminals apply protection, to con-
clude that there are many open questions that touch upon the what, who,
where/when, and why of deviant security. In other words: methods and tech-
niques of DevSec are revealed by researching the basic empirical and normative
qualities, key players and interactive qualities, temporal-spatial qualities and ra-
tional (cost-benefit) motives of deviant security. For example, the rigorous and
in-depth research on the protection of botnets raises numerous question marks
about the deviant security practices of other cyber crimes. Who else applies
deviant controls? There is considerable literature on botnets because they are
most apparent to researchers. Botnet herders are end-users of the underground
economy in the most visible part of the value chain. They make victims by
committing bank fraud or sending spam; their crimes and infrastructure thus
become noticeable to researchers and legal practitioners. The same argument
holds for anti-forensics that are encountered as soon as data that might hold
evidence is preserved by investigators. What about less visible cyber criminals
and deviant security practices? Academic research on bulletproof hosters, their
activities and infrastructure is virtually absent, although the core business of
these malicious hosters is essentially deviant security. These who questions touch
upon the idea of conducting comparative research: do computer-assisted crimi-
nals differ from computer-focused criminals in their security? The existence of
bulletproof hosters, who basically sell security as a commodity, raises questions
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about what the basic normative and empirical qualities of deviant security are,
i.e., its distinctive characteristics, incorporating both the perspectives of both
those who apply DevSec as those who are confronted with it. Because many
protective technologies on their own are neutral and serve a dual-use purpose
(see also 3.3), the security policies on which they are based are affected by spe-
cific situations (i.e., time and space), and therefore point to questions about
when and where deviant security is applied. Lastly, insights from the previous
questions may also shed light on why criminals apply DevSec, i.e., their short
and long term motives. Although the identified security policies and security
mechanisms of cyber criminals are largely technical computer security, computer
science alone cannot provide answers to the above questions. Synthesizing in-
sights from technical computer security with social science and legal scholarship
helps to gain a comprehensive understanding of deviant security as the next
sections show.
3.2 Social Science Literature
Previous sections show that computer science cannot provide answers to many
deviant security-related questions, and pays less attention in understanding the
behavior of those who try to breach technical computer security and subse-
quently placing their actions within criminal law. On the other hand, the mul-
tidisciplinary discipline of attacker economics proves there is much to learn from
social sciences. More specifically, social science helps to formulate a new defi-
nition for modus operandi that emphasizes the need for suspects to protect the
criminal and his/her crimes.
A new definition for modus operandi Much research in social science is
undertaken to understand the actions that a cyber criminal has to take to perpe-
trate a crime. These actions are called modus operandi or method of operation
(MO) by academics and legal practitioners [189, p.24][190, p.89], and tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTP) by the private security industry. An MO gen-
erally relates to how a crime is committed, and serves the ‘successful completion
of the crime’, ‘the protection of the offender’s identity’ and ‘the facilitation of
the offender’s escape’ [191, pp.287-288]. These purposes let us realize that an
MO is actually also very much about deviant security. Yet most social science
studies about cyber offenders put an emphasis on understanding the commission
of crime, ranging from the online grooming of children and/or collection of child
abusive material by sexually-driven computer-assisted criminals [192][193][194],
to the networks, organizations and platforms of financially-driven computer-
focused criminals [195][196][197].
The commission and protection of cyber crime are, however, inextricably
linked to such an extent that is hard to find instances where there is absolutely
no security prior, during or after the commission of cyber crime. Crime without
deviant security implies the use of non-obfuscated malware, real credentials to
register domains for botnets, a suspect’s home Internet protocol (IP) address
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to connect to victims, a suspect’s bank account to receive stolen money, non-
encrypted hard drives, and open conversations about malicious activities to
strangers. Of course, these situations rarely happen, let alone all together.
Data, systems and communications become valuable - and thus are in need of
protection - because they relate to either the:
– Criminal: everything related to the suspect’s online and offline identity
and his/her physical and mental integrity; and/or
– Crime: the collection of related, structured activities designed to produce
a specific product, service, or other cyber criminal output [198, p.210].
Therefore, this study defines modus operandi as:
The commission of crime, and the protection of crime and the
criminal.
Nota bene, all commission and protection practices fall within this definition,
forming a continuum that ranges from a preparation and pre-activity phase to
an activity and post-activity phase [199]. Furthermore, the emphasis on the
criminal and (the outcomes of) his/her conduct are two core dimensions of the
study of crime (the other two being enforcement and victims [20, p.3]), and
dovetails with the notion of who and what attribution in criminal proceedings.
Because of this link to the world of legal practitioners, the definition - including
the distinction between commission and protection - is an essential feature in
this study. While there is excellent social science research on the commission
of cyber crime (e.g., [200][201][34]), the emphasis of this study is obviously
on the latter part of the definition. Therefore, the next sections briefly explore
what social scientists write about the protection of cyber criminal’s identity and
his/her malicious business proceedings, and conclude that a technical computer
security perspective adds to a better social science understanding of deviant
security.
The protection of the criminal When describing and explaining cyber
crime, social scientists mention the nature of the Internet ([50, p.44][89, p.6])
and the deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) [28, pp.140-141,
148] - like encryption - that protect the cyber criminal’s identity [202]. The
resulting anonymity ([203][169, pp.59-60][204, p.7][205, p.75]), enables offending
[203], and helps to evade detection and prosecution [28, pp.140-141]. It is for
good reason that the United States Department of Justice names anonymity the
greatest asset of cyber criminals [206].
How should these aspects of the protection of the cyber criminal be under-
stood in terms of security? Using the components of the synthesized security
analysis, cyber criminals seem to regard their online/offline identity and physi-
cal/mental integrity as valuables. However, the use of certain information tech-
nologies - such as an IP address of a home network router - makes the cyber
criminal vulnerable to attacks by law-enforcement agencies whom may request
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information for identification purposes from third parties, like ISPs. So, cyber
criminals deploy countermeasures, such as the use of a VPN [112], to protect
their true offline identity, and as a result remain anonymous. This security
analysis is a simplification, but nevertheless reveals several research gaps. For
example, the reviewed social science studies do not link anonymity to technical
computer security concepts. Anonymity is an important factor of confidential-
ity [36, p.10], and about the ability to communicate without revealing identity
[64, p.44]. From an attacker’s perspective, anonymity is about not sufficiently
being able to identify the subject within a set of subjects [207, pp.9-12]. By
linking anonymity of identity to the CIA triad, it becomes apparent that de-
viant countermeasures have to protect more than the online and offline identity
of the cyber criminal; it raises the question how factors within the other two
concepts of the security triad - integrity and availability - relate to security for
cyber criminals. For example, how do cyber criminals protect the availability
of computing systems against DDoS attacks from other cyber criminals?
The protection of crime Crime implies behavior performed by a criminal,
or in legal terms, a suspect [80][208, pp.71-72]. Throughout this study, different
terms - criminal business proceedings, illegal output of malicious behavior, and
so on - are used to point out that the protection of crime also implies conduct.
Although there is much written in social science about the protection of the
cyber criminal’s identity, few studies explicitly discuss the protective measures
of suspects whom commit cyber crime. Newman and Clarke mention several
‘criminogenic attributes of the computing environment’ that relate to security
policies of cyber criminals protecting their business operations:
– Stealth ensures that crimes are invisible;
– Challenge that cyber criminals will take as little time necessary to carry
out the criminal act, decreasing the chance of being caught;
– Escape that ‘there is little sense in planning and carrying out a crime if
it is obvious that the chances of getting caught at the time of the act are
very high, or that a trail of evidence is left that will lead inevitably to
detection’ [209, pp.61-63].
Turvey further lists examples of MO behaviors related to deviant security such
as offense location selection (i.e., ‘a server hosting illicit materials for covert
distribution’), and offender precautionary acts (‘the use of aliases’, and ‘IP
spoofing’). He concludes that successful cyber criminals are those who avoid
both detection of their crimes and identification [191, pp.288, 292].
Again, technical computer security helps to structure the specific security
mechanisms behind these abstract security policies. Technical computer secu-
rity also helps us to understand that data, systems and communications become
assets, not only when they are related to the criminal but also to crime. Stealth
is achieved, according to Newman and Clarke, by ‘remote storage on an inno-
cent third party’s computer’ [209, p.61]. Firstly, stealth is defined in the Oxford
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English Dictionary as ‘cautious and surreptitious action or movement’ [210]. We
therefore link stealth to criminal actions - read: crimes - as compared to the
criminal. We further connect stealth to the security goal of unobservability which
is, in turn, an attribute of confidentiality [64, p.44], and about undetectability of
items of interests against all subjects [207], such as the undetectability of child
abusive material against the threat agent of LEA. Secondly, remote storage on
a third’s party computer points to an online form of dead drops: an operational
security technique to exchange information without being connected directly to
another individual. CSAM offenders frequently exchange their abusive material
by uploading encrypted images to a file share service, and subsequently post
the hyperlink of this third party website and/or related password on an access
controlled forum so others can access and decrypt the material. Using a cryp-
tocurrency tumbler, affiliate partner programs [211], or unwitting moneymules
as intermediaries to launder dirty money is essentially a comparable situation
[212], just like usage of anonymous remailers to send messages [36, pp.443-445].
These are all instances of dead drops - i.e., proxies - that provide stealth, or in
terms of technical computer security: unobservability and undetectability [207].
In all of these cases, security policies and mechanisms are installed to protect
data (e.g., child abuse material), systems (botnets) and communications (peer-
to-peer file sharing) - assets related to either the identity of the criminal and/or
his/her malicious activities. The opposite may also occur. Data, software and
systems do not necessarily hold importance to the criminal. Research suggests
that compromised Web servers for conducting spam runs are not protected by
the criminal, because spamming hosts do not require to be accessible to victims,
as compared to phishing hosts [213, pp.176-177]. In other words, systems used
for spam do not hold any value for the criminal after the crime is committed.
A last observation is the absence of empirical data in social science stud-
ies about DevSec which holds lessons for the methodological direction of this
study. Although it is easy to imagine that, for example, escape is vital for the
successful commission of cyber crime, both Turvey, Newman and Clarke give
little empirical evidence for their claims, which is understandable as cyber crime
studies in general lack theoretical and empirical evidence [28][34][80, pp.86-89].
Nevertheless, these social science papers demonstrate that the same security
policies might be found across disciplines on a high level of abstraction (such
as stealth which is also found in computer science papers on botnet protec-
tion). Moreover, these papers stress the importance of using data collected in
the field, and of applying a ‘human-centered’ and ‘human factor’ approach to
increase our understanding of the behavior of cyber criminals to develop better
means of discouraging and disrupting their crimes [214][215].
3.3 Legal Studies
We derive from social science that the commission of crime and protection of
crime and the criminal are inextricably linked. Crime can not be successfully
committed if a criminal does not take any necessary precautions against other
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criminals or law-enforcement agencies before, during and after their malafide
conduct. Criminal law follows this dichotomy between commission and pro-
tection. Simply put, substantive law focuses on the commission of crime as it
defines crimes and establishes punishments [82, pp.7-13]. Generally, if a crime
is committed and identified as such, procedural law begins. Hence, criminals
apply security to avoid encounters with the threat agent of law-enforcement
agencies and related attacks of investigation and prosecution. This raises the
question how procedural law deals with instances of deviant security. This sec-
tion explains why investigative powers are a means to exploit vulnerabilities in
the security of cyber criminals, thus affect the criminal’s CIA triad, to gather
evidence while simultaneously hold an additional objective beyond the goals
currently acknowledged by legal scholars and legislators. The mere threat of
investigations disrupts the cyber criminal process.
Means: legitimate attacks on deviant security There is a so far unno-
ticed relation between on the one hand deviant security that protects crime,
and on the other hand procedural law which governs the investigation and pros-
ecution of cyber crimes. Many procedural laws (and thus police investigative
powers) not only aim at breaching the security of criminals in order to iden-
tify the suspect and obtain evidence related to his/her criminal activities, but
also affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of deviant security. So
criminal procedure not only protects the rights of the suspect and others in-
volved in an investigation by regulating the power of the police [20, p.397][82,
pp.13-18]. The law further prescribes how and when the police is allowed to
exploit both technical and human weaknesses in MOs to gather evidence. This
argument very much makes law-enforcement mandated breachers of MOs in
general and deviant security specifically. The components of the synthesized se-
curity analysis shed light on the relation between the protection of criminals and
investigative powers of law-enforcement agencies. As an example, mandatory
password disclosure - implemented in the United Kingdom and once proposed
in the Netherlands - is a coercive investigative technique to deal with encryp-
tion applied for illegal purposes. A suspect may have an information asset -
for example, child sexual abusive material - that he protects in an encrypted
container. Law-enforcement will try to exploit the suspect’s vulnerability of
fear for incarceration by threatening with a prison sentence if the suspect does
not hand over his/her password. Another example is the legal proposals in
the United States of America and the Netherlands for the allowance of police
hacking [216][217]. Cyber criminals may protect their valuable online market
place with access control management. A successful brute force password attack
by LEA exploits the vulnerability of a weak password to access a legitimately
seized criminal forum. These, and other examples [218], show that investigative
techniques are closely related to the CIA triad. Access control and encryption
both preserve the confidentiality of a security system [54], and mandatory key
disclosure intends to affect that confidentiality. A coordinated takedown of a
CSAM site by ISPs and law-enforcement agencies affects the availability of the
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illegal content.
Investigative powers further follow the same underlying principles of cyber
criminal TTPs that exploit vulnerabilities in the security systems of their vic-
tims, including human weaknesses. Cyber criminals apply social engineering -
the art of intrusion and deception [219][220], with or without the use of tech-
nology [221] - to convince (potential) victims to disclose confidential data or
perform another action [222]. Covert investigative techniques (also known as
undercover powers), such as infiltration and pseudo purchase/services, exploit
human vulnerabilities and are basically social engineering applied by LEA.
These examples show that the technical computer security understanding
of attacks (see [54]) helps to conceptualize investigative powers in cyberspace.
Wiretaps are obviously interception attacks, while takedowns are interruption
attacks, and undercover powers are fabrication attacks. The criticism of le-
gal scholars and computer scientists on police hacking - such as the argument
that law-enforcement officers can alter evidential data - is basically about the
possibility that this investigative power becomes a modification attack which
is not compatible with the legal principle of evidence integrity. The finding
that investigative powers aim at breaching the security of cyber criminals leads
to another conclusion; it implies that comprehensive policies within the border-
centric view on cyber security and cyber crime that include police investigations
also encompasses an understanding of deviant security.
(Additional) objective: disruption of modi operandi According to le-
gal scholars and legislators, criminal law with well-defined punishments has a
number of objectives. It aims at - amongst others - incapacitation, general- and
specific deterrence and rehabilitation [223, pp.889-922]. These objectives are
very much focused on preventing future crimes, and as such, criminal law in-
tends to have real world effects on how citizens behave in society [224, pp.79-84].
However, when criminals do commit crime, merely restrictive deterrence - lim-
iting the frequency, magnitude or seriousness of offenses - is left as an objective
of criminal law [225, pp.35-36]. Does criminal law has any other effects on the
criminal who is already busy with committing crime? Indeed, it is - amongst
others - because of criminal law that cyber criminals are forced to protect crimes
and their identities. This implies that criminal law has effects beyond deterrence
that are directly related to deviant security. Although it has been argued that
the state’s capacity to deter criminals from committing cyber crime might be
limited [226], the ever-present threat of law-enforcement has a real-world effect
on those that are not deterred by criminal law. So, an additional objective and
consequence of procedural law and police investigations can be understood in
terms of the economics of deviant security. The threats/attacks by LEA force
cyber criminals to apply security and as such, negatively affect the commission
of cyber crime. In other words, the mere existence of these legal tools increase
the costs of cyber crime as suspects have to invest (e.g., time, money) or turn
down (reject a potential business partner) resources into/for their security, and
as such, decrease the efficiency of malicious business operations. Criminal law,
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both as threat and attack, is therefore essentially disruptive to the cyber crimi-
nal business process. Legal practitioners suggest that law-enforcement agencies
will no longer have the resources to investigate or prosecute all cyber crime, and
should shift towards disruption of the cyber criminal process [227] while aca-
demics from predominantly computer science have already been discussing the
technical possibilities of such disruptive interventions [185]. Yet legal studies
about criminal procedure in cyberspace heavily focus on attribution of offend-
ers rather than researching the opportunities and legal feasibility of applying
investigative powers for disruptive purposes.
3.4 Interim Conclusion and Discussion
Although Section 2.2 concludes that current security discourses evolve around
good guys who protect themselves against attacks by bad guys, academics and
experts do touch upon aspects of deviant security of cyber criminals. The in-
sights from computer and social sciences, including economics of information se-
curity, suggest that cyber criminals face more threat agents and threats/attacks
than just law-enforcement agencies conducting police investigations. Subse-
quently, it is likely that related vulnerabilities, risks, valuables and countermea-
sures are different as well. For instance, online identifiers are indeed important
data assets for cyber criminals, but financial assets also need protection because
other criminals will try to steal them. Therefore, suspects of cyber crime not
only apply anti-forensics to thwart digital forensic tools, but also deploy other,
largely unknown, security policies and mechanisms that may differ from law-
abiding entities who do not have to evade LEA. Legal scholarship contributes
by revealing that criminal procedure subsequently intends to exploit the vulner-
abilities in this security system. We now understand how these three academic
disciplines - computer science and engineering, law and social science - help to
describe and explain DevSec.
Bearing in mind three major methodological issues in researching cyber crime
- the lack of: i) empirical data, ii) comparative and transnational research and
iii) cyber crime research paradigms [50, pp.54-55][80, pp.86-89][81, pp.1-3] - the
findings of the reviewed themes (i.e., anti-forensics, botnet protection, author-
ship analysis and attacker economics) help to further fine-tune the methodolog-
ical directions to study deviant security practices. Some of the reviewed studies
are, for example, merely written from a digital forensic technology perspective,
and lack a human-centered, and more specifically, a criminal-centric approach.
Although there is overlap in terminology among academic disciplines - e.g., se-
curity policies such as stealth and anonymity - there are too few studies, like
[228], that are truly multidisciplinary in nature. They do not combine theo-
retical concepts and empirical findings, nor methods and techniques, from both
social and computer science to understand the security systems of different cy-
ber criminals. Nor do they link research outcomes to the legal practitioners’
world of procedural and substantive law and police investigations.
Because a theoretical framework on deviant security practices is absent, the
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research part of this study - i.e., part III - are grounded in empirical data de-
rived from, and incorporating the views of, both actors of the social interplay,
namely those who apply deviant security as well those who are confronted by
deviant security. Although the sum of the reviewed studies does not represent
a comprehensive overview of research related to deviant security, it neverthe-
less shows that academic and non-academic literature is in itself a data source
that contributes to an understanding and conceptualization of deviant security
practices. Collected and processed data about DevSec practices should be an-
alyzed from multiple academic angles, especially linking computer science to
legal scholarship and social science, and adding explanatory power by applying
insights from economics of deviant security. In other words, social scientific
methodology is needed to capture a social-technical interplay in which cyber
criminals apply technical computer security in order to be safe from the legal
actions of law-enforcement agencies. These first research steps on deviant secu-
rity will contribute to the development of a broader, new field of study which
goes beyond the practices of deviant security. It might, for example, also include
the computer engineering of deviant security and psychology of deviant secu-
rity that respectively focus on the system design - i.e., software and hardware,
including technical vulnerabilities and associated exploits - of deviant technical
computer security controls, and on the cyber criminal’s individual thoughts,








Researching cyber crime poses multiple methodological challenges. Many cyber
crime studies use small and/or limited data sets of poor quality. Few studies
have structurally and systematically examined the cyber criminal and cyber
security community over long periods of time [229], and/or from a truly socio-
technical-legal perspective. This study intends to overcome several of these
methodological challenges. So far, the study has raised a problem experienced
by academics and legal practitioners: the security practices of cyber criminals.
How to research a practice that intends to affect the integrity, limit the avail-
ability, and increase the confidentiality of associated data sources? This study
combines computer science and social science with legal scholarship, having per-
mission of academic and government authorities to use confidential and unique
data sets. The study aims at producing scientific research that is relevant for
computer science and engineering, social and behavioral sciences and the de-
velopment of law, investigations and policy, thus seeking and forming working
relationships across disciplines [230]. The body of this study relies on social sci-
ence methodologies of Grounded Theory and microeconomic theory to research
the predominantly technical computer security - i.e., the administrative, physi-
cal and technical controls - of cyber criminals. As summarized in Table 4.1, the
study ends with the discipline of law and economics to research investigative
responses against DevSec relevant to especially legal practitioners.
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Part Chapter Description with an emphasis on methodology Methodology
Chapter 1 -
Introduction
The identification of one of the underlying problems of
the current effectiveness crisis in investigations as
experienced by legal practitioners: the security








A literature study on current good guy perspectives on
technical computer and cyber security provides input
for studying the new security paradigm of deviant
security with law-breaking referent objects, and
concludes that a deviant security practices should first
be expressed in a qualitative matter as a full picture on
deviant security is absent before more quantitative







A literature study on four DevSec-related themes -
anti-forensics, botnet protection, authorship analysis
and attacker economics - shows that research on
deviant security should be criminal-centric and
multidisciplinary in nature, i.e., combine theoretical
concepts and normative and empirical findings,
methods and techniques from both computer and social
science, and link research outcomes to the legal









Outlay of the research design for this first in-depth









The core categories of the technical computer security
practices and economics of cyber criminals that stand
out in secondary data sources about those who apply
and those who are confronted with deviant security, and






















Suggestions for investigative approaches for legal
practitioners to confront deviant security practices,
based on the findings of the previous chapters and
other normative and empirical findings.
Socio-technical-
legal research




Chapter 9 - The
Outlook of
Deviant Security
Reiteration of thesis objectives, a filled-in deviant
security process cycle, summary of findings and future
research directions.
Table 4.1: This study is of a multidisciplinary nature. The research problem is derived
from criminal procedure. Social science methods and techniques are applied to gain knowledge
about the technical computer security practices of cyber criminals. The outcomes of this
study aim at providing input for comprehensive policies, evidence-based law and effective
investigations, thus very much at improving the work of legal practitioners.
4.1 Descriptive: Grounded Theory for Deviant
Security Practices
Cyber criminals very much have security policies. They do not necessarily write
down, explicitly dictate, or are even aware of the high abstract policies they
apply. Still, these policies can be discovered by analyzing the underlying asso-
ciated security mechanisms. Which qualitative inquiry fits best to construct a
model on deviant security policies and mechanisms? For this study, the answer
to this question is Grounded Theory (GT). This methodology derives theory
from data analysis, instead of vice versa. Thus, GT does not focus on testing
hypotheses taken from existing theoretical frameworks, but instead promotes
the development of a theory of an action, process or interaction grounded in
empirical data collected in the field [231, pp.2-6]. There are several versions of
Grounded Theory, and this study uses elements derived from two approaches
on GT.
ELS on cyber crime & preference for qualitative research The legal connotations
of researching deviant security are evident. This study has very much a legal starting point
as it identifies a problem that procedural law and police investigations face in confronting
cyber crime: the security practices of cyber criminals. This study further has a legal end
point, aimed at producing outcomes that will benefit public policy, criminal procedure
and police investigations to affect the protection of cyber criminals. The methodology to
achieve such an impact on legal practitioners is called empirical legal scholarship (ELS).
Empirical legal scholarship is the research produced by the academic world to create bet-
ter law, informed by reality instead of assumptions [232, p.910]. ELS is on the rise for
years, with ever increasing numbers of studies, and academic studies on the discipline it-
self [232][233][234][235][236]. Current empirical legal studies on cyber crime are published
in journals as the Cybersecurity, Data Privacy & eDiscovery Law & Policy eJournal and
the Cyberspace Law eJournal; as reports that discuss - amongst others - CSAM and re-
lated laws, policies and investigations [85], or EU law and computer-focused attacks on the
HTTPS value chain [237]; and/or as sources for civil law verdicts on e.g., intellectual prop-
erty violations [238]. However, many of these studies do not label themselves as ELS, nor
explain the discipline and/or used methodologies. Law itself lacks methodology to produce
empirical results. Therefore, between the legal head and tail of empirical legal studies lies
a body of research that relies on the scientific method of inquiry [234][230, p.866]. The
word empirical in ELS points to the evidence about the world based on observation and
experience, whether numerical (quantitative) or non-numerical (qualitative) [233, p.1]. Be-
cause deviant security practices have not been systematically and structurally researched
as an object of study and because theory on deviant security is absent, qualitative inquiry
is preferred over quantitative inquiry. Qualitative research is conducted when a problem
needs exploration, when theory is absent, and when a complex, detailed understanding of
an issue is necessary [239, pp.39-40][240, pp.12-15], also when such issues are related to law
and policy [241][242]. Therefore, this study prefers qualitative over quantitative inquiry.
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Traditional and constructionist Grounded Theory There are two pop-
ular approaches to Grounded Theory. The first approach is the traditional
Grounded Theory, originally developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 and later
modified by Strauss and Corbin [231][240]. The second and more recent con-
structionist approach to Grounded Theory was developed by Charmaz [243].
Basically, the two approaches differ in whether the researcher believes if theory
is discovered as emerging from data separate from the researcher, or constructed
from the data by the researcher. To complicate things further, there are also two
views on traditional GT. After initially writing the methodology together, Glaser
and Strauss developed different views on GT in time. Glaser’s view is that an
objective truth emerges from the data, and every researcher will discover that
same picture when the GT method is properly applied [244]. Strauss, together
with his co-author Corbin, stresses that a researcher has to actively obtain the-
ory from data. They expect that each researcher will place the focus on different
aspects of the collected data depending on their background, beliefs and values
[240]. The second approach - constructivist Grounded Theory - argues that the
researcher is part of the world and data that is studied. Multiple social realities
exists, and past and present interactions with people, perspectives, and research
practices influence the grounded theory. So, the constructivist approach is very
much an ‘interpretive portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it’
[243, p.10].
Another major debate in GT research evolves around the focus on either so-
cial processes or individual experience [245, p.76-78]. Glaser, Strauss and Corbin
aim at localizing social processes in particular settings, which is about the inter-
play between relevant conditions, and the responses of the participants to those
conditions and to the consequences of their actions [246, p.419]. Charmaz’s focal
point lies on individual experience which is more psychological in nature as it
tries to capture the internal world of the participant. Despite these differences,
both approaches acknowledge that scholars should specify ‘those conditions and
consequences, at every level of scale from the most “macro” to the “micro,” and
integrating them into the resulting theory’ [247, p.274][243, pp.118-119]. This
so called conditional and consequential matrix is a focal point of this study as
explained in more detail in Section 4.2 and Figure 4.1.
A mixed approach in this study Glaser and Strauss stressed in their orig-
inal work to use GT flexibly [231]. This study is no exception on this position
as it makes use of elements of both the traditional view of Strauss and Corbin,
and the constructionist view of Charmaz. The former approach dovetails with
the legal connotations of this study. Data is collected selectively to develop a
grounded theory on deviant security that is significant for legal practitioners
in the public sector and serves the general public. Researchers with the same
research questions but other beliefs and audiences might well find alternative
deviant security concepts albeit using the same data. In line with Strauss and
Corbin, this study further tries to catch the social processes of deviant security,
thus its social context, causes and consequences, rather than the psychological
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aspects of deviant security for individual cyber criminals, such as their thoughts,
feelings, and beliefs.
The constructionist version of Grounded Theory guides this research because
of - again - the legal connotations of deviant security. The research population
and their activities - cyber criminals and cyber crimes - are normatively laden
concepts, and are therefore very much social constructions as well, rather than
being objective and neutral ‘truths’ [40]. The security of cyber criminals cannot
be ‘discovered’ when the implementation of such terms differs in time and across
jurisdictions to the extent - as noted before - that law-enforcement agencies
in authoritarian states without the rule of law conduct criminal behavior, as
compared to the political dissidents such police units tend to investigate. The
acknowledgement of the researcher that reality is a construct also touches upon
the constructionist’s emphasis on reflexivity. Going native in the cyber security
community might be a positive type of research, as long as the researcher takes
a reflective stance on the interpretations of him/herself and his/her research
participants, and subsequently presents these to his/her audience [243, pp.130-
131, 188-189][241, pp.9-10][248, pp.229-231].
4.1.1 Cyber Criminal and Cyber Security Participants
Criminals in general, and organized criminals specifically [249], are an unwilling
population for research. They would rather not reveal their activities [250,
pp.54-57]. (Organized) cyber crime is no exception to this rule, as there is
a large dark number of undetected cyber crimes ‘due to the invisibility and
complexity of digital traces’ [76, p.738]. In other words, deviant security is one
of the reasons why there is little known about cyber criminals and their crimes.
So besides legal practitioners, academics who (would like to) study organized
cyber crime are limited to do so because of deviant security practices. Therefore,
multiple participants’ perspectives are sought during the inquiry [247, p.280],
solely based on secondary data sources (see Section 4.1.2). The secondary data
sources of this study are derived from research participants with experiential
relevance, more specifically i) those who apply deviant security and ii) those who
are confronted with deviant security, thus respectively cyber criminals - mostly
computer-focused criminals, and to a lesser extent computer-assisted criminals
- and participants, like legal practitioners, from the cyber security community.
Participants in cyber crime networks The focus of this study lies on
active offenders (as compared to a prison sample) with the following character-
istics in frequency, nature and severity of offending, and skill levels and abilities
[251, p.6]. They are suspects of crime, and operate on their own and/or within
loosely to highly organized groups that commit profit-driven computer-focused
crimes with an international impact such as online banking fraud, ransomware
and spam (see also [196] who had access to similar but less research data, and
reviewed several of the same investigations). These groups are small with just
a few members to very large, consisting of 50 to even more than 80 individuals
as in respectively the cyber criminal Lurk and Dyre organizations [252][253].
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Computer-focused criminals not only include end-user cyber criminals (those
criminals who are at the end of the cyber criminal value chain and make vic-
tims), but also cyber-crime-as-a-service providers. The latter develop and offer
various cyber criminal services and products that the end-user criminals need
to commit and protect their financial cyber crimes such as malware, exploits,
infected computers (botnets), and bulletproof-, code obfuscation-, credit card-,
money mule-, and phishing services [254][255][256], see also Figure 6.2.
Cyber crime in networks and as a service
Because of their interdependence to succeed, cyber criminals form collaborative relation-
ships that are characterized as cyber crime networks which evolve around informational
capitalism [257], i.e., criminal assets that are further explained in Chapter 5 [34][258]. In-
formation technologies empower criminals in commission and protection. Indeed, IT acts
as a force multiplier, enabling criminals with minimal resources to generate potentially
huge negative effects [28][78]. IT also allows a single criminal to commit a large number of
small or low-impact crimes distributed among many jurisdictions [34]. Thus, IT promotes
the deskilling and reskilling of criminal labour and collaboration among cybercriminals.
These developments have led to cyber-crime-as-a-service (CaaS) economy - in other words,
commoditized crimeware in the underground market [255] - including providers that de-
liver services/products for protective purposes. It is therefore expected that the organized
nature of cyber crime will keep increasing in the future [76][259, p.7]. That cyber crimi-
nals and their businesses are networked becomes evident in the following case. Lurk was
a malware that targeted Russian financial institutions. After members of this group were
arrested in Russia, the Angler exploit kit - another specialized service - completely disap-
peared. Both groups were apparently highly interconnected, or perhaps even one and the
same [260]. This interdependency poses a major vulnerability to cyber criminals and their
crimes. For example, money mule herders have, according to Europol, a high dependency
on the availability of mules and a medium dependency on fake identity documents (IDs) to
open bank accounts [261] (see also [179, pp.31-32]).
Police evidence shows that committing financially-driven cyber crime is their
day job and primary means of support. The precise geographical location of
many of these anonymous cyber criminals is unknown, but the population con-
sist largely of cyber criminals who presumably live in Europe, former Soviet
Union states and the United States of America, and master Dutch, English,
Romanian and/or East Slavic languages (Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian).
While automated translation software was frequently used, a group of linguists,
translators and police investigators with an East Slavic background also helped
to understand the language and subculture of the latter group. Nota bene,
Russian is also the lingua franca for cyber criminals who are not located in,
or citizens of, the Russian Federation, but the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), large parts of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern and Cen-
tral Asia (more commonly referred to as Русский мир - ‘Russkiy mir’). The
terms Russian-language and Russian-speaking in this study therefore refer to
Russian citizens and citizens of the countries of the former Soviet Union, as
well as citizens of other countries who have emigrated from the countries of the
former Soviet Union to other parts of the world [259, p.3]. However, there is
also a considerable group of participants whose true identity and whereabouts
are known, especially when investigations led to the arrest and prosecution of
suspects. Over 50 Chinese cyber criminal fora have also been reviewed with the
53
help of a sinologist, but less extensive compared to the English-speaking and
East Slavic cyber criminal underground economies.
The participants of this study were further supplemented by computer-
focused thrill-seeking criminals and sexually-driven computer-assisted criminals.
The first group mostly consists of a small number of predominantly young Dutch
amateurs (also known as script kiddies) whose crimes are predominantly DDoS
attacks and defacements of websites. They generally have a forum presence on
open gaming and closed script kiddie fora, communicate via chat and email, and
may meet offline (see Section 7.2). The latter group consists of mainly Dutch
viewers, possessors, distributors and producers of child sexual abusive material.
They are sexually-driven (only a single commercial distributor of CSAM has
been studied), and their core business evolves around producing, collecting and
sharing child abusive material with like-minded people. Although their security
practices are less well documented by academics, investigative journalists and
private security researchers, police investigators and their dossiers are useful
sources to learn more about these hidden and sensitive crimes. CSAM users
apply deviant security too, have a presence on dedicated CSAM fora, use chat
to communicate, and may meet co-conspirers offline.
Generally, the offline identities of the cyber criminal participants are un-
known. Of some, even their online identity (also referred to as moniker or nick-
name) is unknown, which means that only their criminal activities are known
to the researcher. To conclude, the research population of this study that oper-
ate in cyber crime networks is very diverse: they commit different crimes, have
different backgrounds, motives and skill sets, are on different fora, use different
chat clients, et cetera, and are active in different time periods and duration over
time.
Participants in cyber security networks The second group of partici-
pants that has experiential relevance in this study are those who are con-
fronted by deviant security: academics, analysts, attorneys, diplomats, inves-
tigators, judges, legislators, policy-makers, private security researchers, public
prosecutors and (victim) witnesses. Most of these participants work within
CERTs, corporate security (i.e., cyber threat intelligence departments) of large
private enterprises, cyber hotlines on e.g., e-commerce fraud, identity fraud
and online child abuse, European and international analyses and coordina-
tion agencies such as the European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) of the Euro-
pean Union’s law-enforcement agency Europol and the Global Complex for In-
novation (IGCI) of INTERPOL, dedicated cyber crime investigation units of
national European and federal US law-enforcement agencies, internet service
providers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), financial institutions, min-
istries/departments/offices/secretariats of state, the private security industry,
and universities [262][56][80, pp.88-89]. Other participants are those whose as-
sistance is sought by the cyber security community such as victims, witnesses,
netizens and general Internet users: they too are confronted by DevSec [80,
pp.88-89].
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Many participants are members of cyber security networks that evolve around
informational capitalism and are composed of nodes that are ‘interconnected in
order to authorize and/or provide security to the benefit of internal and ex-
ternal stakeholders’ [91]. These networks are trust-based with secrecy towards
non-members as a default policy [35, pp.234-235]. These networks are formed
along linguistic, geographical and increasingly geopolitical lines. This study in-
cludes first-hand experiences and insights of different networks, such as visits to
private and public cyber security agencies (including law-enforcement-, intelli-
gence and security agencies) in various European countries, the United States of
America, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China; and par-
ticipation in strategic and operational meetings of the Dutch Electronic Crimes
Task Force (ECTF), Dutch Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),
the European Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (JCAT), the US International
Cyber Crime Coordination Cell (IC4), and the US National Cyber-Forensics &
Training Alliance (NCFTA). During such visits and meetings, agencies gener-
ally presented their strategies and/or finished and ongoing operations against
profit-driven computer-focused crimes.
4.1.2 Secondary Data Sources
What kind of data sources are collected from these two participant groups?
In qualitative inquiry in general, and Grounded Theory (GT) specifically, the
researcher is the instrument [263, p.34]. Qualitative research (especially GT,
but also the previously mentioned empirical legal scholarship) promote that the
researcher should first become familiar with an area of scientific research that,
in this case, is relevant to the development of law and policy, and should take
a multidisciplinary approach to develop knowledge [230, pp.866, 871-875][239,
p.41]. Entry into the field and locating participants are not an issue in this study
as the researcher works within the cyber security community. As said, these
networks are trust-based as trust facilitates the necessary willingness to share
information [56][262]. Because organized crime is largely a hidden phenomenon
that is only revealed with the use of evasive investigative powers [249], being an
embedded academic researcher within a national law-enforcement agency that
has a tradition in cooperating with academics in empirical research in the area of
organized crime (or: a police investigator who is conducting scientific research)
[264], opens more opportunities to collect rich secondary data sources about the
two participant groups than working in a traditional academic setting.
Personal writings of cyber criminals Grounded Theory depends on qual-
itative field research to investigate those attitudes and behaviors best under-
stood within their natural setting [265]. Although this study relies on typical
qualitative data sources such as interviews, observations and documents [239,
pp.129-143][247, p.274], there are also considerable differences with the common
practices as prescribed by most literature on GT. The constructionist view on
GT prescribes that researcher and participant should embark together on the
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process of constructing reality [243]. However, this study does not construct re-
ality through interviews with those who apply deviant security as this decreases
the number of available participants, and raises questions about the credibility
of the researcher and a number of serious ethical issues. A criminal might pro-
vide (new) incriminating evidence about former or recent activities during the
conversation. Dutch law prescribes that the interviewer, in this study being both
researcher and police officer, is obliged to act when he/she suspects that certain
crimes have been committed like explaining to the interviewee that he/she is
a suspect of crime and has the right to remain silent. Instead, this study re-
lies on unobtrusive information created by cyber criminals themselves, so-called
ground truth data. Other researchers have done this as well, such as McCoy
et al. and Kanich et al. who both used the operational databases of malafide
pharmaceutical affiliate programs to understand their business [168][188]. In
this study, not only such databases, but also chats, logs, postings, audio and
video conversations are used. Cyber criminals largely communicate online, us-
ing social media, chat, email and fora to discuss - amongst others - security
related matters [266][267]. Participants within the cyber security community
- especially law-enforcement agencies - have both the legal, organizational and
technical ability to gain an information position in the underground economy,
either by intercepting data in motion or by preserving and/or seizing data at rest
[20, p.207], as well as manually engaging in conversations with cyber criminals.
Lawfully intercepted and preserved data of cyber criminals are unobtrusive. It
therefore allows to observe cyber criminals in their natural setting which con-
tributes to scientific credibility as these text-based data are created - i.e., mostly
written - by the participants themselves. Other sources also ensure access to
unbiased and non-contaminated data about the physical, offline environment
of cyber criminals. The researcher has participated in house searches of cyber
criminals, and reviewed photo images and video recordings that were made by
LEA during undercover operations and before, during and immediately after
arrests of suspects and house raids. So, compared to researchers who use a sin-
gle source - a leaked client database or cyber criminal forum - this study uses
multiple data sources that were generated by the cyber criminal community.
Participant observation Another data source is participant observation within
the cyber security community. The idea behind participant observation is that
certain experiences are only understood through an intensive involvement with
the people in their cultural environment, usually over an extended period of
time [250]. The idea of moving from research on the police to research with
the police seems especially applicable to study cyber criminals and their prac-
tices [268][269, p.4]. Working as a researcher within the cyber security com-
munity provides opportunities to understand the full concept of deviant se-
curity. Daily proceedings within these cyber security networks evolve around
being confronted with deviant security, and - when it concerns police investi-
gation units - trying to breach that security to collect evidence. In practice,
the researcher has frequently conducted (and thus experienced) the full inves-
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tigative cycle within a European national cyber crime unit - i.e., the Dutch
National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) - that investigates complex, innova-
tive and/or organized computer-focused crimes, mostly within an international
context during this study (for an extensive description and evaluation of the
cyber security and cyber crime discourse in the Netherlands in general and the
NHTCU specifically, see [270][271]). The unit consists of over 120 individuals
with various academic and police backgrounds. The NHTCU was - amongst
others - involved in investigations against the following organized groups be-
hind financially-driven computer-focused crimes with an international impact
such as Buhtrap, Carbanak, Dyre, GameOver Zeus and Torpig, ransomwares
such as Chimera, Coinvault, CTB-locker, Shade, Teslacrypt and Wildfire, and
DDoS booter Webstresser.org [272]. The unit is also one of the initiators of
the award-winning public-private platform No More Ransom to prevent, detect
and confront ransomware [273], the No More DDoS platform to prevent, de-
tect and confront DDoS attacks, and Hack_Right for alternative sentences -
e.g., community services, financial transactions, fines, official warnings and pro-
bation - for young, low-threat offenders. The unit was further responsible for
the takedown of multiple botnets, such as Bredolab and Simda, arrests of the
individuals behind bulletproof hoster Maxided and related CSAM file-sharing
service Depfile, and for the takeover and takedown of cryptomarket Hansa.
Led by international partners, NHTCU was also involved in the investigations
of the bulletproof infrastructure Avalanche, the cyber criminal forum Darkode
and underground bank Liberty Reserve. Less known cases involved investiga-
tions against (mobile) banking trojans and other forms of online frauds, and a
wide range of criminal facilitators such as malafide telecom providers and on-
line money laundering schemes, including rogue cryptocurrency tumblers and
job scam services. In a few instances, sexually-driven computer-assisted crimes
were investigated as well, especially cases against high value CSAM targets.
Data of all these investigations, and many more that remain confidential, were
reviewed for this study.
During this five year research project, hundreds of conversations and in-
formal interviews were conducted with participants from the cyber security
community. Why so many interviewees? That is because police investigators
continuously have many (and often long) discussions with the above mentioned
participants as so much is still unknown about the commission and protection
of cyber crime and related responses such as investigations, laws and policies.
The individual interviews were taken by the researcher in his other capacity as a
police officer. Only notes were taken during these conversations that varied be-
tween unstructured, open-ended interviews and semistructured interviews [248,
pp.150-152][239, pp.130-134]. Group discussions in which results of this study
were presented were conducted as well (basically member/stakeholder checking
and focus group interviews [248, pp.194-206][239, pp.208-209][263, p.346]). Ad-
ditionally, observational field notes were written about deviant security related
issues that the researcher experienced himself during investigations as opposed
to the participants’ interpretation of the investigative events.
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Data sources from participants in practice
Police investigations evolve around seeking the truth and making statements that go be-
yond reasonable doubt [274, pp.489-490]. Therefore, investigations generate trustworthy,
credible and coherent data to reconstruct who is responsible for what, or - in case of on-
going crimes - what is going on and who is involved. Generally, multiple hypothesis are
tested and a variety of data sources are used before conclusions are drawn. During an
investigation of a high value CSAM target in the Netherlands in 2015, the Dutch National
High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) worked with the Dutch National Child Exploitation Team
and foreign law-enforcement agencies. The consortium placed wiretaps on telephone and
Internet connections, preserved servers, installed recording devices in the suspect’s car and
house, conducted physical observations, gained a presence on CSAM fora, executed a house
search, interviewed co-conspirers and witnesses. In another investigation into a computer-
focused crime, the NHTCU received a report of a private security company. The report
stated that several C&C servers were hosted in the Netherlands and used on attacks on
financial institutions. Servers outside of the Netherlands were preserved as well. Further-
more, netflow, payments details and subscriber details were requested. The private security
company provided further details about the MO, malware samples and used exploits, while
Europol organized a meeting to inform all major European banks. The Dutch GovCERT -
Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) - sent a threat analysis of the security vendor
to national CERTs that further distributed this report to national banks. National CERTs
and victims in turn, provided new information about the attacks as well. The NHTCU also
collaborated with multiple governments, and received and made advanced analyses about
offenders, used infrastructure and attacked victims.
Other sources Other used data sources include open-source files about de-
viant security such as academic studies, news media, non-fiction books, policy
documents, security blogs and videos. Furthermore, legislation and policy doc-
uments were reviewed, especially from the Netherlands, and to a lesser account,
the European Union and its Member States. Closed-source files mainly con-
sist of police dossiers for court purposes, although a court judgment may not
necessarily have been issued yet (see [196, p.4][249]). The latter files include
obtrusive testimonies and (audio and video recorded) statements of suspects,
witnesses and victims, and offline and online (unobtrusive) observations by law-
enforcement officers [239, pp.130, 141]. An online open database of Dutch court
documents was examined as well. Open and closed-source intelligence reports of
public and private organizations about actors and threats, and confidential sta-
tistical analyses on criminal organizations and their crimes, used infrastructure
and attacked victims were used as well. Such advanced analyses include time-
lines of botnet C&C IPs and domain names, patterns in ATM usage by money
mules, network-actor models on intercepted chats, and social network analy-
ses of fora, and were mostly produced and visualized by software programs as
iBase/Analyst’s Notebook, Gephi, Kibana, Maltego, yEd and/or VUE, and by
tools developed by the Dutch national police and the broader LEA commu-
nity. Furthermore, two questionnaires and a case study were distributed among
police investigators in various countries for the European Multidisciplinary Plat-
form Against Criminal Threats on cyber crime (EU Policy Cycle EMPACT),
followed by a round table discussion with high level management of national
cyber crime units (see Chapter 8). So, this study uses information that ranges
from soft intelligence to solid evidence about deviant security practices [249].
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These multiple qualitative and quantitative sources of data allow triangulation
and strengthen validity, reliability and credibility [263, p.350][275, pp.233-234],
which are important in cyber crime research [251, p.17]. Lastly, a small number
of reflexivity journals are written about the researcher’s own interpretations of
the data as well as the feedback of the cyber security community participants on
the constructed deviant security concepts (i.e., member checking [248, p.205])
[276][243, pp.131, 188-189].
4.1.3 Data Collection, Analysis and Writing
How are these secondary data sources collected and processed for research pur-
poses? A central characteristic of GT is simultaneous collection, analysis and
writing which are considered interrelated processes [246, pp.419-420][277, p.34].
For explanatory purposes, this section distinguishes between and describes how
the initial data collection and analysis were executed, and how subsequently
constructed categories were refined with the help of theoretical sampling.
Initial data collection and analysis A total of five years was spent in the
field, and during that time, relevant secondary data sources were collected in
the following sequence. Firstly, the topic was observed and experienced during
police investigations without collecting data. This helped to get acquainted to
the field in general, and specifically to the cyber security community and police
culture, daily work proceedings, and available data sources. After this adjust-
ment and exploration phase, the initial coding and data collection started. This
study first applied deterministic, purposeful sampling methods which focus on
selecting information-rich cases and participants [278]. Participants and cases
were sampled opportunistically, based on their availability to the researcher
(convenience sampling) [279, p.28]. Because the cyber security community and
their investigations are networked (meaning that many nodes within the net-
work will contribute to, or at least become aware of, transnational cyber crime
cases), and because criminal infrastructures are often hosted in the Netherlands,
the researcher was continuously notified by public and private actors about new
and ongoing high profile cases. Cases were also generated by his police unit,
because of reactive investigations (e.g., based on a victim complaint) and pro-
active investigations (based on own initiative). At the same time, data were
also collected from open sources, mostly blog posts from security researchers
(nota bene, evidence from open sources is also collected during police investi-
gations). Participants within the cyber security community who were aware of
the research project further pointed to cases that were interesting to review.
Especially former CSAM investigators that switched to computer-focused in-
vestigations pointed out relevant online child sexual abuse cases.
The DevSec-related issues in these sources were written down, then initially
coded and later focused coded, i.e., extensively testing the most useful initial
codes against other data on a low level of abstraction [243, p.43]. These codes
were subsequently linked to either the what, who, when and where of deviant
security or a rest category in NVivo. DevSec suppliers on fora were linked to
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who, while instances of encryption were initially linked to the rest category,
only to realize later in time that cryptography is linked in this study to time,
thus when and where. Simultaneously, informal analytical notes (memos in GT
terms) were written about the ideas that occurred. Slowly, the first preliminary
categories emerged.
A day in the office: continuous cycle of data collection & analysis
Generally, the progress of ongoing investigations is discussed on a daily basis within the
Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit. Setbacks and break-throughs in investigations
respectively mean encountered deviant security practices or exploited vulnerabilities such
as a successful wiretap, a match between an email address and nickname, the preservation
of a C&C server hosted in the Netherlands, or an official police report of the criminal
intelligence unit about the real identity of an unknown (so called no name) suspect. As
in qualitative research, data collection is followed by the analysis phase in investigations.
On many occasions, the data is too abstract, and multiple perspectives - digital, financial,
tactical - are needed to make sense. What are we looking at? Does this link to any
existing entities or other pieces of information? Which hypotheses do this data confirm or
reject? Why would the individual behind this attack use this tool? Is this disinformation
or did the perpetrator(s) really make this mistake? Which investigative power should we
execute next? Essentially, these discussions were often implicitly about filling in the various
components of the deviant security process cycle. Frequently, the help of others was sought.
When legally allowed, a combined analysis was done with private security researchers who
were studying the same malware campaign, foreign LEAs who were conducting parallel
investigations, and increasingly academics as well. A new phase of data collection and
analyses would start. Besides investigations, analyses were conducted about the broader
cyber threat intelligence picture and to determine long-term cyber security strategies. Is
this particular ransomware on the rise, and if so, where are perpetrators, infrastructure
and victims located? Who are the key enablers within the CaaS value chain? What are
the downsides of virtual currencies for both the cyber criminal and investigative business
processes? How do we inform 20.000 malware victims that are located all over the world?
Which academic, private industry or public sector collaborations do we need to deal with
this particular problem? What is our approach to country X, international organization Y
and newly founded cyber security platform Z? We have found a criminal database of a DDoS
service with clients of a young age, how do we deal with them? Due to these discussions and
experiences, the theories of deviant security were applied, tested and refined to understand
the cyber criminal landscape and explore appropriate investigative responses.
Refinement of categories and theoretical sampling Questions arose
and gaps appeared in these first categories. For example, there were many cases
in which cyber criminals applied deception, but the deception tactics seemed
to differ greatly. Two main categories emerged from the data: instances in
which cyber criminals used deception to commit crime, which has protective side
effects against law-enforcement; and instances in which cyber criminals applied
deception solely for deviant security purposes. Still, within these categories,
deception classifications were absent. A review of academic literature provided
a useful taxonomy with various deception tactics. Many observed cases fitted
within an adapted and enriched version of this taxonomy, although some of the
described tactics had not yet been observed. More data was gathered - known
as theoretical sampling - to fill in these gaps and refine the deviant deception
framework and its properties. Examples of deception tactics derived from the
literature were sometimes in the data set of this study, but not recognized as
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such till then. As with all categories in this study, theoretical sampling was
further done by searching for data in police systems - a review of case files -
as these systems perfectly lend themselves for quick, focused and easy keyword
searches, while at the same time providing new and rich empirical data. In
few instances, academic courses were followed on intercultural communication,
international relations and Russian security policies, taught at universities in
the Russian Federation.
It further became apparent that there were relationships between core cat-
egories across the study [243, pp.117-118]. Deception is, for instance, one of
the causes for i) information asymmetries within ii) intertwined networks. As
countermeasures against deception, cyber criminals apply iii) distrust mecha-
nisms and iv) trust mechanisms. These four core categories are all linked to the
who of DevSec, and as such it becomes apparent that deviant deception is best
understood as an interactive process that occurs between key players of DevSec.
At the same time, deception is also linked to the what of DevSec. Deception
skills are an intangible asset to cyber criminals and punishable under substantive
law. This insight helps to construct what makes security deviant, and define
its basic normative and empirical qualities. These findings were used during
informal group discussions with colleagues and other law-enforcement officers,
while simultaneously receiving feedback, new ideas and further refinement of
core categories. Such sessions were also helpful to test if categories were ma-
tured to a point in which saturation was reached and further sampling was not
needed [243, pp.113-115]. Slowly, an integrated and comprehensive grounded
theory on deviant security practices emerged that is placed within the socio-
logical grand theory of the Information Age and explained by a combination of
microeconomics and technical computer security.
4.2 Explanatory: Information Age & Microeco-
nomic Theory
Two economic perspectives are used in this study to provide explanatory power.
Firstly, deviant security practices are understood and placed within the larger
sociological paradigm - ‘the fundamental models or frames of reference we use
to organize our observations and reasoning’ [265] - of the Information Age.
This perspective deals with the macroeconomic changes from an Industrial Age
to an Information Age with economies based on information technology that
essentially created cyber crime. The second perspective, microeconomic theory,
helps to understand the decisions that cyber criminals have to make about some
of the observed deviant security practices in this study.
4.2.1 Deviant Security in the Information Age
Similar to studies about the commission of cyber crime, the results of this
study about the protection of cyber crime and the cyber criminal are placed
within the grand theory of the Information Age. This section first explains the
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importance of having a framework that connects the macro, meso and micro
level relationships that shape deviant security practices, and proceeds by briefly
outlining why the paradigm of the Information Age is able to do so.
Placing a theory on deviant security in a social paradigm Why de-
riving categories within a larger conceptual framework as the Information Age,
while Grounded Theory is essentially about developing new conceptual frame-
works? First of all, Grounded Theory does not reject the use of existing theoreti-
cal frameworks if a theory complements, extends or verifies findings, or provides
insights and directions for middle-range theories [240, pp.39-41]. This study
about the security practices of cyber criminals is essentially a middle-range the-
ory that fits within the larger sociological paradigm of the Information Age, and
several concepts derived from that paradigm - like the importance of networks
in today’s society - add to a more granular understanding of DevSec. Strauss
and Corbin further recommend to specify ‘those conditions and consequences, at
every level of scale from the most “macro” to the “micro,” and integrating them
into the resulting theory’ [247]. So, they advocate to research the processes
of society at large that influence and shape a research topic. The relevance
for this approach is most striking in Chapter 7: deviant security practices are
heavily affected by events outside the cyber criminal’s sphere of influence. GT
also promotes to study issues at the level of networks, small organized groups
and individuals, more specifically for this study the deviant security of cyber
criminal networks, groups and individuals, and cyber security networks, inves-
tigative units and individual police officers. As shown throughout this study
and as visualized in Figure 4.1, the Information Age is able to integrate the
macro, meso and the micro dimensions that shape DevSec.
Secondly, explicitly mentioning a social paradigm is further necessary be-
cause of reflexivity - the awareness of the researcher of how his/her world view,
social identity and background impacts his/her study - which is of great im-
portance to Grounded Theory [243, p.132][276]. Computer scientists and legal
scholars generally do not explain to their audience what their perspective is on
reality [234][280]. However, social paradigms have undoubtedly, but perhaps un-
knowingly, a profound impact on the outcomes of their research. Legal scholar
Orin Kerr stated about research on Internet law:
‘By choosing the perspective, we choose the reality; by choosing the
reality, we choose the facts; and by choosing the facts, we choose the
law’ [281, p.361].
If that were so, both the researcher and his/her audience should be well aware
what that perspective on reality is as, in this case, the research findings aim at
impacting the decisions of legal practitioners in the public sector.
Deviant security in the Information Age The Information Age is a pow-
erful paradigm to understand the macro conditions that impact the deviant
security practices in the cyber criminal’s micro environment. Although few
62
computer science studies in general, and technical computer security studies
specifically, refer to the Information Age, the perspective has been widely ac-
knowledged by social scientists (like David Wall, Majir Yar and Myriam Dunn
Cavelty [84][34][28][75]) and legal practitioners (of e.g., the Dutch national po-
lice [282]) as the paradigm to understand the commission of today’s cyber crime
and explore appropriate responses.
Amongst other scholars, sociologist Manuel Castells wrote an extensive tril-
ogy about the social, economical, cultural and political transformations at the
end of the previous century that have such an impact on today’s life [45][283][44].
The strength of the paradigm for this study lies in its emphasis on the domi-
nant role of information technologies in present day’s society. Today’s societies
embrace, and indeed, depend so much upon IT, and its subset of the Internet,
that Castells names this era the Information Age:
‘Technology is society, and society cannot be understood or rep-
resented without its technological tools’ [44].
Technology has accelerated globalization, and enabled the organization of dom-
inant functions and processes within society around networks. Hence, present-
day society is labelled a network society [44], which is vital for this study with its
usage of secondary data sources of participants from cyber security and cyber
criminal networks. The Information Age and Network Society not only have
a profound impact on law-abiding entities, but also on the way today’s crime
manifests itself. Cyber crime is transnational, technology-driven and has be-
come ‘an essential feature of the new global economy, and of the social/political
dynamics’ [283]. As shown in Part III, the paradigm helps not only to under-
stand the commission of cyber crime, but the deviant security practices of cyber
criminals as well.
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Figure 4.1: The conditional and consequential matrix, brought forward by Corbin and
Strauss, is according to Charmaz ‘an analytic device for thinking about macro and micro
relationships that might shape the situations the researcher studies’ [247, p.274][243, pp.118-
119]. The security practices of cyber criminals are affected by interacting macro, meso and
micro level spheres of influence. The macro (external) environment is uncontrollable to the
cyber criminal, but have a powerful impact on his/her business and security practices. Macro
level dimensions that affect DevSec include international and national laws, policies and law-
enforcement interventions, but also technological innovations and societal events on which
cyber criminals have little influence. Meso level spheres of influence point to DevSec-related
aspects that occur within, or because of, cyber security and cyber criminal networks, like secu-
rity culture on cyber criminal fora and other large collectives. Lastly, micro level refers to the
individual factors of a cyber criminal that impacts his/her security, like learning capabilities,
adaptability and other competencies. Figure 7.1 is a filled-in conditional and consequential
matrix that presents the key concepts that shape the temporal-spatial nature of deviant se-
curity.
4.2.2 The Microeconomics of Deviant Security
Because Section 3.1.4 already explains attacker economics and the economics of
deviant security, this section briefly discusses several underlying assumptions.
Cyber criminals wittingly or unwittingly conduct i) risk assessments which are
explained in this study by ii) microeconomic theory based on iii) rational choice
perspective. In practice this means that the core categories of Part III are struc-
tured by principles from technical computer security, and further enriched by
microeconomic theory to gain an in-depth understanding of the deviant secu-
rity practices. Yet the formulation of investigative responses against deviant
security cannot not solely rely on microeconomics, but also has to connect to
the world of legal practitioners. In other words, effective police responses from
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a purely microeconomic perspective do not equal appropriate police responses
from a legal point of view. Formulating appropriate responses against deviant
security, including an assessment of the legal feasibility of investigation strate-
gies, fits within the discipline of iv) law and economics - the application of
microeconomic theory to analyze laws, policies and police investigations for a
legal practitioner audience - and is very much the legal tail of this study.
Deviant security risk assessment Many deviant security practices can be
explained by risk assessments that cyber criminals have to conduct. Cyber
criminals hypothetically have to assess the risks that they face properly, not
to a compliance standard of due diligence and due care (known as checkbox
security), but because their physical and psychological integrity is at stake:
they can get arrested, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated for their crimes.
Risk assessments should provide - amongst others - cost-benefit analyses (CBA)
[59, p.74]. Yet the goal of this study is not to create a rigorous deviant CBA
taxonomy, but rather highlight exemplary costs and benefits of the protection of
crime and the criminal. These costs and benefits of this study are expressed in a
qualitative manner such as, but not limited to, economic tradeoffs - the balance
between various factors related to deviant security that are not attainable at the
same time. Together with other microeconomic concepts that are mentioned in
the next paragraph, these insights provide an understanding of the risks that
cyber criminals are willing to accept - i.e., their risk appetite - and identify
situations in which they apply e.g., too much or too little security.
Microeconomic theory Readers may notice that several key concepts of
deviant security - such as trust [284, pp.572-573][54][285], assets [286][274],
and temporal and situational factors for decision-making [287, pp.116-117] -
are linked to microeconomic theory and rational choice perspective. Microe-
conomics is generally used to research economic activities as an interaction of
individuals pursuing their private interests and allocating their resources in a
market [70, p.5][286, p.3]. This research project is no exception, yet takes the
practices of law-breaking individuals who operate on cyber criminal markets
(i.e., attacker economics) as objects of study. As the little brother of the eco-
nomics of information security [182][181], and previously explained in detail in
Section 3.1.4, the core argument of the economics of deviant security is that not
only the technical computer security practices of law-abiding agents but also
those of malicious agents can be explained by microeconomic language such as
competitive (dis)advantages, information asymmetries, negative externalities,
perverse economic incentives and tradeoffs.
Rational choice perspective The use of basic microeconomic theory to un-
derstand e.g., security tradeoffs assumes a rational choice perspective (RCP)
[54][288, pp.4,8,47]. RCP on crime was originally put forward by the academic
discipline of crime science, and takes the offender’s decision-making as the cen-
tral focal point for understanding criminal behavior [289][209]. Lately, the per-
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spective has also been deployed on cyber crime [290][291][292][293, pp.581-582],
and adopted by the discipline of cyber crime science (CCS) [288]. The latter
discipline advocates RCP for interventions that immediately reduce the com-
mission of cyber crime and harm to victims. CCS combines technical computer
security with empirical research methods used in crime science which are similar
to grounded theory data collection principles and techniques such as triangula-
tion, direct observation, and interviews [288][289][294]. Rational choice assumes
that criminal behavior is a purposive, dynamic process influenced by situational
factors in which offenders try to maximize profits and minimize risks. RCP fur-
ther assumes that criminal behavior is rational in the sense that offenders may
improve their decision-making through experience and learn and modify their
strategies to commit crimes, albeit bounded by limits of time, ability, and the
availability of relevant information (also known as bounded rationality) [295,
pp.1-2][296, pp.24-36].
Law & economics Microeconomic theory based on rational choice provides
explanatory power to the DevSec model, but also forms the tailpiece that con-
nects to the legal significance of the study. Not only prosecutorial discretion,
plea bargaining and sentencing discretion may be understood in economic terms
[297], but aspects of criminal procedure prior to prosecution as well, such as po-
lice investigations. Offensive investigative powers stand in close relation with
the vulnerabilities and tradeoffs of the cyber criminal. More specifically, they
try to exploit them and breach the cyber criminal’s security system. Therefore,
they are very much economically-based instruments that work as an incentive
for cyber criminals to change their behavior, and to increase the efficiency of
responses [274, pp.5-7][298]. Their investigations further have to collect evi-
dence that prove that criminals have acted rationally [274, pp.501-502], while
taking into account levels of bounded rationality, i.e., cases where there is no or
less culpability. Because of this economic approach, the last chapter of Part III
includes implications for legal practitioners, and fits within the legal discipline
of law and economics [299]. This discipline is a subfield of ELS when a study is
based on empirical data and not merely theoretical [235, pp.145-146].
4.3 Limitations
As the first structured and systematic research project on deviant security prac-
tices of cyber criminals, this study has inherent limitations of its participants
and empirical data, methodology, theoretical foundations and outcomes. This
section reflects on the nature of these limitations, provides arguments for the
choices made and suggests how such limitations could be overcome in the future.
Participants and empirical data Limitations concerning participants and
related data sources are plentiful. Firstly, there is a lack of knowledge about
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financially-driven computer-focused criminals who are so successful in their De-
vSec practices that they remain undetected. For example, a top law firm stated
during this study that they frequently had quoted companies as clients who were
hacked, whose confidential files were stolen and who were subsequently extorted.
During the five years of this study, not a single organized extortion group was
discovered, until the last year of the research project. How many more cyber
criminal schemes are out there, not yet detected by or reported to organizations
with a public mission like the academic world, law-enforcement agencies or me-
dia outlets? There is evidence that some of the top organized computer-focused
criminals are physically working together to limit the amount of online com-
munications between group members. While we sometimes see their damage to
victims, large parts of their MO - especially their preparations, pre-activities
and post-activities - are shrouded in mystery. Moreover, this study relies on
information that ranges from soft intelligence to solid evidence, including third
party intelligence reports and lawfully preserved and/or intercepted writings of
anonymous individuals who - amongst others - discuss DevSec practices. It is
difficult to check the underlying sources of these reports, while reality can turn
out to be rather different from what initial investigative steps suggest [249]. A
third concern with some of the solid sources is the lack of corroborating evi-
dence to check if the referent objects concerned also (correctly) implemented
the discussed DevSec policies and mechanisms in practice. Furthermore, it is
unknown to what extent encountered countermeasures of this study’s partic-
ipants can be generalized to other cyber criminal communities. Few controls
were only observed a single time, while the cyber criminal community does not
exist. It is unknown how accepted and how frequently these countermeasures
are also applied by others, like Brazilian politically-driven hacktivists [300], as
cyber criminals and the networks to which they belong, are very heterogenous,
and differ in culture, motives, skill sets and so on. Lastly, the described and
explained deviant security practices might be a snapshot in time. Although the
DevSec policies and mechanisms are described on a high level of abstraction,
we have no idea how controls of cyber criminals will develop over time as this
is the first major study on these practices. Yet the quality and quantity of par-
ticipants and empirical data of this study is unprecedented compared to other
academic studies. Moreover, the goal of this study is to present a first broad
overview of the various components of deviant security, and more research is
indeed needed to address these limitations. Therefore, each section ends with
an interim conclusion and discussion that lists directions for future research.
Grounded Theory A concern related to the methodology of GT is the pos-
sibility that the normative outcomes and constructed categories of this study
are regarded as non-objective, non-critical or biased as the author is work-
ing within the cyber security community. As stressed by others, ‘innovative
research methodologies, including direct engagement with law-enforcement, fo-
rum participants and observations of market activities before, during, and after
any intervention’ are needed to explore effective responses [301, p.97]. Besides
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documented problems related to research with police such as cultural and or-
ganizational barriers [268], advanced investigations on computer-focused and
computer-assisted crimes are lengthy, progress in irregular fashion with uncer-
tain outcomes, and take place in very closed, trust-based environments. Aca-
demics might not have time, or even have the opportunity, to deploy such in-
novative methodologies. So being embedded within law-enforcement might be
inevitable to study deviant security in detail. Still, this study invested in over-
coming the above mentioned objections by refraining from securitization and
commodification of security. Whether scholars apply Grounded Theory or not,
awareness of their own preconceptions, values and beliefs is vital as security
is indeed increasingly deeply political [302]. Moreover, results of unsupervised
statistical and artificial intelligence methods and techniques such as word2vec
and topic modeling on cyber criminal data also steered the direction of this
study. These methodologies perfectly fit within Grounded Theory as they pro-
mote the unbiased discovery of theory in large data sets. Yet the potential
and limitations of applying such technologies in GT need further exploration.
Lastly, some scholars might conclude that this research is not a true Grounded
Theory study, or a too flexible interpretation of the methodology especially as
a mixed GT approach is used in this study, existing theories to explain deviant
security practices and a literature study was conducted in Chapters 2 and 3.
However, several scholars, including Strauss, Corbin and Charmaz, have argued
that researchers should not rigidly apply Grounded Theory, but with a degree
of flexibility and creativity instead [303, p.7][245, p.77][243, pp.2, 9].
The Information Age Manuel Castells’ trilogy has been named as belonging
to ‘the class of grand sociological grand theory’ [304]. If this is true, remains
the question. On the one hand, Castells has been criticized for extrapolating
from current trends, and using empirical data selectively to make normative
arguments [305]. According to Castells, the European Union would be the best
example of a successful decentralized network of 28 states. Yet he overlooks the
constant push of the EU, including Europol and Eurojust, for more influence
- i.e., centralization - upon the area of cyber security and cyber crime at the
expense of Member States [306][307][308][309][310]. Related to this issue is
Castells’ position on a grow towards globalization instead of the traditional
nation-states. Yet we see the revival of nation-states - i.e., China, Russia, United
Kingdom and United States - and new geopolitical blocks which have a true
impact on the fight against cyber crime as Section 7.3 shows. On the other side,
when the first volume was published in 1998, a critique was that much of the
work was pushing at open doors [311], such as the importance of information
technologies and networks in today’s society.
A problem for this study is further that Manuel Castells did not mention
cyber crime at all, but solely discusses organized traditional crime in the In-
formation Age. Yet cyber crime significantly differs from traditional crime,
pressing the need for new academic disciplines such as cyber criminology and
cyber-crime science [204][288]. Notwithstanding this argument, several leading
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criminologists on cyber crime, most notably David Wall and Majid Yar, success-
fully used the paradigm to understand financially-driven computer-focused and
sexually-driven computer-assisted criminals. Still, the question could be raised
how deviant security would fit within other grand theories. Deviant security
could also be placed within grand sociological theory of the Risk Society, as
described by Ulrick Beck, David Garland and Anthony Giddens [312][313][314].
From this perspective, more emphasis would be on risk as compared on (de-
viant) security, and the interplay of risk as a source of insecurity and related
risk management for both cyber criminal and cyber security communities. Such
an approach would research how the attacker capabilities of key players from
both communities create risks and uncertainties for the other side and fuel each
other’s insecurity that have to but cannot fully be governed.
Economics of Deviant Security A first limitation about the microeconomic
explanations of this study is its merely qualitative and inductive nature, as
compared to deductive and quantitative. While (unpublished) statistics are
used as data sources as well, a more mixed methods approach on the economics
of deviant security would produce more robust outcomes. Yet the goal of this
first structured and systematic study on DevSec is to show that economics is
a helpful discipline to explain some of the encountered security practices of
cyber criminals. A shortcoming related to microeconomics and rational choice
perspective as theories to explain deviant security practices is the critique that
people are boundedly rational, fail to maximize their utility and that their
preferences are affected by context [315][316, p.39][317]. For research on cyber
crime specifically, RCP would lean too much on the notion of human behavior
as the driving force behind criminal activities, and too little little on the hybrid
partnership between technology and humans, especially in crimes that have a
robotic and automatic character such as botnets [293, pp.581-582]. However,
applying microeconomic theory and a rational choice perspective in this study -
supported with empirical data and build upon a grounded conception of DevSec
- pays attention to those shortcomings and is more sensitive about context.
These first law-and-economics insights might ultimately fit within a wider law
and behavioral science movement that researches deviant security as a field of
study on its own and supplements the inadequate elements of the RCP with
insights from other social science disciplines [315]. Indeed, there is a need for
new perspectives, such as the anthropology, linguistics or psychology of deviant
security that will provide more explanatory power and broaden the field of study.
Outcomes for legal practitioners A limitation of this multidisciplinary
study is its review of predominantly Dutch normative data sources, i.e., legisla-
tion, policy and investigations, even when some of the reviewed operations are
conducted by other countries. For instance, when other countries send a request
based on a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) to the Netherlands, the na-
tional police of the Netherlands opens a criminal case under Dutch law to execute
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the request. A concern with research in such complicated socio-technical-legal
settings is that the researcher is thrown back to his/her own cultural prejudices
and internal feelings [109, p.95]. This indeed occurred, for example, during
presentations and collaborations with officers from several national and inter-
national law-enforcement organizations. While more comparative legal research
on cyber crime in general and deviant security specifically is indeed needed,
this study is the first that has access to and takes notice of views of multiple
law-enforcement agencies from various non-Western jurisdictions. A further crit-
icism might be the relatively small audience of legal practitioners, even within
a single legal discipline, more specifically criminal law [234, pp.425-426]. Yet
this study focuses on all legal practitioners within the criminal justice system as
compared to merely lawyers. Nowadays, the former occupational group includes
many professionals with a technical background such as data scientists, digital
investigators and software developers, and with a social science background such
as behaviorists, criminologists and statisticians. Moreover, the multidisciplinary
nature of this study will appeal to a broad audience and is a representation of
what cyber crime and investigations truly are. Both phenomenon and reaction
to this phenomenon are socio-technical practices within respectively substantive
and procedural legal frameworks.
One might further argue that this study adds to the process of securitiza-
tion by overly focusing on the administrative, physical and technical security
practices of cyber criminals, and related investigative responses that are part of
the border-centric view on cyber security and cyber crime. Firstly, the security
practices of cyber criminals are viewed in this study from a technical computer
security perspective (as compared to responses that are viewed from a cyber
security perspective). According to scholars from the Copenhagen School, this
technical discourse does not qualify for securitization [4, p.1160]. Simply put,
securitization is very much out of the question when describing and explain-
ing the phenomenon of deviant security practices from an academic, technically
neutral point of view. Although suspects of cyber crime and their security prac-
tices have always been a core domain of public policy, law and investigations,
the pitfall of securitization is real in the debate about investigative responses to
deviant security. After all, scholars of the Copenhagen School argue that secu-
ritization language is frequently used in cyber security [75] [107][30][4]. For this
reason, the research project refrains from securitization grammar, and does not
- amongst others - qualify and/or quantify how big a threat deviant security is
to investigations, nor pleads for expansion of investigative powers. The Copen-
hagen School’s securitization approach itself also has serious shortcomings. It
has been criticized for being merely an analytical tool with limited normative
utility [318]. In other words, besides simply arguing for desecuritization, the
analysts that apply this approach have little ‘ability to influence the securitiza-
tion process in a deliberate and thought-out fashion and [...] to a desired effect’
[318, p.44]. Therefore, this study presents a normative framework against de-
viant security in Chapter 8, taking notice of the critiques of the borderless view
on cyber security and cyber crime by regarding police investigations as means
to provide human security that respect Internet as a global public good.
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4.4 Ethical issues
This study not only tries to avoid ethical problems - e.g., harm to participants -
by installing safeguards for those who apply deviant security, but also for those
who are confronted by it. Contrary to other studies on cyber crime [319], the
research project has explicit academic Research Ethics Board approval from the
University of Bristol, and legal approval by relevant government authorities in
the Netherlands based on the Dutch Police Data Act (Wet Politiegegevens), to
use the previously mentioned secondary data sources for research purposes and
publish about the deviant security practices of cyber criminals.
Protecting those who apply DevSec During data collection, there was no
offline or online interaction/contact between the researcher and the cyber crim-
inal participants for the purpose of this study. Only secondary data sources are
used. Several measures are taken to ensure their anonymity during data analysis
and writing. Firstly, detailed information in this study is predominantly derived
from legitimate sources on open, public sources such as newspaper articles and
technical reports from investigative journalists and private security researchers.
Illegitimate sources that have been leaked online are not used, to prevent re-
victimization. When it concerns information derived from closed sources like
lawfully intercepted communications of cyber criminals, the vast majority of
offline identities of the cyber criminals are unknown to the researcher for the
simple reason that these individuals are not identified because of - amongst
others - deviant security. Secondly, the method of data analysis and writing -
inductively developing a theory as prescribed by GT - ensures that constructed
DevSec policies and mechanisms are quite abstract and not linked to the true
identity of those who apply deviant security controls. The latter argument also
applies to those cases in which the offline identity of the criminal is known to
the researcher (especially police reports). For this reason, the use of quotations
to bring in the voice of these particular participants is missing [239, pp.182-
183]. While outsiders will have a hard time in attributing the de-anonymized
cases to individuals, potential harm may still occur when insiders justly and/or
erroneously recognize themselves or others.
Protecting those who are confronted by DevSec During data collec-
tion, there was no offline or online interaction/contact between the researcher
and participants from the cyber security community for the purpose of this
study. Conversations and interviews with these participants are also considered
secondary data as these were conducted as an investigator who worked on op-
erational cases and in need to understand DevSec practices that are thwarting
investigations. There are also other ethical considerations to protect those who
are confronted with DevSec and their daily proceedings. Individuals in the cyber
security community - most notably, private security researchers and investiga-
tive journalists - have been threatened by cyber criminals in the past. It is a
myth that cyber criminals are merely ‘tech geeks’ who will refrain from using
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violence against persons they deem threat agents. There have been instances
in which cyber criminals use physical violence, including the use of fire arms,
against law-enforcement officers. Therefore, research findings are presented in
such a way that they not harm participants from the cyber security community.
These considerations also apply to the community’s capabilities to fight crime.
Cyber criminals collect and exchange information about law-enforcement activ-
ities [320, p.18], and one of the findings of this research is that cyber criminals
benefit from understanding the capabilities of their threat agents. So, not only
quotations of interviewees are missing in this study, but also screenshots of fora,
names of police operations and writings that link LEA to specific investigations,
unless these findings are also found on open Internet sources. Thus in many in-
stances, this study cites publicly available sources, although the researcher had
far better operational insights. Citations are in this study also used as references
for readers to learn more about certain public and private operations against
cyber crime. This practice indeed differs from other qualitative studies which
present such direct observations to enhance their credibility to their audience
[248, pp.414-417].
Lastly, some people might believe that this study in general will benefit cyber
criminals in building better security and therefore harm police investigations.
Ross Anderson points out that this issue has already been addressed since the
first books on cryptography were published around the 16th century. When he
addressed the question if his book on security engineering should be published
at all, Professor Anderson commented [36, p.xxviii]:
‘While some bad guys will benefit from a book such as this, they
mostly know the tricks already, and the good guys will benefit much
more’.
While he referred to knowledge that might help the commission of crime, the
same reasoning applies to knowledge about deviant security. The cyber criminal
community already knows all the tricks in this study about the protection of
crime: deviant security is frequently discussed at great length on cyber crim-
inal fora, and many data are collected from similar closed and open sources.
As pointed out above, many studies are also not police investigator-centric,
while poor knowledge and skills of police investigators prove to be the reason
for ineffective investigations [321]. More research on the specific problems that
investigators face will increase the effectiveness of their investigations, and de-
viant security is definitely one of these problems. Lastly, the inductive inquiry
of this study allows a level of detail that illustrates the underlying principles of






What? - Basic Qualities of
Deviant Security
The next chapters present the core categories of the technical computer security
practices of predominantly profit-driven computer-focused criminals that stand
out in the data, and are considered the most relevant to legal practitioners. The
core categories that are presented in this chapter follow the narrative account
of criminal investigations setting out who did what, when, where, how and why
[322, pp.256, 269][323, p.308]. More specifically, how cyber criminals apply
protection is understood in this study by researching:
– What are the basic normative and empirical qualities of DevSec (Chapter
5);
– Who are the key players and related interactive protective qualities (Chap-
ter 6); and
– When and where is DevSec applied, i.e., temporal-spatial protective qual-
ities (Chapter 7).
When looked at the bigger picture, the findings of this research suggest that
cyber criminals need to protect anything, against anybody, anywhere, at any
time. As a consequence, they constantly (have to) make cost-benefit analyses
about their security that can be understood in - amongst others - microeconomic
terms. Therefore, all chapters provide explanations:
– Why security-related practices occur, in other words, reasons for observed
deviant security practices. These explanations are mostly derived from
the economics of deviant security - a combination of technical computer
security and microeconomics - and to a lesser extent other social science
disciplines such as linguistics and security studies.
The sum of observed deviant security practices represents the full range of ad-
ministrative, physical and technical countermeasures of a preventive, deterrent,
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detective, corrective, recovery and compensating nature. The identified deviant
security policies and mechanisms in this study should, however, not be con-
sidered in isolation, but in close coherence as depicted in Figure 9.4. Cyber
criminals very much apply security in compensating layers. More precisely,
they have their own version of defense and offense security in-depth, aimed at
protecting the criminal and his/her crimes against threat agents.
The first research question is an obvious one. The term is used through-
out this study, but what exactly is deviant security? A multidisciplinary ap-
proach answers this question. Concepts derived from computer science, and
more specifically technical computer security, are at the heart of this chapter,
and subsequently combined with concepts - see Figure 5.1 - from various other
academic disciplines. Legal scholarship helps to define deviant security; security
studies to understand the meaning of DevSec; and microeconomics to explain
the provision, form and function of the security of cyber criminals.
Technical computer security to understand DevSec practices
This study categorizes DevSec as being either defensive or offensive in nature, and as ad-
ministrative, physical and technical security controls [59, p.28]. The conceptual differences
between these categories are illustrated by the following observed case. An email service
was advertised as a high security web-based email system with encryption, authentica-
tion, public key infrastructure (PKI) and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME). For this reason, many cyber criminals were attracted to this service. The bad
guys made, however, one mistake. The email service only offered technical security, and
not administrative security against information requests of law-enforcement agencies. On
the contrary, the company fully complied to court orders. While a copy of the content of
the mailbox cannot be extracted, valuable metadata can be successfully delivered by the
email service.
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Figure 5.1: This oversight visualizes the structure of Chapter 5 via a selection of key concepts
about the basic normative and empirical qualities of deviant security. For a full oversight of
descriptive and explanatory key concepts of Part III and their inter-relation, see Figure 9.4.
5.1 Definition: What Makes Security Deviant?
The commission of crime and protection of crime and the criminal are not
only inextricably linked from a criminological viewpoint, but also from a legal
perspective. In short, criminal law defines the referent object whom conducts
security deviant practices. How deviant security is further constructed and
perceived in substantive and procedural law is shown by a brief analysis of two
legal sources: i) national public law, more specifically Dutch substantive and
procedural law, and ii) international public law, i.e., various conventions of the
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Council of Europe that predominantly aim at harmonizing national procedural
and substantive laws of states parties [82, p.215]. The last paragraph of this
section concludes that the normative definition for deviant security is empirically
observable. Security practices of cyber criminals may truly deviate from law-
abiding entities which holds several consequences for researching DevSec.
Defined by criminal law In this study, the referent objects of security are cy-
ber criminals. From a criminological perspective, these referent objects execute
a modus operandi that consists of the commission of crime and the protection
of crime and the criminal. In other words, commission and protection are insep-
arably entwined. Because of the legal connotations of the commission of crime,
a definition for deviant security requires a legal approach as well. Irrespective
of the legal system of jurisdictions [324], who and what are deemed criminal
are legal constructs, and therefore must comply with the elements of criminal
liability such as, but not limited to, the elements of mens rea (for elements in
US law, see box Legal connotations to assets in Section 5.5) [325]. If these ele-
ments are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, an individual is criminally liable
for the crimes he/she committed. This legal responsibility of an individual for
the commission of crime is a conditio sine qua non for defining the referent ob-
ject of deviant security. Thus, the latter part of an MO - i.e., the protection
of crime and the criminal - is also understood from a legal perspective. Simply
put, deviant security practices are the countermeasures of a legal or natural
person who is criminally liable for the crimes he/she committed. This makes
deviant security practices a legal construct and a normatively-laden concept as
well. Therefore, this study subsequently defines deviant security as:
all technical computer security controls of natural and legal per-
sons who are criminally liable for the commission of crime, in order
to protect the criminal and his/her crimes.
The next paragraphs continue by explaining how national and international
public law - predominantly Dutch substantive and procedural laws and vari-
ous conventions of the Council of Europe - further fine-tunes the definition for
deviant security.
Constructed by absence of law Firstly, the definition for DevSec is further
shaped by the absence of regulation. Besides a few exceptions (see Section 5.3),
generally, neither the assets that DevSec has to protect, nor DevSec measures
themselves are protected by private and public law. Similarly, neither are there
any industry standards for the security of cyber criminals. The criminal assets
that DevSec practices have to protect may also differ from bonafide assets of
law-abiding citizens (see also Section 5.4). The latter are defined and protected
by e.g., tax and intellectual property laws that do not apply to criminal products
and services. Obfuscated malware cannot be regarded as intellectual property,
neither can a cyber criminal get an insurance against rippers, nor put his/her
fire arms on the balance for a tax refund. Basic civil law principles such as pacta
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sunt servanda - agreements must be kept - do not apply to the contracts between,
let us say, a malicious crypter and his/her client. The only effective criminal
contracts are indeed self-enforcing contracts as they lack third-party contractual
enforcement [326, pp.26-27]. To induce a desired behavior, cyber criminals have
no other option than offering carrots - rewards like the bug bounty program for
cryptomarket members [327] - or hitting others with sticks, i.e., punishments
like bans from fora as described in Section 6.6.
Law may also prescribe security standards to norm-addressees in order to
protect computer users in general, but does not do so for law-breaking refer-
ent objects and/or any unmistakable deviant security mechanisms that protect
criminals. For example, legal provisions such as the European Union 1999 eS-
ignatures Directive dictates that qualified trust providers such as certificate au-
thorities should provide trusted encrypted communications for computer users
(see also [74]). There are no laws, however, that demand that criminal trust
providers - i.e., escrow services - comply to a certain standard (see Section 6.4).
This is one of the reasons why cryptocurrencies are popular among cyber crim-
inals. The related cryptocurrency payment systems provide a level of deviant
security because these decentralized systems lack legal and/or technical mecha-
nisms that empower central authorities like mandatory authentication, payment
processing based on intermediaries and the possibility to revoke transactions
[328][329][330].
Constructed by procedural law The definition for DevSec is further fine-
tuned by explanatory reports of procedural laws from, in this study, the Nether-
lands. In other words, do Dutch legislators identify and acknowledge the exis-
tence of deviant security practices as a problem for police investigations? Ex-
planatory reports of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (DCCP) explicitly
mention administrative and physical (read: offline) DevSec practices of tradi-
tional criminals, and later in time, also online and technical security of cyber
criminals. Of importance are the outcomes of the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry
Committee into Criminal Investigation Methods (1994-1996, see [331] for the
reasons and findings of the committee). The committee provided the foundation
for the procedural Act on Special Investigative Police Powers (Bijzondere Op-
sporingsbevoegdheden, also known as BOB), effective as from the year 2000. This
act was specifically designed to regulate various intrusive investigative methods
to fight organized crime. The research group of the parliamentary inquiry com-
mittee defined organized crime in 1995 as ‘groups [...] capable of effectively
shielding their activities against targeted actions of the government’ [332, p.9].
The researchers distinguished between defensive and offensive contra-strategies,
which is similar to terminology as active and passive disruption from more re-
cent computer science research on botnet protection [158, p.129]. The defensive
contra-strategies are ways of criminals to conceal their activities against com-
petitors and government such as changing cars to thwart police observations.
The offensive contra-strategies - very much the focus of the research group -
are the willingness and ability of organized groups to actively fight government
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action [332, p.28], and include:
– The use of physical violence and intimidation;
– The elimination of individuals by way of corruption;
– The collection of information about government activities to subsequently
adjust their own criminal activities (i.e., contra-observation);
– The use of media to create a favorable reputation or to discredit the gov-
ernment;
– The deployment of powerful and important individuals to influence gov-
ernment decisions;
– The distribution of disinformation to distract the government (e.g., double
informants) [332, pp.133-134].
In fact, it is very much because of these deviant security practices that Dutch
procedural law, i.e., Titel V of the DCCP, also allows investigations of those
involved - i.e., not being suspects of crime yet - in planning to commit serious
and organized crimes. According to the Dutch legislator [333], law-enforcement
agencies need a proactive stance against these organized groups, and actively
breach their deviant security to identify the offenses these criminal organizations
are committing, as it is unlikely that (their) victims and witnesses will come
forward and file a complaint.
How should we perceive the above mentioned DevSec practices from a tech-
nical computer security perspective? All measures are either administrative
or physical countermeasures, of both defensive and offensive nature, against
government action, see Table 5.1. Bribery as criminalized in the Council op
Europe’s Convention on Corruption is, for example, an administrative security
measure, while the use of violence is a physical security measure. Defensive
and offensive deviant security mechanisms of a technical nature, also deployed
against other threat agents than the government, are not included in the report
from 1995. Yet the explanatory memorandi of the Computer Crime Act III
(Wet Computercriminaliteit III ) in the Netherlands explicitly mentions breach-
ing technical security of a defensive nature, like encryption, in a cyber criminal
context [334, p.6]. Similarly, the explanatory report of the Convention on Cy-
bercrime names encryption, intentional manipulation and deletion as means
designed to destroy evidence [335, pp.3, 21]. Still, the fact that security prac-
tices may also include technical countermeasures of an offensive nature is not
recognized as such in any of these explanatory reports.
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The best defense is a good technical offense?
Cyber criminals do launch attacks for security purposes. The Rombertik malware con-
ducted a DoS attack on forensic tools. It called the Windows API OutputDebugString
function 335.000 times as an anti-debugging mechanism [336]. Cyber criminals also initi-
ated major and persistent DDoS attacks against the website of the public-private No More
Ransom initiative to prevent that their assets of decryption keys are distributed to their
victims [337]. During this study, malware developers further put a threat into their ran-
somware code. In a line of code they stated that if the security researchers of a specific
AV vendor would decompile their malware, they would publicly accuse the researchers of
illegally hacking their servers. A last example of an attack for security purposes is the
DarkSeoul malware that after successful installation on a victim’s machine, disabled the
main processes of legitimate antivirus software to avoid detection [338]. A last example
is cyber criminals who discussed the idea of discrediting the work of a private security
researcher. By adding legitimate websites in malware code, ISPs that used the researcher’s
botnet tracker would incorrectly label these sites as hostile, and hopefully stop using the
tracker [339].
Moreover, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the DCCP
and the Dutch Police Act (DPA) implicitly acknowledge that breaching DevSec
is an inherent part of executing investigative powers. The DCCP and, when spe-
cific investigative powers are not codified in the DCCP, article 3 of the Dutch
Police Act prescribe what the police is allowed to do, but not so much how the
officers should execute investigative powers. Of course, these powers should be
in accordance with article 8 ECHR (the right to private life and family life) and
legal principles as subsidiarity and proportionality. For example, the DCCP
prescribes that officers are allowed to conduct a house search (what), but does
not expand on search methods and techniques (how). What if a door of the sus-
pect’s house is fortified? Here come article 7 of the Dutch Police Act and article
1 par. 3 sub b of the Police Instruction (Ambtsinstructie) to the rescue: officers
are allowed to use all necessary violence to achieve their goal. This means that
investigators may kick in a fortified door during a house raid. Still, articles 6:198
and 6:200 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek or BW) demand that the
police adequately locks the kicked-in door after the search. In other words, the
police must restore the suspect’s security to a sufficient level against other threat
agents after execution of its investigative powers. Similarly, the police is also
allowed to brute force a seized but encrypted server, hack an electric door lock
of a car to install an electronic listening device, and/or put some psychological
pressure on a suspect during an interrogation. Law-enforcement agencies have
no other option but to exploit these human and technical weaknesses. Without
such legally allowed breaches, police investigations as truth-seeking processes
would be pointless because collecting evidence is impossible.
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DevSec found in procedural law Defensive nature Offensive nature
Technical security ! #
Administrative security ! !
Physical security ! !
Table 5.1: Legislators acknowledge most types of deviant security controls in explanatory
reports of Dutch procedural law, with exception of offensive countermeasures of a technical
nature like email floods.
Constructed by substantive law How does the criminalization of certain
deviant security practices in substantive law further construct the legal def-
inition for DevSec? Commonly, administrative, physical and technical coun-
termeasures of an offensive nature are criminalized, see Table 5.2. Examples of
such punishable acts include crimes against public authorities in general (articles
177 to 206 of the Dutch Penal Code (DPC) and the Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption) like actively thwarting investigations and bribing judges; online
and offline violent crimes against e.g., children (articles 239 to 254a DPC and
the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and
Sexual Abuse); and various forms of unlawful interception of communications
(articles 139a to 139f DPC and article 3 of the Convention on Cybercrime).
Is the same true for the criminalization of defensive acts of deviant security?
There are few instances where the appliance of defensive administrative and
physical security measures are criminalized in the Dutch Penal Code. Examples
of the latter are offline means of money laundering like article 420quater DPC
and article 6 of the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime that prohibit knowingly hiding, disguising and dis-
posing financial objects that originate from crime. Hiding objects is known as
security through obscurity: a security policy, yet a poor one [59, p.34]. Adminis-
trative deviant controls of a defensive nature include security through deception:
deception tactics like administrative acts that help to avoid detection and dis-
courage potential attackers, such as law-enforcement. Examples are forgery of
documents, information and biometric characteristics (articles 225 to 235 DPC
and articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on Cybercrime), e.g., using false pass-
ports/credentials.
However, no punishable acts of defensive technical security are found in the
Dutch Penal Code and conventions of the Council of Europe, perhaps because
these controls typically serve a dual-use purpose ‘that guarantee anonymity in
legitimate actions [but also] provide new means to violate laws and hide the iden-
tities of lawbreakers’ [340, p.200]. These products can be used by law-abiding
and law-breaking entities alike. So, proposals of law-enforcement, politicians
and legislators to criminalize the intentional use of cryptography in the com-
mission and concealment of crime would be a break away from current legal
reality. Still, the US Committee to Study National Cryptography Policy al-
ready concluded in 1996 that two approaches could be taken to criminalize the
use of cryptography for criminal purposes, namely as a blank provision or as an
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aggravating factor for a specific list of crimes. At the same time, the committee
acknowledged that there are considerable interpretation problems with terms as
intentional use and cryptography [341, pp.273-274].
DevSec found in substantive law Defensive nature Offensive nature
Technical security # !
Administrative security ! !
Physical security ! !
Table 5.2: The Dutch Penal Code does not criminalize the possession and/or usage of
technical defensive DevSec controls with dual-use nature like secure-deletion software.
Empirically observable appearance & consequences Although DevSec
is defined and constructed by formally enacted rules (read: criminal law), DevSec
is further shaped by multiple forces. These forces include informal social norms
enforced by potential threat agents other than LEA, such as individuals in the
direct social surrounding of the cyber criminal. For example, a father approved
of the cyber crimes that his sons were committing. As a result, they did not
have to take any additional physical security measures to shield their crimes
from their father at home. Chapter 7 gives an in-depth discussion how DevSec
is further shaped by cultural, local/global, macro/microeconomical, political
and technological dimensions.
Because of the real-world effects of (the absence of) law and other forces, the
security of cyber criminals becomes empirically observable which holds several
consequences for this study. Firstly, the appearance of DevSec practices may
truly deviate from the security practices of law-abiding entities. Law-abiding
entities do not intentionally host their legitimate content on the servers of bul-
letproof hosters, buy a VPN for a premium price on an access controlled cyber
criminal forum, or take a subscription at a counter-AV services to test their
software. Additionally, defensive technical deviant security controls are dual-
use products, and not prohibited by substantive law, yet frequently misused by
cyber criminals. Hence the semantic meaning of the word deviant which covers
the legal and empirical reality of security by cyber criminals more appropriately
than labels as criminal security or unlawful protection.
Secondly, the idea of empirically observable DevSec means that the security
of cyber criminals becomes observable and measurable in respectively a qual-
itative and quantitative manner. Qualitatively, DevSec is of a kind and to a
degree. An analogue example to explain this argument is a criminal who ap-
plies physical security to protect his/her home. He/she can choose from various
kinds of locks, such as a cylinder lock on his/her door instead of an electronic
lock. The degree of physical security may vary, depending on the situation. The
cylinder lock might not be used when an individual feels safe in comparison to
a situation where there is a high chance of theft by a ripper. Deviant secu-
rity practices can also be converted to a numeric format and as such become
quantifiable. We could measure the increase of technical security controls of a
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forum over time, the probability distribution of DNS fast flux of a botnet, or
the correlation between the demand of a DevSec service and its price.
5.2 Meaning: Subjective Condition
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, deviant security is perceived in this study
as a social practice between a certain us and them. These practices are a contin-
uing activity: security must endlessly be tested against known and hypothetical
threats of a range of actors. These continuous threats to the security of cy-
ber criminals has also resulted in a professional DevSec industry with DevSec
practitioners, such as suppliers of bulletproof hosters and VPNs (see Chapter
6). This view sees security very much as a means to an end. However, Zedner
argues that security from a good guy perspective can also be a state of being
[106][31]. This section takes this position as a starting point to assess what
the meaning is of deviant security, its state of being either as an objective or
subjective condition.
Not an objective condition Firstly, DevSec as an objective condition im-
plies a situation without any threats [106, p.155]. This presumes a world in
which cyber criminals have no threat agents and can therefore freely commit
crime. They are free from fear and do not need to apply any controls. In this
utopian situation, cyber criminal do not require to be referent objects of deviant
security. Of course, this condition does not match reality. In the real world,
cyber criminals will always face a number of threat agents, threats and attacks.
In fact, cyber criminals are continuously surrounded by enemies (see Chapter
6).
Could DevSec as an objective condition then be defined as a state of be-
ing protected from threats? Zedner names neutralization, avoidance and non-
exposure as means for law-abiding entities to achieve this condition [106, p.155].
Indeed, we learn from this study that cyber criminals apply technical computer
security to pursue this goal but never achieve it. Even if this objective state
is attainable, new threat agents and/or threats could emerge. Thus what is
secure today, might well be outdated tomorrow. Legislators might allow new
investigative powers; a trusted co-conspirer might turn into a highly aggressive
competitor in the underground economy; or AV vendors might find a way to
prevent ransomware family from being profitable. These examples indeed prove
that objective security is defined by reference to what is deemed a threat [31,
p.15]. Moreover, the protection of crime and the criminal can never be 100%
waterproof because deviant security is inextricably linked to the commission of
crime. An aspect of this inseparable link is that cyber criminals face a tradeoff
between the commission of crime versus the protection of crime and the crim-
inal. This is essentially a value tradeoff as a suspect must make a judgement
‘about how much [he/she] would give up on one objective to achieve specific
amounts on other objectives’ [342, p.935], with very successful criminals finding
the perfect balance between both commission and protection instead of regard-
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ing security as an after thought. Cryptocurreny miners who deploy malware, for
example, must balance the mining of potential revenues versus the risk of being
detected by the true owner of the infected machine [184]. Cyber criminals may
use legitimate freemium web analytics services to optimize their phishing sites,
which turns out to be a vulnerability when the data that these services collect
about the criminal and his/her crimes are shared with LEA or the private se-
curity industry. Another observed case includes ‘sleeping’ money mule accounts
on an infected machine of a victim, waiting to be activated by the group behind
the MYFL malware to transfer the stolen money, promoted the commission of
crime. Once discovered by the banks, these accounts negatively affected the
security of the mules. In other words, striving for perfect DevSec against threat
agents and threats/attacks lays a heavy, if not unsurmountable, burden on the
efficiency of the criminal business processes. Absolute deviant security against
threat agents and threats actually leads to a paradoxical situation in which the
cyber criminal has to pay the ultimate opportunity cost of not being able to com-
mit any offenses. Lastly, objective security is unattainable for cyber criminals
because components of the security cycle - threat agents, threats and valuables,
including the referent object of DevSec (the criminal and his/her crimes) - are
not set in stone but subjective and/or normative constructs that are subjected
to changes in time and place. This argument is further elaborated on in the
next paragraph.
To conclude, DevSec as an objective condition is out of reach for cyber
criminals, and the cyber criminal community is well-aware of this issue. For that
reason, cyber criminals may attend bonafide conferences on technical computer
security, start threads with lively discussions about all sorts of security related
topics on fora, and update dual-use security software on their machines to avoid
exploitations of vulnerabilities by threat agents. Thus, the material meaning
(see [106, p.160][31, p.21]) of deviant security lies in the empirically observable
efforts of cyber criminals to invest in continuous learning about threat agents
and threats/attacks, patch vulnerabilities, reduce risks, avoid damage to assets
and install countermeasures.
Subjective condition DevSec is rather a subjective condition: the sense of
cyber criminals about their own safety. In other words, this condition does not
refer to any objective state, but only to the feelings of cyber criminals about
their security. Still, these feelings may be correlated with objective conditions
of security [106, p.156]. As described in the previous paragraph, components of
the security cycle are subjective. There might well be a security gap between
what the cyber criminal regards as a threat agent, threat/attack, vulnerability,
risk, asset, risk or countermeasure, and how other key players (like LEA) in-
terpret these components [106, p.156]. Such mismatches are essentially either
vulnerabilities for cyber criminal, or missed investigative opportunities for law-
enforcement agencies. At the same time, what is considered legal and/or an
allowed practice by bonafide entities - e.g., ISPs that permit IP spoofing from
their servers - might actually be a condition for cyber criminals to label that
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entity as being bulletproof against actions of key players from the cyber security
community.
While research on deviant risk perceptions is absent, several cases are ob-
served in which DevSec practices were virtually absent or very low. These
instances provide evidence that at least some professional cyber criminals un-
derestimate the risk on exposure. They might feel absolutely safe - a ‘qualified
condition of freedom from anxiety or apprehension’ [31, p.16] - that leads to an
optimism bias, read: underestimation of security risks. For example, an individ-
ual posted a video on social media, depicting himself while freely talking about
the cyber crimes he committed. However, an investigative journalist discovered
the clip and published an article about him [343]. Moreover, because of the
decontextualized nature of the Internet [344], some individuals might not know
that they have trespassed the law, and therefore apply little to no security. The
very absence of any DevSec controls in an MO may be an indicator that there
was no or little intent to commit a crime, and thus indeed be a legitimate de-
fense and/or a reducing factor in sentencing [345]. The opposite idea - security
may prove intent - is confirmed by Dutch court decisions in which the judges
ruled that technical protective measures, more specifically encrypted and/or
password protected folders containing CSAM, provides evidence that a suspect
intentionally downloaded and stored illegal content [346][347]. Similarly, admin-
istrative security measures, such as appointing socially vulnerable straw men for
business holdings, giving them nicknames while solely communicating through
Tormail and taking their debit cards from them, proved that a financially-driven
computer-focused criminal had knowledge about money laundering via his com-
panies [348].
‘Let me help you with your security!’
During this study, an adolescent defaced the website of a small municipality in the Nether-
lands, and intentionally added information about his true offline identity. He placed a
message to the website saying ‘Hi municipality [of town X]! Say hello to your colleague
[very specific name Y] who is a friend of mine! Regards, [nickname Z]’. As it happened
to be, Y was indeed working for municipality X, and knew defacer Z. Just a single phone
call to the town hall was needed to solve the case, and Z accepted a transaction of the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service to do 40 hours of community service. Responsible dis-
closure policies of several hardware manufacturers, like [349], prescribe that vulnerability
reporters must announce their organization and name. This ensures that reporters give
up the security that protects their identity and, as such, show their good intentions. A
situation has been observed in which unknown individuals who obscured their true identity
kindly, but persistently, demanded a ‘reporter’s fee’ in cryptocurrencies from a business for
finding a vulnerability in the company’s system that hold sensitive personal and company
data. They further stated that ‘it is a pity if somebody would post the data publicly’. The
combination of financial demands, warnings about possible damages and deviant security
measures alerted the company that these individuals might not want to comply to the
installed responsible disclosure guidelines, and was subsequently the reason for the com-
pany to inform the police about a possible extortion. These examples and the previously
mentioned court cases show that deviant security is used by the judiciary as an indicator
of intent that could be established according to objective standards, read: common and
custom rules and factual circumstances, while personal characteristics - thus a more sub-
jective approach - may also play a role like personal knowledge and previous experiences
[350, pp.187, 211].
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In this sense, the symbolic meaning of deviant security - i.e., the assur-
ance that ‘something’ is done against threats - addresses these subjective feel-
ings. The symbolic role of security to cyber criminals seems ambiguous. Be-
sides persistent spam messages and advertisement banners [229, pp.40-41], few
rhetoric and strong emotional appeals by DevSec providers on fora have been
observed during this study, such as aggressive marketing and sales strategies in
which they overreact for inflated threats agents and attacks. Forum discussions
about security, especially vulnerabilities, are usually on-topic and realistic, while
threads and posts are of members who have no other interest than avoid getting
caught. Moreover, evidence from investigations shows that some bulletproof
hosters (BPHs) give surprisingly little assurance to their customers about their
ability to protect them.
On the other hand, cyber criminals might sit in a security theater : a sit-
uation in which countermeasures merely provide the feeling of security while
doing little to nothing to achieve it [351][31, pp.21-24]. For instance, providers
of deviant security - like bulletproof hosters - have been observed during this
study who assured clients about their capabilities to protect them from law-
enforcement agencies. In reality, their statements were make-belief promises
as these facilitators were subjected to police investigations at the time. The
investigators discovered that these cyber-crime-as-a-service providers had not
installed some of the most basic technical computer security controls to protect
e.g., their customers. Likewise, DevSec measures may also merely meet concerns
about subjective insecurity, but not about the actual threat. Small fortifications
will not delay the police from entering a building or room, but rather result in
the deployment of special weapons and tactics units (commonly referred to as
SWAT units) and use of excessive force (also known as no-knock warrants).
5.3 Provision: Club, Common, Private and Pub-
lic Good
After the definition and meaning of deviant security, this section describes and
explains how DevSec is supplied to referent objects. Like good guy security
[352][353][354], DevSec can be provided as a club, common, private and public
good, distributed in either a centralized or decentralized manner. Two charac-
teristics are vital to distinguish and understand goods. Rivalry means that a
good can not be used by two individuals at the same time. Excludability means
that an individual has exclusive control over a good and that others are excluded
to use that good [352, p.78][355, p.11], see Table 5.3.
Private good: excludable and rivalrous Deviant security controls can
be a private good, thus excludable and rivalrous. This becomes apparent in
the commercial and proprietary nature of some of the observed cyber crimi-
nals’ countermeasures. Cyber criminals purchase dual-use intangible security
software of bonafide companies to protect their systems and data [356, p.15].
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Forum administrators deploy commercial DDoS mitigation services of legiti-
mate technology companies to provide system reliability - i.e., continuity of
correct service [66, p.6] - of their online market places, and thus ensure avail-
ability of their platform to forum members [53, p.549]. Malware developers and
crypters may test their obfuscated malware against legitimate antivirus prod-
ucts via counter antivirus services (CAV, see Section 6.6). Similarly, legitimate
programs might protect botnet panels against brute force attacks and SQL in-
jects. Dual-use purpose countermeasures also include tangible products sold in
spy shops, such as recorders, cell phone scramblers, global positioning system
(GPS) jammers, or hidden compartments and pointed weapons in, for exam-
ple, flash lights. Of course, not all commercial security is legitimate and/or
serve a dual-use purpose. There is also a vivid underground economy where
cyber criminals can buy a range of specialized deviant countermeasures, i.e.,
deviant-security-as-a-service. In these cases, individuals pay others for their
DevSec, and in turn receive security products and services such as bulletproof
hosting, malware crypting or money laundering. Those who are not part of the
transaction, have no control over these DevSec controls, and as a result, cannot
consume them at the same time.
Club good: excludable but non-rivalrous Deviant security can also be
a club good, so excludable but non-rivalrous. Members on closed cyber crim-
inal fora and of organized groups have their own individual deviant security
interests that are partly conflicting and partly matching the interests of other
members. They aim at multilateral security [64, p.49]. Security conflicts are rec-
ognized and compromises negotiated, mostly via long group discussions and/or
direct interventions of forum administrators (also known as admins). Moreover,
community members helps each other out to keep the individual’s and group’s
security up-to-date, without outsiders profiting from these provisions. In such
access controlled communities, security is very much a peer-produced good. This
good does not only include sharing administrative security policies (rules, news
and so-called tips & tricks), but also technical security controls. Most fora have
threads where members post - amongst other things - license keys of bonafide
antivirus software that other members may use for their own benefit. The lat-
ter is an example in which security is completely decentralized by its members.
Yet forum administrators formulate policies and implement countermeasures as
well, and as such ensure that security as a club good is also provided in a more
centralized manner to its associates. Throughout this study, examples are given
of systems of cyber criminals, such as cryptomarkets and fora, with incentive
centered designs (ICD) that focus on ‘getting the good stuff in and keeping the
bad stuff out’. These designs respect motivated security behavior of individuals
by providing incentives to induce human choices that improve the effectiveness
of the system’s security at large [357, p.7].
Public good: non-excludable and non-rivalry In DevSec as a public
good, there is no rivalry and no excludability for the referent objects. Firstly,
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security is provided by free and/or open-source security products in a decentral-
ized manner. Collective goods include the criminal usage of free, automated and
open SSL/TLS certificates; open-source challenge-response tests - i.e., captchas
- to protect fora against brute force attacks; the usage of free public Wifi to surf
on the Internet [320, p.10]; or freely available artefact wiping tools for the pur-
pose of data sanitization. In these instances, deviant security is a peer-produced
public good provided by civil society, like individual netizens, online communi-
ties, and private and public organizations. No matter if entities are trespassing
or abiding the law, they will all receive the same kind and degree of security.
Centralized means of control, like national laws and government policy, may
also provide security as a public good to cyber criminals. Apart from justifi-
able acts (also known as justification), unlawful acts by threat agents against
the security of criminals are very much violations of substantive law as well,
and punishable as such. This might result in exclusion of evidence from such
breaches in court, and deter other threat actors to attack DevSec at all. Law
may also protect criminals against specific attacks under all circumstances. The
protection of the physical and psychological integrity of the criminal is funda-
mental in most international and national public legal frameworks. The absolute
prohibition on torture (article 3 ECHR) and the right to remain silent (nemo
tenetur - included in article 6 ECHR) protect suspects against disproportional
government actions. There might also be active government policies to protect
cyber criminal practices. In response to the arrest and extradition of Russian
suspects from various (holiday) destinations to the United States [358], Russia
issued travel advisories for their citizens in 2013 which countries are considered
‘unsafe’ [359]. Additionally, there are not only continuous rumors in news media
outlets but evidence is also brought forward by the US Department of Justice
about Russian criminal hackers that are protected and even deployed by Russian
authorities [360][361][362].
Common good: rivalry but non-excludable Lastly, DevSec can be rival-
rous and non-excludable, namely a common good. Today’s cyber crime is orga-
nized in networks, especially due to the emergence of cyber-crime-as-a-service.
For all actors in these networks, deviant security is very much a common good
which everybody needs. However, because actors have different perceptions on-,
motivations for-, and interests in deviant security, they may also consume each
other’s security instead of promoting it, thus effectively lowering the security of
all. Let us take the so-called pharma wars as an example: a turf war between
two sponsors of pharmaceutical spam as described in the non-fiction book Spam
Nation by investigative journalist Brian Krebs [211]. The pharma wars were in
essence a competitive escalation that led to a destructive conflict [363, pp.241-
242]. The same line of reasoning goes for cooperative suspects and criminal
informants who share information about their colleagues with LEA. By break-
ing their silence (omertà [364, p.6], or external secrecy), they effectively lower
the security of their co-conspirers which causes a classic prisoner’s dilemma. In
other words, they may make decisions that benefit their own security, but neg-
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atively affect the overall security of the larger cyber criminal collective. So, not
only the security of law-abiding entities [352], or the commission of cyber crime
- like phishing attacks [365] - are limited resource economies, but the deviant




Rivalry Private good: commercial dual-use
security products and tailor-made
DevSec services
Common good: controls that will
increase an individual’s security at
the expense of the security of the
larger cyber criminal community
Non-rivalry Club good: peer-produced security
within closed cyber criminal groups
Public good: free & open-source
security products, and active
government policies & absolute
human rights
Table 5.3: Excludability and rivalry are key to understand how DevSec can be provided as
a club, common, private and public good.
5.4 Function: An Asset To Protect Assets
In the Information Age, everything that relates to information technologies (IT)
- i.e., data, software and hardware - has extreme value to both law-abiding
entities and criminals alike (in other words, become assets) [28]. While assets
are important in a range of academic disciplines including computer science, no
studies are found that provide a taxonomy for assets of cyber criminals. This
section first determines what cyber criminal assets are from a predominantly
socio-legal perspective. Such an understanding not only helps to determine
which valuables need security (for a summary, see Table 5.5), but also what
deviant security is in itself: an asset that protects assets.
Assets relate to the criminal and his/her crimes Assets of cyber crimi-
nals relate to the two key components of an MO, more specifically i) the criminal
and ii) his/her crimes, the latter consisting of both his/her conduct and the out-
comes of his/her conduct. As compared to the latter assets, valuables related to
the criminal are - or ought to be - more important, at least from the perspective
of law-enforcement agencies [206]. Any damage against these assets may ulti-
mately result in violations against the suspect’s physical and/or psychological
integrity. So identity assets are not only beneficial for commission, but also
protection. Sharing personal details can, for example, be an important factor
for building trust among (potential) transaction partners, including having a
reputation of being trustworthy [115]. Similarly, protecting identifiable details
is also important to suspects of crime because the exchange of personal informa-
tion may hold blowback effects such as identification by threat agents. Loss of,
or damage to, identity then comes at great costs like arrest and prosecution that
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will ultimately also harm the commission of crime. The formidable reputation
of Russian cyber criminal Paunch in the underground economy was important
to attract other skilled co-conspirers and customers to the Darkode forum [366],
but at the same time, half of the international LEA community was trying to
compromise his identity assets for attribution purposes (i.e., who did what).
The second asset category relates to criminal activities. These assets have,
according to the motivation for crime, financial, political, sexual and thrill-
seeking value. In practice, a criminal may attribute multiple values to an asset.
A data asset such as a carefully collected CSAM series does not only have sex-
ual, but also financial and emotional value, respectively when CSAM is sold via
a commercial website, or contains identifying details of the perpetrator and/or
victim. The value of assets may differ. Complete credit card credentials - ‘fullz’
- are more expensive than partial information such as ‘dumps’ and ‘CCV2’
[320, pp.3-4]; new CSAM is more in demand than old, ‘recycled’ material; zero-
day exploits are preferred over well-documented exploits; and early issued ICQ
numbers - an instant messaging client popular among Russian-language cyber
criminals [367] - help to boost reputation as these numbers imply a long pres-
ence in the underground economy and are therefore more exclusive than recent
ICQ numbers.
Protection of the criminal versus his/her crimes
Cyber criminals may face a zero-sum tradeoff between securing assets related to criminal
versus his/her crimes. Indeed, it is easy to theorize that the protection of the cyber criminal
should always prevail over the protection of crime. Harm to the criminal - like arrest and
prosecution - has the potential to stop all business proceedings on a more permanent basis.
However, cyber criminal may also choose for the protection of crime instead of the criminal.
Several cases have been observed in which profit-driven cyber criminals used their true
credentials to register an account of an underground and/or legitimate bank that holds
their illegally obtained gains. The underlying thought is probably that they were afraid
that they would lose their financial assets when they cannot prove to the financial service
provider that the subscriber details match their real offline identity. After all, they are in
to this business for the money.
These two asset categories may collide as cyber criminals frequently need
identification to achieve integrity, availability and confidentiality for the protec-
tion of their business and, paradoxically, their identity as well. Cyber criminal
fora may deploy access control management to offer a safe business environ-
ment for their members. The forum members need to be identified with the
use of a username, email address or account number, and authenticated using
a password in order to be authorized to access data and to be hold account-
able for actions. Nota bene, verification links might be send to chat and email
services, while disposable temporary email accounts are not allowed for that
purpose [368, p.6]. Due to such strict access controls, forum members face for a
dilemma. This security mechanism is needed to protect the criminal and his/her
crimes, but in order to do so they have to reveal clues about their identity. This
poses a risk, especially when authentication mechanisms are badly implemented
and exploitable with brute force or dictionary attacks [155]. Not only can hack-
ers use login names, email addresses and passwords to take over the accounts of
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forum members, but this data are also important leads for attribution by law-
enforcement agencies. So, access control causes a paradoxical situation: cyber
criminals need security to protect their identity and business, but in order to
do so they may have to violate their privacy.
Tangible assets A further categorization can be made between tangible and
intangible assets. Assets of cyber criminals, as described in Section 5.1, differ
from bonafide assets as only the latter can be legally protected by e.g., binding
contracts and patents [369]. Therefore, strict implementation of asset catego-
rizations from the good guys perspective is impossible. Still, widely accepted
asset categorizations - e.g., the Balanced Scorecard [370][371] - combined with
criminal and case law are a helpful starting point for understanding what cyber
criminals and legal practitioners consider as criminal valuables. Although one
might associate the practices of cyber criminals solely with the intangible online
world, physical subjects and objects are also very important to cyber criminals
and public and private cyber crime investigators alike [372]: all cyber-attacks
stem from a person who physically exists in a certain location [364, p.1]. This
study therefore distinguishes tangible assets for cyber criminals between:
– Physical subjects: human beings such as referent objects, clients, corrupt
officials, co-conspirers, (criminal) informants, actual and potential victims,
and witnesses (also known as the human factor in cyber crime and cyber
security [215, p.15]). Dutch procedural law prescribes that police inves-
tigations must work towards the prosecution of suspects (articles 27 and
132a DCCP) and witnesses are obliged to give testimony in court (article
213 DCCP), while helping victims of crime is a key task of the Dutch
police according to article 3 of the Police Act 2012 (Politiewet 2012 );
– Physical objects, and more specifically:
◦ IT focused physical objects: IT objects are important because they
consist of the hardware that is vital to commit cyber crime and in
which digital evidence resides. Hardware includes computers (tablets,
desktops, laptops, routers, servers and associated accessories like key-
boards and monitors), telecommunications (cell phones and batter-
ies, SIM cards, mobile WIFI) and other data carriers (USB sticks, SD
cards, external hard drives). IT focused physical objects are not only
central in the execution of a range of digital investigative powers and
subsequent collection of metadata and content (read: evidence, see
Table 5.4). They have also been the focal point of legal discussions
about new investigative powers in cyberspace [373][374][375][21];
◦ Non-IT focused physical objects: administrative paperwork, build-
ings, cars, cash money, luxury items, payment cards and the like.
These objects are often overlooked by academics in discussions about
cyber crime, but very important to legal practitioners in investiga-
tions. Ultimately, cyber criminals use offices from which they commit
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their crimes, drive cars to meet other co-conspirers, and monetize
their virtual dirty money in hard cash or luxury items [212][376].
Many traditional investigative powers focus on these non-IT objects,
such as the recording of confidential communication in cars (known
as bugging), confiscation of illegally obtained assets, or no-knock war-
rants to enter properties. These powers are frequently deployed in
cyber crime investigations; if not always when investigations lead to
physical arrests of suspects (see Table 5.4).
Although not fully exploited in Dutch cyber crime investigations [377],
both non-IT as well as IT focused objects may contain forensic evidence
like blood, scent and DNA traces and finger and foot prints. This phys-
ical evidence may help to attribute physical subjects to physical objects,
and confirm or reject hypotheses such as ‘only suspect A’s DNA [Deoxyri-
bonucleic acid] and finger prints are found on keyboard B and computer







464 33 Number %
IT focused physical objects 962 67
Computers 130 14
Telecommunications 389 40
Other data carriers 443 46
1637 100 Total 962 100
Table 5.4: A total of 1637 objects were seized in eight investigations of the Dutch National
High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU). Bearing in mind that the NHTCU conducts large-scale
operations against organized criminal groups, two investigations had over 450 seized objects,
five investigations had between 450 and 100 seized objects, and in one investigation less than
100 objects were seized [377].
Intangible assets While this study considers tangibles as physical assets,
intangibles are all non-physical assets. Intangible assets - also known as intel-
lectual capital [378, pp.371-374][370, pp.20, 22] - can be distinguished between:
– Human capital (also referred to as knowledge assets [379]): the knowl-
edge, experience and competencies that individuals need to commit crime
including creativity, received training, reputation and talent.
– Information capital: the software and data in databases, information sys-
tems and technological infrastructures that cyber criminals need to com-
mit their crimes, such as chat clients, malware, operating systems and
stolen documents;
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– Organization capital: the organized group’s or larger community’s cul-
ture, business processes and relations, its leadership, management and
structure, alignment of its members with its strategic goals, and the com-
munity’s ability to collaborate and share knowledge, necessary to commit
their crimes.
Intangible asset categorizations to understand cyber criminal fora
The distinction between information, human and organization capital on both the commis-
sion of crime and the protection of crime and the criminal is most apparent on cyber-crime-
as-a-service fora. Some members of these online platforms - so called leaders and motivators
[380] - provide vital human capital (i.e., knowledge) about commission and protection to
other members, including ‘chatters’, via threads and posts. The vendors on CaaS fora offer
products and services - mostly information capital - that facilitate commission and protec-
tion like infected hosts, stolen credit card details or botnet panels (see Figure 6.2). Lastly,
there is a small group of forum members that provides the necessary organization capital
to keep the forum up-and-running, including arranging deviant security as a club good
against inside and outside threats. Their formal status is simply known as administrators
or admins, yet they have to make crucial security-related decisions about the forum. They
perform roles and tasks equal to chief executive officer (indeed, somebody has to supervise
daily business operations) and chief financial officer (for processing incomes from advertise-
ments, fines and restitutions, and expenses like salaries, hosting and security). Admins also
have to patch vulnerabilities, come up with deviant security policies and mechanisms, and
resolve disputes. These jobs are comparable to respectively chief information officer, chief
security officer, and chief legal officer. The latter functions as a trias politicus as there is no
separation of powers on fora. Administrators and their helpers are often legislator, judge
and executive in one.
Intangible assets generally do not create value on their own, and need to be
combined with other intangible and tangible assets [370, p.21]. Developing and
operating information capital like malware and botnets require human capital. If
developed or operated in a group, organization capital is also needed. Similar to
traditional criminals [198, p.202], organized business processes of cyber criminals
require coordinated efforts over time as well.
Moreover, Dutch criminal law considers tangible assets as goods that rep-
resent financial value, but is ambiguous in regarding intangible assets as such
[82]. Yet, similar to their bonafide counterparts [381], malafide intangibles may
become tangibles when they are brought to the market and become part of a
transaction, and as such are converted into monetary value. The importance of
hard cash to cyber criminals - and broader: the idea of attackers as resource-
limited actors [382] - becomes especially apparent in the communications be-
tween two individuals. They agreed that they had the human and organization
capital to commit crime: they were very focused and had great ideas, techni-
cal skills and the network to make things work. They missed, however, the
necessary money to buy the required information capital in the underground
economy, such as malware components and infected hosts, and physical objects
on legitimate markets like hardware. As a consequence, they concluded that
were not able to conduct any illegal activities. Similarly, large amounts of hard
currencies and luxury items are frequently discovered and seized during house
searches such as two million Euro and thirteen (luxury) cars found on eleven




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Deviant security: an asset to protect assets The previous paragraphs
discuss assets that are necessary for the commission of crime. These assets
need protection because of the value that they represent for the well-being of
the criminal and his/her business. Therefore, the commission and protection
of cyber crime are inextricably linked to such an extent that it is hard to find
instances where there is absolutely no security prior, during or after the com-
mission of cyber crime. In a world of continuous online and offline threats,
in which deviant security is in most instances not a publicly available good,
security is very much an asset to cyber criminals, i.e., a scarce commodity in
what sociologists David Lyon and David Wall name an electronic panopticon
[386][34] (see Section 7.1). This is shown by the vivid underground market
for a large variety of deviant security services. For instance, the services and
products of bulletproof hosting and connectivity providers consist of - amongst
others - anti-DDoS protection, dedicated/shared/virtual private servers, domain
registration/protection, (double) fast flux, IP masking/spoofing, proxy servers,
remote desktop protocol (RDP), secure sockets layer (SSL), Socket Secure pro-
tocol (SOCKS) and virtual private networks (VPNs) [255, p.31][387, pp.3-4].
Some of these protective services/products, like VPNs, represent fixed costs
which do not vary with changing output. Whether a cyber criminal increases
or decreases his/her commission, he/she only needs a single VPN subscription
to safely access the Internet and therefore his/her monthly VPN costs stay the
same. Other services and products related to bulletproof hosting and connec-
tivity are variable costs to referent objects, and depend on changing output. If
a suspect would like to increase the number of attacks, he/she might need more
bulletproof servers, DDoS protection, domain registrations and the like. The
subsequent prices of these deviant security assets are determined by - amongst
other things - their quality and level of protection [388, p.10][267, p.171]. For
instance, low-quality fake IDs are cheaper than high-quality ones. Moreover,
DevSec products and services - like the mentioned hosting and connectivity ser-
vices - are sold for considerably higher prices than comparable goods available
on the bonafide market [256], sometimes, as observed during this study, up to
ten times. Because the commission of crime differs among different types of
cyber criminals, (the usage of) related protective assets do too. As compared
to sexually-driven cyber criminals, profit-driven cyber criminals have to invest
in additional security services like escrow services and cryptocurrency tumblers.
Thus, the total costs (i.e., fixed plus variable costs) of deviant security are very
much determined by the type of crime and criminal.
The criminal’s perceived value of assets that are needed for the commission
of crime can be measured by its level of security. Let us take spam servers and
CSAM as examples. Spam servers generally rely on few, if any post-activity
controls. The related IPs and domains are easily blocked and/or taken down by
the cyber security community after usage as compared to C&C servers where
criminals need availability of their servers, and therefore need additional tailor-
made DevSec services to deal with incoming abuse notifications. The reason
for little security is that when the spam run has been conducted, continuity is
not required and therefore their job is done. In other words, the servers do not
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represent any value any longer [213, pp.176-177]. New - read: exclusive - CSAM
is shared in highly secure environments, while older material is more accessible
and found on open parts of the Internet [389, p.15]. There are also instances
in which hardware, software, data and physical objects lack any security, and
therefore appear to have no value to the criminal. However, the value of an asset
is not only determined by its objective value (based on a e.g., monetary expres-
sion) and subjective value (based on e.g., symbolic, moral or emotional effects)
to the referent object, but also by the objective (read: legal) value to his/her
threat agents. Law-enforcement agencies may regard certain objects as assets
because of their importance to police investigations. A CSAM user protected
his home IP address with a VPN connection while downloading encrypted abu-
sive material. The criminal did not place the same importance on protecting
his home IP address when accessing another site which only contained the de-
cryption keys as this act is indeed not an criminal offense on its own. The legal
practitioners considered the connections to this decryption site as an asset for
their investigation. They were subsequently able to retrieve the suspect’s home
IP address through lawful intercept. To conclude, criminal assets are not only
valuables that generate and/or facilitate, but also secure the criminal and the
commission of crime.
5.5 Form: Intangible and Tangible Products &
Services
As we know what is the function of deviant security - an asset to protect assets
- we move forward and describe in socio-technical terms what form deviant
security takes, namely tangible or intangible, and as a dual-use product or as
a tailor-made service. Table 5.6 is a summary and Figure 5.2 a visualization,
of both intangible and tangible protective asset categorizations with related
examples.
Intangible protective assets Similar to legitimate assets and assets related
to the commission of crime, intangible deviant security assets can be categorized
as human, information and organization capital. Because human and organiza-
tion capital are very much soft controls - in other words, management-oriented
- they are classified as administrative controls [59, p.28]. On the other hand, in-
formation capital on DevSec is categorized in this study as either administrative
or technical controls.
– Human capital on DevSec consists of the knowledge, experience and com-
petencies that individuals need to formulate deviant security policies, and
to correctly implement these policies in order to protect the criminal and
his/her crimes, including creativity, received training and talent. Observed
knowledge assets are the many and constantly updated threads about
security-related issues, including complete ‘how-to-securely-commit-crime’
manuals, on financially-driven cyber criminal and sexually-driven CSAM
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fora [320, pp.9-11][390]. Because technical deviant security constantly
evolves, some threads about e.g., vulnerabilities in encryption standards
on well-managed fora are more than ten years active, and continuously
updated with the latest news and insights. Observed vulnerabilities of
protective human capital include little understanding of technical com-
puter security and illusion of control biases.
Previous experiences with the right to talk and/or remain silent
A suspect was arrested by law-enforcement and interrogated about the crimes he had com-
mitted. He was a first time offender, and therefore had no prior experience how to approach
such an important event in the post-activity phase of his (ultimately unsuccessful) MO.
The investigators later stated that they noticed his inexperience. Compared to seasoned
reoffending suspects, he was both talking and remaining silent on the ‘wrong’ moments
during the interrogation which was beneficial in building a criminal case against him.
– Organization capital follows the same line of reasoning. Cyber criminals
are depending on co-conspirers in an ascending order of organizational
sophistication: from colleagues, peers and teams to formal organizations
[197, pp.157-158]. Alignment, culture, leadership, processes, teamwork
and other capabilities of organizations are therefore not only needed to
commit cyber crime, but also to protect the collective, individual mem-
bers and their activities. According to private security researchers, orga-
nization capital was exactly why the Ponmocup botnet stayed under the
radar for over ten years [391]. Observed vulnerabilities of protective or-
ganizational capital include little authority by group leaders, no internal
rules or frequent violations of rules, and the inability to resolve conflicts.
– Information capital include administrative acts like legal registrations for
protective purposes in e.g., offshore jurisdictions, legal immunities that
prevent prosecution, or false credentials/records/subscriber information.
They also consist of technical controls, more specifically intangible infor-
mation technologies - i.e., software and data - such as tailor-made De-
vSec services (e.g., malware packers) and dual-use software products like
encryption, firewalls, IDs and technical access controls. Observed ad-
ministrative vulnerabilities include the blocking of financial accounts that
were registered with false credentials, while technical vulnerabilities are
of course identical to weaknesses of legitimate software (thus from a good
guy perspective on technical computer security).
Notably, intangible protective assets may hold monetary value in the cyber
criminal community. Deviant security consultants and technicians who advertise
on cyber criminal fora and/or work within closed organized groups, see Table
6.2, sell nothing but human capital. They exchange knowledge about DevSec
for money, and as such, convert the intangible to a tangible.
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Figure 5.2: This picture shows various intangible and tangible assets that are needed for the
commission of crime and the protection of crime and the criminal. Operation rooms, fences
and CCTV are non-IT focused physical objects. A referent object - read: physical subject
- needs human capital to understand how to operate a kill switch. The kill switch message
itself is information capital while the sending and receiving hardware, respectively a cell
phone and desktop, are IT focused physical objects. For successful collaborations, suspects
need organization capital. They might agree that all communications must be encrypted.
The encrypted messages between communication systems are considered information capital
as well.
Tangible protective assets Tangible protective assets are all physical se-
curity controls, either subjects or objects, that protect tangible and intangible
assets, including other deviant security assets. Tangible protective assets are
synonymous for physical deviant security, and are discussed in-depth in Section
7.4. Again, tangible security assets are categorized as:
– Physical subjects who have a role in deviant security practices. Cyber
criminals and other key players that are described in Chapter 6 conduct
physical behavior that protects the criminal and his/her crimes. In other
words, referent objects perform physical acts to install and maintain on-
line and offline deviant security controls to protect themselves and other
subjects - like their co-conspirers and victims - as well as physical ob-
jects. Observed human vulnerabilities include personality characteristics
like laziness, forgetfulness, overconfidence and the propensity to engage in
risky behavior [110, pp.1257-1258][292], and health issues such as mental
and physical disorders - e.g., states of high sexual arousal - that promote
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accidents, failures and mistakes.
– Physical objects may also deliver security to the cyber criminal and his/her
crimes, and is further specified as:
◦ IT focused physical objects are all hardware products that protect the
criminal and his/her crimes such as physical access control, prepaid
telephones, secluded business enterprise servers, routers with state-of-
art encryption, and closed-circuit television (CCTV). As virtually all
security IT focused physical objects come from bonafide vendors (see
next paragraph), observed vulnerabilities are published and unpub-
lished weaknesses in legitimate hardware. Notably, law-enforcement
agencies can physically seize these objects, and as such, have the
technical ability and legal mandate to exploit these vulnerabilities.
◦ Non-IT focused physical objects consist of fake passports, keys, locks
and vaults, armored doors, weapons, fences, hidden passages/spaces,
and even squeaky stairs that warn the cyber criminal about threat
agents who are approaching his/her operation room. Observed vul-
nerabilities of non-IT focused physical objects include fake IDs with
evidently false credentials, and cash money in hidden passages that
were found by a trained police dog (also known as K9).
The municipality of Limburg
A non-Dutch suspect of online banking fraud purchased a fake Dutch passport in the under-
ground economy to open a bank account in the Netherlands. The passport was apparently
signed by the ‘major of the Limburg municipality’. This alarmed a bank employee: while
Dutch passports are indeed issued by local municipalities, Limburg is not a municipality.
It is the name of two provinces in both the Netherlands and neighboring Belgium. In this
situation, the suspect had too little human capital to assess the quality of his fake ID. In
another reviewed case, a cyber criminal group behind a mobile banking trojan launched a
landing page for phishing purposes. While the word login was spelled correctly in Dutch,
the cyber criminals misspelled the word password (wachtwoord) in such a way that few
potential Dutch-language victims would fall for the scheme.
Duals-use security products & specialized DevSec services So far, this
study uses the terms DevSec products and services as if there is no difference
between the two descriptions. However, there are specialized, mostly propri-
etary products for the commission of crime. These products, such as intangible
malware and tangible skimming devices for banking fraud, are tailored to the
needs of cyber criminals. Comparably, there are no DevSec products on the
underground market that are specifically designed and manufactured for cyber
criminals besides GPS and cell phone jammers. All observed security mecha-
nisms which are used for DevSec purposes are dual-use products of bonafide
entities, such as commercial parties or open-source communities. Examples
are intangibles like encryption, obfuscation, steganography, cryptocurrencies;





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vaults and so on. All these products - again, with the exception of GPS and
cell phone jammers - are legitimate (but sometimes licensed), widely available
on the bonafide market, and neutral in the sense that the referent object of the
security product decides whether they will be used to protect good or bad acts.
Legal connotations to assets
Criminal assets are not only combined by cyber criminals to create value, but also by legal
practitioners to constitute criminal liability [298, p.1221]. Four elements are necessary for
criminal liability under US law [392, pp.52-53][325]. Firstly, human capital connects to
the mental element of crime, mens rea, and its subclass of criminal intent: knowledge of
wrongdoing. Secondly, information capital and tangible assets connect to attendant cir-
cumstances, such as child sexual abusive material, malware on systems, and/or a victim.
Thirdly, actus reus - the criminal’s conduct - subsequently glues human capital to infor-
mation capital and tangible assets, thus knowingly and without justification possessing,
viewing, producing or distributing child abusive material. The last element is that there
should be a forbidden result or harm, thus damage to assets, mostly related to victims like
children who are physically and emotionally harmed for the production of CSAM. So, the
involvement of assets described in this section - whether used for commission or protection
- combined with the element of harm very much make individuals criminally liable, and
further make that these assets differ from assets used by law-abiding entities. What about
organization capital? This intangible asset is about the coordination between, and degree
of involvement of, individuals in crime and their subsequent legal role as accomplices, acces-
sories, aiders, abettors or conspirators as concluded by e.g., the Dutch court in the TorRAT
case [348].
Deviant security controls with cyber criminals as exclusive addressees are
very much specialized services, instead of tailor-made or mass-made products.
These practices may deviate from their law-abiding counterparts that offer an
identical product. BPHs use the same kind of dual-use hardware and software
as legitimate hosters for their dedicated and virtual private servers, but make
these IT objects bulletproof against responses from the cyber security commu-
nity with their administrative security services such as handling incoming abuse
notifications. Likewise, bulletproof connectivity providers use regular servers
and network technologies, but do not register their company, log traffic or com-
ply to information requests of LEA. The services of crypters - also called packers
- consist of using widely available obfuscation software, implementing it on mal-
ware to conceal its purpose and subsequently testing the obfuscated malware
on counter-AV services. These CAVs, in turn, offer a specialized service to
the underground economy, namely using bonafide antivirus products in offline
sandboxes, and sending the results of their test back to their criminal clients. A
last observation about tangible and intangible valuables - whether serving com-
mission or protection, as a duals-use security product or a specialized DevSec
service - is that they may lead to tangible and intangible costs which is further




...an intangible asset leads to... ...a tangible asset leads to...
...an intangible
cost:
Malware source code is leaked on the
open Internet.
Talented malware developer of an




Fierce competition in the
underground economy leads to lower
prices for e.g.,
ransomware-as-a-service.
Money mule group does not hand
over withdrawn money to malware
developers.
Table 5.7: Situations may occur in which intangible and tangible assets lead to intangible
and tangible costs. For example, malware source code is an intangible asset of an organized
cyber criminal group. When the source code is leaked, the group will likely lose revenues
as either the cyber security community can study the malware and find solutions against it,
and/or other cyber criminal groups will use the leaked malware to target potential victims
first. In short, an event related to an intangible asset led to intangible costs.
5.6 Interim Conclusion and Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to describe and explain the basic normative and
empirical qualities (what), more specifically the definition, meaning, provision,
function and form of deviant security. The findings of this chapter suggest that
cyber criminals have to be able to protect anything which is an impossible task
as perfect deviant security does not exist. This insight holds significant impli-
cations for understanding how law-enforcement agencies can deal with DevSec
practices which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
On the definition for DevSec This study argues that the definition for De-
vSec is solely a legal issue. Referent objects of deviant security are those natural
and legal persons who are criminally liable for the commission of crime. Their
countermeasures to protect the criminal and his/her crimes are what we call in
this study deviant security practices. These persons knowingly violate substan-
tive law without justification, and are therefore a legitimate target of procedural
law and investigations of law-enforcement agencies. Subsequent legal analysis of
national and international substantive and procedural law from respectively the
Netherlands and the Council of Europe reveal that most forms of deviant secu-
rity practices are criminalized with the exception of technical countermeasures
of a defensive nature, while most DevSec practices are mentioned in explana-
tory reports of procedural law except technical countermeasures of an offensive
nature. To develop a full picture of the legal aspects of DevSec, not only more
legal sources should be analyzed such as case law, customs, and comments of
legal scholars. There is also a need for comparative legal studies on protection
of cyber crime, just as there are similar studies comparing substantive laws of
different countries related to the commission of cyber crime [393][394]. In other
words, comparative legal research may shed light on the differences and simi-
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larities between national legal frameworks - e.g., common and continental law
systems - related to the security practices of cyber criminals. In which juris-
dictions and under what circumstances is, for instance, the usage of encryption
for deviant security purposes criminalized? Have national legislators ever men-
tioned offensive technical controls to justify the introduction of new investigative
powers?
On meaning and provision of DevSec This study further provided evi-
dence that the normative definition for DevSec is empirically observable. Not
only may the security practices of cyber criminals truly deviate from good guy
security, the findings of this study also prove that DevSec is empirically measur-
able in a qualitative manner while arguments are given why DevSec is further
measurable in a quantitative fashion. So besides more legal scholarship, there is
abundant room for progress in a number of other disciplines, using a variety of
data sources, methods and techniques. One of such new areas is the psychology
of deviant security, using - amongst others - interviews to learn what (convicted)
cyber criminals think about their own and others’ deviant security. This ap-
proach is based on the meaning of DevSec as a state of being, more specifically
a subjective condition that refers to the feelings of cyber criminals about their
own security. The questions for this new field of study are numerous. In which
mental state do cyber criminals make more failures and mistakes? What effect
do advertisement banners of DevSec providers have on forum members? What
do cyber criminals consider to be their most important (protective) asset, and
why? Because security practices of cyber criminals are empirically observable
and deviant from practices of law-abiding citizens, more research will also help
attribution as e.g., stealth can also be revealing [19, p.20]. Research is further
needed on the relation between intent of suspects and their level of deviant
security. The current study also described the provision of DevSec, either as
a common, club, private and public good. Related to the latter two goods is
the misusage of cyber criminals of commercial and free legitimate services like
social media [395]. Yet it remains unclear how cyber criminal misusage exactly
deviates from the legitimate usage by law-abiding referent objects as a limita-
tion of this study is the fact that it had no access to customer databases of
legitimate companies. Lastly, more research is needed on how multilateral secu-
rity is achieved within cyber criminal communities. Which individuals or what
events brings conflicting security interests to light, and what strategies do forum
admins and significant others deploy to, for instance, negotiate compromises?
On function and form of DevSec Before describing the function of DevSec,
namely an asset to protect other assets, this chapter provides an extensive tax-
onomy for assets. This taxonomy is not only applicable to assets related to
the commission of cyber crime, but also to assets related to the protection of
cyber crime and the cyber criminal. This means that its form is tangible and
intangible as well, and comes as a duals-use security product or a specialized
DevSec service. Further socio-technical studies may focus on the proportion of
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human, organization and information capital on CaaS markets. Which topics
are most discussed, which products/services are most offered, and what is the
equilibrium of admins/moderators to members/postings? More work is further
required to determine the financial value of tangible and intangible assets of
profit-driven cyber criminals, and costs and profit margins of DevSec products
and services on the CaaS market. Qualitative research may explore how pricing
works in the cyber criminal underground economy. Hopefully, mixed method
approaches may answer if cyber criminals hold security budgets and an upper
cost ceiling that they will not break. Ultimately, based on seized data sets of
markets like Alphabay, Hansa or Darkode, future studies might measure the fi-
nancial value of secure platforms, and understand which intangible assets of the
platform represent the most value to the community such as a well-functioning
reputation or dispute resolution system, or a seller with a unique product or
service that attracts new members to the market place.
104
Chapter 6
Who? - Interactive Qualities
of Deviant Security
We now move on to the interactive qualities of DevSec. As depicted in Figure
6.1, the following narrative of key players, their inter-relationship and the inter-
play between associated vulnerabilities and countermeasures is generated from
the ground truth data. Firstly, three groups of key players of deviant security
are categorized and described without discussing their interdependence, more
specifically the i) referent objects of deviant security, ii) providers of DevSec
and iii) threat agents to the protection of cyber criminals. The chapter then
explains their inter-relationship, i.e., the nature of the intertwined networks in
which these key players operate, and the related vulnerability of information
asymmetries between key players. The latter weakness is fueled by the coun-
termeasure of deception which creates new vulnerabilities that in turn have to
be patched by trust and distrust mechanisms. In other words, vulnerabilities
can cause snowball effects that lead to a vicious circle - i.e., downward spiral -
in which one weakness and related countermeasure generate multiple new, and
sometimes even graver, vulnerabilities.
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Figure 6.1: This visualization shows the structure of Chapter 6 via a selection of key
concepts about the interactive qualities of deviant security. For a full oversight of descriptive
and explanatory key concepts of Part III and their inter-relation, see Figure 9.4.
6.1 Autarkic & Autonomous Referent Objects
The first category of key players are the referent objects of deviant security.
Cyber criminal collectives on a meso level - whether the larger cyber criminal
community or a specific cyber criminal organization - are to a certain degree
autarkic when it comes to their protection. On a lower, micro level of aggrega-
tion, individual cyber criminals have to be autonomous in their security as they
cannot rely on others for their security.
Autarkic cyber criminal collectives All criminal communities are to some
extent autarkic in their security, yet some communities are more independent
and self-sufficient than others. For example, sexually-driven CSAM platforms,
as compared to financially-driven CaaS fora and cryptomarkets, do not have
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vendors that offer commercial deviant security services [385]. Review of rele-
vant investigations and conversations with investigators paint a picture about
the members of CSAM communities who solely rely on themselves and their
co-conspirers for coming up with security policies and implementing them cor-
rectly. Hence, security threads and postings are constantly updated as CSAM
offenders need to be up-to-date about the latest threats and vulnerabilities,
underlining the idea of deviant security as a continuous activity (i.e., pursuit)
and club good. While commercial online CSAM shops, file-sharing services and
fora might make use of protective services such as rogue financial handlers and
bulletproof hosters, LEA encountered several non-profit CSAM fora that were
hosted on home servers (nota bene, no data is found of CaaS fora and/or cryp-
tomarkets that were hosted on home servers). The explanation for the latter
might be that many BPHs explicitly forbid CSAM on their servers, and/or that
CSAM users tend to keep their collection - an asset which has emotional and
sexual value to them - physically close to them [194, pp.148-170]. A degree
of autarky is not an exception for smaller units, like cyber criminal organized
groups. While some organizations try to keep the group as closed as possible,
and develop and execute as many parts as possible of their MO themselves (one
of the key differences between the Carbanak and Buhtrap group: the latter out-
sourced more of their work as compared to the former), even the most advanced
Russian-language groups cannot avoid contracting out some of the security they
need [396]. Similarly, the Dutch TorRAT group had started largely autarkic,
but increasingly bought services and products from the underground economy,
like bulletproof hosting, CAV and malware obfuscation [397]. Thus, there is a
tradeoff between autarky of the collective versus outsourcing of deviant secu-
rity to outsiders of the collective. Notably, some vendors on the CaaS market
jumped in on this tradeoff, and offer a balance by providing do-it-yourself De-
vSec services. Some fake document providers, for example, may have their own
websites on which customers can create their own fake passport, driver license
or other identity document [398].
Autonomous cyber criminal individuals All cyber criminals are to some
extent autonomous in, and thus responsible for, arranging and executing their
own security. As described, each individual has his/her own specific deviant
security interests. Therefore, an individual cannot rely on the larger commu-
nity or the group for his/her deviant security, and need some self-governance
of their protection without outside control as their security is seen by others as
a negative externality. A developer that sells his/her malicious software on the
underground economy might not care if there are any vulnerabilities in his/her
malware that are exploitable by threat agents. His/her clients will probably take
the true punch as their botnets install the malware on victims’ systems and as
such take the biggest risk of getting detected. Botherders, in turn, rather at-
tack the networks and machines of third parties with their botnet, and not the
owners of the infected machines, to avoid detection and thus loss of the asset of
a bot [357][162, p.17]. Similarly, several breaches of client databases of vendors
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in the underground economy were observed during this study. However, the
owners of the databases did not inform their customers. They have no incentive
to do so: complying to any informal underground data breach notification law
would harm their credibility and result in a competitive disadvantage. There-
fore, individuals have to strike a balance in their security between cooperation
with others versus autonomy of the individual. Security interests as confiden-
tiality, unobservability and anonymity (read: protection of identity) express a
preference for autonomy. Even for security interests that are needed for cooper-
ation like availability, accountability or authenticity, individuals need a degree
of autonomy to check any related security violations [64, pp.47-49]. Thus, a ref-
erent object has to undertake at least some of his/her deviant security without
outside control, and will always bear some implementation costs.
6.2 DevSec Providers & Services
The second group of key players are suppliers of deviant security. Providers of
DevSec can be divided in those who intentionally deliver deviant security and
those who unintentionally provide it, and are found across both cyber crimi-
nal and cyber security communities. That the division between intentional and
unintentional providers is not black and white, but rather forms a continuum,
is shown by one of the most important aspects of cyber crime: the (mis)usage
of Internet hosting services. As compared to other legitimate and illegitimate
services, servers are absolutely vital for the commission of cyber crime. In
other words, while sexually-driven computer-assisted CSAM users can go with-
out money laundering and financially-driven computer-enabled drugs vendors
without fake documents, all computer-enabled crimes and most other cyber
crimes are depending on domains, IPs and servers. Yet the behavior of hosting
providers may widely differ in the level of technical computer security towards
cyber criminals and be classified in legal terms such as culpability and liability
as shown in Figure 6.5.
Intentional providers Deviant security may be complex, labour-intensive
and time-consuming for referent objects. Malafide individuals and organiza-
tions might decide, for example, that they cannot or do not want to bear any
development costs of deviant security controls. As a result, DevSec has become
a sellable asset. So, not only the commission of crime consists of specialized
and deskilled divisions of labour [34], but also the protection of the criminal
and his/her crimes to the extent that there is a DevSec-as-a-service economy
in the cyber criminal underground as shown by Figure 6.2. Service providers,
who operate on this market and knowingly provide DevSec, include hosting and
connectivity providers, counter AV vendors, crypters, escrow service providers,
malware developers that do security-by-design, and deviant security consultants













Escrow Provide trust between vendors (read:
supply) and clients (read: demand).
Counter
antivirus
Test malware to prevent detection by
legitimate AV software, as a separate
service or integrated in e.g., exploit kits.
Credit card
checking







Crypting Obfuscate and/or resize code to prevent
detection & add functionalities to detect
debuggers and virtual machines (VMs) of
security researchers (see e.g., [399, p.3]).
Preloaded/configured
VMs
Deliver virtual machines that are
purposely build to securely commit crime
by avoiding data leakage about the
criminal and his/her crimes. Frequently
combined with other countermeasures
such as deception tactics, e.g., leaking
disinformation, and integrated




Deliver phone (prepaid or subscription)
with business enterprise server, encrypted
communications and/or anti IMSI
catching.




connectivity handles abuse notification, and provide
secure sockets layer (SSL) deployment
and IP spoofing. Provide SOCKS, Layer
2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) and (other)
VPN protocols without revealing








Conceal the origins of illegally obtained
money, typically by means of transfers
involving foreign banks, legitimate
businesses [402], or accepting criminals’
cryptocurrencies and randomly
exchanging cryptocoins for other users’








Serve as ‘relaying intermediaries who
cloak the criminals’ true identities. [...]
These schemes act as an additional level
of indirection and obfuscate traces that
the criminals might have left behind
otherwise’ [212, p.1082].








Produce false documents such as
passports, IDs, drivers licenses and




Provides verification via e.g., phone/short
message system (SMS) to register email,
chat and other accounts on platforms of
legitimate services.




fication mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and
international mobile equipment identity





Prevent prosecution after arrest by
means of bribery.
Physical security controls Detect, deter and disrupt intruders with
physical security controls such as CCTV,
jammers and scanners. These controls are
mostly sold via spy shops that may also
connect clients to providers of technical






Execute a range of attacks such as
telephony denial-of-service, distributed
denial-of-service, email flooding, IMSI
flooding, and buffer overflow.
Human capital 5.5 Deviant
security
consultancy
Formulate and/or implement DevSec
policies and mechanisms to clients.
Table 6.2: An oversight and description of the various DevSec vendors and their products
and services in the CaaS underground economy, including the DevSec category in which these
products and services fall. Be aware that some services and products are also offered by
bonafide vendors on the regular IT market, yet in another, i.e., legitimate capacity.
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As said, states can be intentional providers of DevSec as well, and turn se-
curity for criminals into a public good. Besides (geo)political reasons that are
explained in detail in Section 7.3, states may also have other incentives to tol-
erate DevSec practices in general and more specifically the DevSec-as-a-service
economy. This happens, for instance, with secure communication platforms.
These may not be taken down when LEA and intelligence services have ac-
quired a valuable information position after considerable efforts. Criminals may
also openly show their activities in states without the rule of law, using extreme
violence and the installment of a security apparatus [283]. Such an apparatus
consists of a network of bribed police officers, judges and politicians that provide
a ‘roof’ to suspects (крыша - ‘krysha’ in Russian) [320, p.10][364], to the extent
that обнал (‘obnal’ - i.e., money laundering for bribery purposes [376][405])
and prevention-of-prosecution are offered as a service on cyber criminal fora
[343]. Police officials in the Silk Road investigation obstructed justice by offer-
ing counter-intelligence on law-enforcement to the administrator of the forum
[406]. Individuals misusing their diplomatic status to commit cyber crime have
also been observed during this study, as well as cyber criminals that commis-
sioned legal attacks by corrupt law-enforcement officers on malafide competitors
and legitimate private security vendors to protect their illegal activities. In all
of these examples, state protection as a private good is delivered by government
officials to cyber criminals. The private security industry may also willingly
provide DevSec. During a joint public-private investigation of the police and
a private security company into online bank fraud, a competing security ven-
dor knowingly published a report about the same malware. Immediately after
the launch of the report, the criminals altered the configuration of the malware
and avoided the usage of ISPs in certain jurisdictions which negatively affected
the investigation. Lastly, other stakeholders in the cyber security community -
most notably witnesses and victims - may provide security to criminals by, for
example, altering statements, or not filing a complaint [80, pp.85-86]. The latter
is apparent in cyber crime cases, like ransomware, in which victims have few
incentives to file a complaint although the victim and his/her computer might
hold investigative leads for the police [407].
Unintentional providers Actors within the cyber security community - no-
tably, states, the private security industry and other stakeholders - can also
be unintentional providers of deviant security. Legislators and policymakers
may write laws or policies that not only protect the rights of the individual,
such as the attorney-client privilege, but might also hold unexpected conse-
quences that protect malicious activities. Traditional criminals added attorneys
in email discussions by default, sent legal interns to criminal meetings [408],
and shipped narcotics in letters with logos of law firms. Accidents, mistakes
and failures might help criminals as well. A uniformed police man asked a sus-
pect of an investigation during a routine check if he was related to cyber crime
‘because the police system says so’. Police and CERTs that unknowingly sent



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in turn told their criminal clients that they were a target of law-enforcement
agencies. A DevSec-as-a-service provider has been observed that sold a service
in which governmental institutions unintentionally helped out. A cyber crimi-
nal claimed that he had hacked multiple police systems, subsequently provided
evidence of his access, and offered information from these systems for sale. Secu-
rity researchers accidentally sent false positive indicators of compromise (IoCs)
to banks, turning the banks’ focus away from the attackers. Technologies of
bonafide technology and security vendors are misused by criminals for protec-
tive purposes - such as Brazilian cyber criminals who use legitimate social media
to communicate [409, p.2], cloud services to host C&C servers [410], or cyber
criminal fora using DDoS protection of a legitimate service provider. Victims
might contribute by not being forensic ready, like having installed IDS and au-
dit systems, which seriously hampers private and public investigations after a
successful attack. Lastly, a fire in a datacenter destroyed hardware for law-
ful interception and historical subscriber information [411]. How should those
who are confronted by deviant countermeasures regard these challenges? All
the examples point to a twofold setback for the cyber security community, i.e.,
the double whammy effect of deviant security. The cyber security key players
not only have to overcome the security practices applied by the criminal, but
also their own, self created barriers and those of significant others, that help
criminals in commission and protection. Many of the underlying causes of the
current effectiveness crisis in traditional investigations are also present in pub-
lic and private cyber crime investigations. These challenges are mainly of a
political/legal and organizational nature [412], such as too many unnecessary
bureaucratic rules, absence of strategy and coordination, internal and external
conflicts, mismanagement, loss of operational momentum, poor skill sets and
professional attitudes, and fierce rivalry within the cyber security community
[12][413][228, pp.64-65, 98-100][414][415].
6.3 Threat Agents & Attacks
The third group of key players of deviant security are threat agents. Each type of
cyber crime - whether computer-focused, assisted or enabled; politically, profit,
sexually or thrill-driven - comes with its own risks to the criminal’s assets, read:
threat agent and related attacks. These breachers of deviant security consist of
a wide variety of actors within and outside the cyber security community, more
specifically mandated threat agents, (victim) witnesses, public and private se-
curity researchers, other criminals and referent objects themselves. Some threat
agents and attacks will have a significantly lesser impact on the referent object
than others. Fraud by a ripper only leads to an unfortunate but single mone-
tary loss. Public leakage of the malware source code by a disgruntled insider
(e.g., developer) or thrill-seeking outsider (hacker) results in continuous loss of
revenues, while doxing by vigilantes or competitors causes permanent damage
to the criminal’s true identity. While most examples in this section are about
threat agents who intentionally breach the security of cyber criminals, there is
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also evidence of unintentional breaches. An ISP, for example, accidentally run
an autoscript that deleted all data on an important server of a cyber criminal
group.
‘Please do not touch my CSAM server’
An investigator and prosecutor told the following story about a system administrator of a
company who had stored his CSAM collection on a server at work. Presumably, he did not
want his colleagues to physically touch his server. He therefore attached a plastic name label
on the server so others would leave the server alone. However, when LEA investigated him,
officers could easily find his server in the company’s rack frame. The label also provided
evidence that the server was truly his. The CSAM user in this example faced a zero-sum
security tradeoff. The name label did not create a situation in which he would discourage
both types of threat agents. On the contrary, his gain of scaring off colleagues with a name
label meant a certain loss when law-enforcement officers would need to locate the server and
subsequently attribute the server to him. Similarly, a BPH labelled his servers that were
blacklisted by the private industry to protect these IT focused assets, but simultaneously
provided evidence for LEA that he had knowledge about the malicious activities of his
clients on these servers. Lastly, many suspects during this study were encountered that
saved all their writings with other cyber criminals as proof about e.g., the negotiated terms
and conditions of (potential) business transactions. When alleged violations of agreements
occur, transaction partners can demand arbitrage of forum admins and present the writings
as ‘evidence’. The same writings that can also be used as evidence by legal practitioners
against them in court.
Mandated threat agents Some key players - predominantly state agencies
- have a public legal mandate to launch offensive attacks against suspects of
crime. These public agencies wait for, and exploit, any failures and mistakes
of cyber criminals, and breach DevSec. Police investigations primarily focus on
tracing back the true identity of their suspect, and will subsequently stream-
line their strictly regulated interception, interruption and fabrication attacks
as such. Some regulators, like the United States’ Federal Trade Commission
and the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), have legal
powers to investigate a limited number of specific cyber crimes like the act of
sending spam messages. Likewise, the US Federal Communications Commission
and the Radiocommunications Agency Netherlands have the legal authority to
investigate distributors and users of GPS and cell phone jammers - a physi-
cal deviant security control. Financially-driven individuals who also conduct
state-sponsored espionage - as well-known suspect with monikers Slavik and
lucky12345 allegedly did [416] - or cause large damage to national critical in-
frastructures - like the WannaCry ransomware did [417] - might become targets
of intelligence services that have far reaching surveillance powers. Hence, a re-
view of advertisements and terms and conditions of bullet proof hosters show
that most of these DevSec providers try to avoid becoming a threat agent to
state security, thus a target of intelligence services, by explicitly forbidding ter-
rorism and/or anti-government related activities on their servers. Still, this
prohibition may be ignored by clients. BPHs have been (mis)used as crimi-
nal proxies in a number of state-sponsored attacks to create political plausible
deniability, namely: the use of deception tactics - маскировка (‘maskirovka’)
in Russian, false flag attacks in English - to disguise intelligence, military or
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state-sponsored attacks (see also [418], and the BlackEnergy crimeware used in
politically-driven espionage against Ukrainian government institutions [419]).
(Victim) witnesses Witnesses of cyber crime, including victims, are indi-
viduals within public and private organizations and the general public (child
victims, coincidental bystanders, concerned citizens, family members, neigh-
bors, etc) who are confronted with cyber crime. Some breach DevSec uninten-
tionally such as girlfriends who use their boyfriend’s VPN connection (which
is intercepted by LEA) to login to social media revealing her true identity.
Observed examples of intentional breaches of physical deviant security by the
public are victims of CSAM that disclose the abuse to others, or family members
and friends that discover CSAM on a home computer, revealing the activities
and/or identity of the perpetrator. Similarly, evidence from reviewed inves-
tigations and media reports show that communication, financial and security
products/services of legitimate companies are frequently misused for criminal
purposes [395][420][421]. Several organizations did step forward and informed
and/or collaborated with LEA about these activities during this study. From
a legal perspective, the knowledge of (victim) witnesses about crimes can be-
come evidence in criminal proceedings through the form of victim and witness
statements. Yet they might be exempted to give evidence when they are legally
allowed to do so, such as marital privilege. Moreover, victims and other plain-
tiffs can start civil lawsuits against cyber criminal defendants, like a software
vendor did against operators of - amongst others - the Kelihos, Rustock and
Zeus botnets [422][423][424]. Not only can civil lawsuits be brought against
defendants to compensate for the financial losses caused by the botnets, but
plaintiffs can also obtain court orders that permit to seize botnet assets like
domain names and hardware without first notifying the owners of these assets
[425].
Public & private security researchers A special category of witnesses
are academics, abuse hotlines, attorneys, investigative journalists, NGOs, pri-
vate and public CERTs, regulators, employees of the private security industry
(like antivirus vendors and private investigators - called contracted security)
and corporate security such as cyber threat intelligence departments of large
enterprises (called in-house security). They too pose a security threat to cyber
criminals, especially by pro-actively gathering information about the security of
cyber criminals, and subsequently reporting about their vulnerabilities. Besides
commercial aspects, there is a big difference between private and public security
parties. The former is able to install intrusion detection systems on their clients’
machines, while some of their public counterparts also focus on commercially
less interesting targets including DevSec providers like bulletproof hosters. In
other words, both groups have their own unique information position. The at-
tacks by security researchers (also called defenders from a good guy security
perspective) are mostly defensive, but sometimes also offensive: think of an
incriminating news report about a malware author by an investigative journal-
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ist [426], botnet sinkholes by non-profit organizations [427], or academics who
couple machine learning methodologies with information retrieval techniques to
crawl carding shops, fora and chat channels on - amongst others - the Dark Net
[428][429]. The threats of public and private security researchers include tech-
nical and non-technical attacks of fabrication, interception, interruption and
modification. These attacks harm the availability, integrity and confidential-
ity of criminal assets. The former includes the removal of infected computers
in a botnet and/or takedown of C&C servers [159], the middle points to DNS
sinkholes to obstruct the use of C&C domain names, while the latter refers to
news articles that uncover the hidden world of cyber criminals and their crimes.
Public and private security researchers too might be exempted to give evidence
when they are privileged to do so based on e.g., attorney-client privilege like legal
practitioners, or data protection laws like journalists and scientific researchers
[430].
Other criminals Other criminals can be threat agents to referent objects of
deviant security as well. Breaching the security of other cyber criminals is for
most criminals a low-risk activity: offenders can protect their identity, while
they do not have to be physically near their ‘victim’, nor do they have to come
forward with their deeds [17, pp.445-450][431, p.178]. Furthermore, their vic-
tims will likely not file a complaint either. For example, an organized group
specifically targeted carder shops that sold stolen credit card credentials. There
are various motives in play why criminals target other suspects of crime: com-
petitors intend to harm the business of their rivals; hacktivists are motivated
by ideological goals; rippers are financially driven; and vigilantes want to initi-
ate prosecution. Throughout this study, examples are given of attacks by these
threat agents against assets of other criminals, including their security. Less
obvious criminal threat agents to malafide assets are pirates of ‘criminal intel-
lectual property’. Unauthorized malware is offered for sale on the underground
economy like the pirated versions of the ransomware-as-a-service Philadelphia
[432, pp.22-28]. The developers of both Carbon Grabber and SpyEye therefore
installed protective measures, including backdoors, against those who used an
unlicensed copy of their malware [433][434]. The individuals behind the Black-
hole exploit kit protected their malware code with a commercial encoder for a
similar reason [435]. While cyber criminals commit a range of computer-focused,
computer-assisted and computer-enabled offenses against other criminals, an act
with far reaching consequences is revealing identifying details of their victims
(known as doxing) as this affects the confidentiality of the precious identity
asset of a criminal. Indeed, cyber criminals, including hacktivists and other
cyber security vigilantes [436], regularly hack their targets and leak the stolen
information - sometimes complete databases - to investigative journalists, LEA
or public drop boxes. This illegally obtained evidence by a third party is under
certain circumstances admissible in - amongst others - Dutch criminal court
proceedings [437][438].
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Hacktivists against CSAM users
The fear of getting caught in combination with the need for security were exploited by
hacktivist group Anonymous during a technology-based social engineering attack against
CSAM users in 2011. They launched a disinformation attack on a CSAM underground
forum, claiming that Tor should be updated because the privacy enhancing technology
could not be trusted anymore. On the day of the legitimate Tor update, they subsequently
offered a bogus software update that allowed the hackers to extract the true IP addresses
of the users, and tracking their visits to underground fora. As such, the hacktivists harmed
the identity assets of 190 alleged CSAM users [439].
Referent objects: breach your own security Lastly, referent objects may
intentionally or unintentionally breach their own security. Because cyber crimi-
nals are always to some extent autonomous in their own security, many breaches
occur because of their own self-inflicted accidents, failures and mistakes such as
bad implementation of administrative security policies or malfunctioning tech-
nical security mechanisms. VPN connections frequently fail and/or are not
consistently used which reveal the criminal’s home IP address in netflow data
[112]. Similar to the error made by the MoneyTaker group where a program
developed to erase all malware traces on a victim machines failed [440, p.4], a
suspect under investigation wrongly configured a server. Instead of automat-
ically deleting the access logs of the server, all traffic was still recorded and
stored. A suspect refused to hand over the password of his laptop to the po-
lice. He had, however, installed a remote access tool on the machine for testing
purposes. The investigators, in turn, exploited this backdoor and gained ac-
cess to the machine. Security may also be intentionally lowered to optimize
malicious business proceedings. Although highly secure, Tor over a triple or
even quadruple VPN connection may seriously slow down Internet access, and
is therefore probably one of the reasons that this practice has not been observed
during this study. Moreover, suspects have the legal privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. Yet they may be inclined to intentionally give up (some of
their) security after arrest by handing over incriminating evidence and/or finan-
cial assets to the police in the hope that cooperation will lower their sentence
(see, for example Dutch court case [441]), to the extent that some will turn
into (criminal) informants. Lastly, novices - also known as newbies or noobs -
are major threat agents for cyber criminal organizations, as their failures and
mistakes may have a negative impact on co-conspirers.
6.4 Information Asymmetries in Intertwined Net-
works
After describing referent objects, DevSec providers and threat agents, the ques-
tion of this section is: what is the inter-relationship of these key players? Key
players and their assets - whether human or non-human, tangible or intangible,
for commission or protection, related to the criminal or his/her crimes - do not
stand on their own: they interact in networks [293]. Generally, academic studies
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distinguish between cyber criminal networks and cyber security networks. This
dichotomy between the criminal phenomenon and reaction to that phenomenon
is a simplification of reality. Because applying and breaching DevSec is a socio-
technical practice, the key player networks in which self-suppliers, providers,
purchasers and breachers of DevSec operate, are all intertwined. These inter-
twined networks hold various vulnerabilities related to the identity and business
operations of cyber criminals. An important vulnerability that affects the se-
curity of cyber criminals are information asymmetries between the key players
of the intertwined networks. As a result, cyber criminals operate on a lemon
market - a form of market failure - for their deviant security: they have little ac-
curate information about the quality of their purchased security product and/or
service.
Intertwined networks of key players In practice, key players have mul-
tiple identities as they are part of various groups and networks: criminal and
legitimate, private and professional, social and technological. The groups and
networks in which these entities operate are indeed interconnected, i.e., networks
of networks. Cyber criminal networks react to interventions of the cyber secu-
rity community after events like the arrest of a co-conspirer, the takedown of
their Internet infrastructure, or the publication of a threat analysis with IoCs of
their attack. The group behind the mobile banking trojan Cron, for instance,
modified their malware to attack other countries than Russia after the arrest of
a member in the Russian Federation [442]. In other words, networks are con-
stantly surrounded and shaped by key players that either support or fight them
[293, pp.592-593].
Because cyber criminals belong to various groups and networks, the multi-
ple identities that they develop come into play at different times, depending on
context [363, p.96]. However, managing multiple identities is extremely hard for
cyber criminals. As depicted in Figure 6.3, the groups and networks of referent
objects and threat agents are not only linked, but also very much intertwined as
entities potentially hold several roles over time. Most key players can simulta-
neously be on the providing and receiving end of DevSec, as well as breaching it.
As a result, cyber criminals are always connected to potential breachers, even
in their most trusted social surroundings. For instance, DDoS attackers were
identified after they bragged about their crimes to relatives of law-enforcement
officers. Many law-enforcement agencies have information positions within cy-
ber criminal networks through (criminal) informants and undercover operatives.
Likewise, there are allegations of Russian law-enforcement agencies actively re-
cruiting cyber criminals to work for them [443][252]. Cyber threat intelligence
reports of other nodes within security networks - especially private security com-
panies - may lead to the believe that they have a well-established information
position on criminal networks as well. For instance, a private security company
- prior to the official police investigation - publicly named several nicknames
who were allegedly related to a botnet, but a cyber crime unit of the police
could not identify any monikers, even after using evasive investigative powers.
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Did the private security company do a very good job in open source intelligence,
or did they go a step further, such as starting conversations with other cyber
criminals or even went so far that they hacked the suspects’ systems?
Citizen participation in police investigations further intertwines the network.
For example, the general public was asked on Dutch television if they recognized
the voice of a ransomware offender, and on another occasion, the face of a vic-
tim depicted on an image. Furthermore, multiple law-enforcement agencies have
launched the idea of more active crowd policing projects in which citizens are
stimulated to detect and report cyber crime [444]. Such ideas and initiatives
add to an environment of emerging cooperative criminal justice system in which
cyber security vigilantes also play a significant role [436], such as an individual
that took down the Wannacry botnet who turned out to be the alleged devel-
oper of the Kronos botnet [445]. Criminals therefore need to apply security
in all of their networks, as informational capital in, for example, a legitimate
network might reveal the identity and criminal activities within another net-
work. Such contamination of identities and activities are often breakthroughs
in investigations (see e.g., [446, p.2]). Think of entities of cyber criminals -
like bank accounts, chat and email addresses and/or phone numbers - that are
used for both illegitimate and legitimate business/private purposes. Similarly,
the arrests of two wanted Russian suspects of carding in the Netherlands were
possible because one of them posted his whereabouts on his social media profile
[447]. Another individual not only used an unusual greeting (‘hiyas’) on an ac-
cess controlled CSAM forum to say hello to befriended members, but also used
the word on one of his legitimate social media accounts [448]. A last argument
for the intertwinedness of cyber criminal and cyber security networks is the en-
tanglement of the underground economy with the legitimate economy. Besides
obvious examples as misusing financial services to launder money, several cases
have been observed in which legal entities were financially depending on cyber
criminals. A law-enforcement agency had to preserve a server which was rented
to a reseller of an ISP. In reply to a question of the agency, the ISP stated that
they had no idea if the reseller would, in turn, inform his criminal client about
the preservation. The question of the police was, however, rhetorical. The re-
seller - a long standing client of the ISP - was a well-known bulletproof hoster
with many public reports providing evidence about this accusation. An inves-
tigator told about another case in which a postal service earned over a million
euro a year from a reshipping scheme and gave its malafide customer discounts.
In such situations, legitimate entities might have a hard time to say farewell to
their illegitimate clients and turn a blind eye on malafide activities.
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Figure 6.3: Key players - who may hold various roles - operate in an intertwined network
which, in turn, creates vulnerabilities for the cyber criminal’s identity and his/her malicious
business proceedings. A ripper on a carder forum might reveal his own physical location when
buying drugs on a cryptomarket, while his wife - i.e., a witness of crime - might accidentally
reveal her husband’s identity, activities or location to others in the network.
Information asymmetries between transaction partners Because cyber
criminals can easily cause many small-impact victimizations distributed across
multiple jurisdictions, the relationship between offenders, victims and the crim-
inal justice system has become asymmetric [80, p.80]. But asymmetric rela-
tionships also occur in ways that do not benefit the commission of crime. Due
to disinformation, misinformation and too little information about actors and
their businesses [449][450], classical information asymmetries occur: one party
has less (accurate) information about a transaction than other involved parties
[451]. These information asymmetries relate to transactions of legitimate and
illegitimate actors and systems with whom the criminals interact. Key players
can have different roles of which the cyber criminal is not aware. Carders, for
example, face uncertainties about the nature of the seller’s identity, and the
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quality of the compromised credit cards [452, pp.522-527][453][454]. Too lit-
tle information about the vendor and his/her products may harm the buyer’s
identity and/or business proceedings, something rippers take advantage of when
cheating on buyers [186]. This does not only occur in transactions between cyber
criminals, but also between cyber criminals and legitimate parties. Let us take
take legitimate services that are misused for the distribution and download of
CSAM to illustrate this point. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing services and video
media players are provided to the CSAM user by legitimate software vendors.
The client, however, does not know if the company collaborates with the police
or if the software leaks personal information (see [455] for victims that could read
client data of a DDoS booter because that information was sent with the attack
traffic. Similarly, a legitimate telecommunications application software product
leaked the IP addresses of (criminal) users, see [356, pp.15-16] and [112]). The
main question for a cyber criminal is in all of these transactions: is the other
party friend or foe; a potential business partner or a threat agent? Because of
the absence of laws that protect financial transactions of cyber criminals, the
problem of know-your-customer (KYC) applies to the underground economy
as well. More specifically, money launderers, including transaction anonymiz-
ers like rogue Bitcoin tumblers, do not implement anti-money laundering laws
(AML) which are generally based on KYC principles [456][330][457]. On the
contrary, they try to provide relationship anonymity [329]. Not only LEA, but
both transaction partners - money launderer and client - will therefore have a
difficult time to establish the true identity and motives of the other party as
well.
Information asymmetries about third parties These examples are, so
far, all classical information asymmetries between parties involved in transac-
tions based on reciprocity. However, third party information asymmetries might
also occur. Intertwined networks generate information asymmetries for the cy-
ber criminal about an important third party that is not involved in any transac-
tion with the cyber criminal, but unilaterally interferes with the business trans-
actions of cyber criminals, such as mandated breachers. Online money launder-
ers will therefore try to increase the information asymmetry between them and
investigative authorities, while legislators try to decrease this information asym-
metry with KYC and AML controls [330][457]. There is yet another negative
side of the coin for suspects. Just as the general public lacks knowledge about
the surveillance and decryption capabilities of intelligence services [458], cyber
criminals have a hard time to reconstruct the investigative methods deployed in
past and ongoing operations of law-enforcement agencies. As depicted in Figure
6.4, cyber criminals might unknowingly be under investigation, while LEA is
successfully receiving information from other nodes in the intertwined network
about the criminal and/or his/her malafide activities. This is, for instance,
shown by Russian cyber criminals who traveled to various holiday destinations
and who were subsequently arrested by local authorities on the legal request
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [358]. Therefore, cyber criminals
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go at great length to increase the amount and quality of information about the
capabilities and operations of the cyber security community, and subsequently
adjust their behavior to the findings. In several instances, cyber criminals dis-
cussed newspaper articles about arrested individuals and tried to determine the
online identity of the suspects. When an arrested suspect was a known contact,
they subsequently deleted their current online pseudonym and changed to an-
other nickname. The reason behind this practice is that ongoing use of their
old moniker may hold the vulnerability of linkability (see [207, pp.21-25]) to
the true identity of its holder. Because an advanced group of cyber criminals
changed the location of their C&C servers immediately after a report with in-
dicators of compromise was published by a private security company, the group
presumably made use of legitimate content change detection and notification
services to receive automated alerts when new results appeared on the Internet
about keywords related to their assets. A more offensive and proactive stance
is to develop relationships within the cyber security community, in other words,
gather information through corrupt legal practitioners and private researchers.
Figure 6.4: Two major questions for the cyber criminal about legitimate and illegitimate
business partners, and breachers of his/her security: i) ‘Is my (future) business partner a
threat agent?’ [64, p.49], and ii) ‘What are the threats and attacks by known breachers, in
other words, am I and/or my potential business partner being investigated by LEA?’
Vulnerabilities of information symmetries in intertwined networks
Most self-proclaimed deviant security providers - or perceived as such by their
clients - apply external secrecy, thus confidentiality, about how they protect
their customers. They provide no to little information about their business
operations to their clients which, as a result, become a black box. Generally,
customers seem to accept this practice as a self-evident truth. Ultimately, cy-
ber criminals have too little information about who is bulletproof under all
circumstances and who is not, and there are no effective independent quality
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assurance or disclosure mechanisms. Thus, just like good guy security [182], and
products and services that promote the commission of crime like compromised
creditcards [186], the market for deviant security is a lemon market. Buyers
can not distinguish between high-quality products and services (referred to as
peaches) and low-quality ones (known as lemons) [451]. As such, information
asymmetries add to the subjective and symbolic meaning of DevSec to cyber
criminals. They might buy protective products/services that let them merely
feel safe against threat agents, as compared to actual objective and material
deviant security that truly protects them.
Are alleged criminal hosters truly bulletproof against threat agents?
Based on the culpability scale of [274, p.488], hosting categorization of [459, p.21] and
conducting and reviewing intelligence and investigations on bulletproof hosters, this study
divides Internet service providers in good hosters, bad hosters and crime hosters (read: bul-
letproof hosters) as depicted in Figure 6.5. Between the legitimate behavior of good hosters
and illegitimate behavior of criminal hosters are the bad hosters. Bad hosters correctly rea-
son that their system administrators cannot remove CSAM from their servers because they
first have to check (and thus view) the material which is indeed de jure prohibited. Bad
hosters further argue that they, as ISPs, are protected by laws such as article 14 of the EU
E-commerce directive which prescribes that hosting providers are not legally liable for the
content that they host. There are many instances in which hosting providers with a repu-
tation in the cyber criminal underground for being bulletproof fully cooperated with LEA.
These facilitators may have economic incentives to pass off lower quality products/services
than promised to their clients. After all, availability of the complete business process is
more important than the confidentiality of a single client. Other hosters accept only virtual
and cryptocurrencies and evidently false subscriber details, and allow malicious content on
their servers, but do not provide any further anti-LEA services to their clients. Lastly,
some will also inform their customers about any abuse notifications, so the client can take
necessary actions. Few will also move that content to another server. In short, there exists
a continuum of seller qualities for hosting malafide activities. These examples make clear
that moral hazard may occur in the intertwined network. Some actors, like bulletproof
hosters, have an incentive to take more risks - i.e., hidden actions - after a deal is struck
because others, i.e., their clients, will bear the (security) costs of those risks. After all, these
facilitators might regard the DevSec of another referent object as a negative externality.
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Figure 6.5: Be aware that especially the data centers of bad hosters may attract bulletproof
resellers and other criminal customers, because of poor abuse enforcement policies and network
monitoring, and non-response to industry standards such as voluntary notice-and-takedowns
(NTD) of - amongst others - websites with child abuse material [460]. Another notion is
that this model holds an inherently Dutch legal perspective in which intellectual property
violations are not actively prosecuted, and legal child erotica (as compared to illegal child
abusive material) are dealt with by voluntary industry compliance.
The market for bulletproof IP addresses, either provided by hosting and con-
nectivity providers, is such a lemon market. Research shows that the majority
of VPN services suffer from IPv6 traffic leakage [461], while reviewed investiga-
tions tell us that legitimate connectivity providers frequently log traffic and/or
cooperate with LEA. Moreover, cyber criminals may get IP addresses assigned
that were issued to other criminals in the past. As such, these servers are asso-
ciated with illegal activities and therefore be on a blacklist of the cyber security
community. To compete with these lemon providers, several bulletproof connec-
tivity vendors with a cyber criminal forum presence offered transparency and
set up websites that gave additional information to cyber criminals about the
quality of their acquired IP addresses. Still, total honesty about deviant secu-
rity practices by transaction partners is impossible as third party threat agents
may benefit from transparency. Thus, DevSec-as-a-service providers have to
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navigate between secrecy and transparency. Moreover, good guy legal solutions
to resolve information asymmetries - consumer protection regulation, external
product certification, industry standards or liability laws - do not work as the
cyber criminal underground is very much defined by the absence of formally
enacted laws. What is left are the previously mentioned methods of increasing
the amount and quality of information and installing guarantees through escrow
services.
Because it is unknown what the threats are or what the quality is of De-
vSec products and services, it is hard for cyber criminals to determine return
on investment for deviant security. As a result, they have a protective asset
allocation problem. Should they opt for an approximate versus complete cover-
age of threats? For proactive or reactive measures on optimal configuration of
their security mechanisms? For largely unaffected business processes versus an
essential security overhead (see [64, p.50])? For action of developing and sub-
sequently maintaining new deviant security controls, or inaction until current
controls can no longer guarantee the expected level of protection? Given the
large information asymmetries in intertwined networks, there are no metrics
that provide answers to these tradeoff dilemmas. Therefore, cyber criminals
easily under protect their assets or over spend on security.
6.5 Deception as Deviant Security Control
As explained in the previous section, disinformation, misinformation and too lit-
tle information about key players and their acts cause information asymmetries.
This section elaborates on the former cause: the distribution of false informa-
tion to deliberately deceive other key players. Outright criminal or abnormal
behavior, indeed even being an outlier for a brief moment, is a major vulnera-
bility for cyber criminals. To protect themselves against ‘standing out from the
crowd’, cyber criminals have to deceive other key players. As a result, cyber
criminals themselves are largely to blame for inaccurate information and sub-
sequent information asymmetries in intertwined networks. Deception is defined
as the misrepresentation or restriction of information in order to influence the
behaviors of others [462, p.121], more specifically, as a process through which a
deceiver purposefully induces a false representation to a target [463, p.469] (see
also [449][450]). In other words, deception attacks are fabrication attacks [464,
p.69][54]. As a result, deception affects the integrity of data and related tech-
nical computer security attributes of authenticity and non-repudiation which is
not only a burden to the cyber security community, but to cyber criminals as
well.
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Try not to stand out from the crowd An intelligence report described how a p2p
botnet was monitored through a super peer that was under control of the private security
industry. Among all the HTTP POST requests on the super peer, there was one GET
request: the botnet herder logged on the botnet through the super peer instead of the C&C
botnet panel. He further stuck out because he subsequently logged in with admin privileges
which regular p2p traffic has not. Standing out from the crowd can also be understood in
the literal sense of the word. When an organized group of Latvian, Moldovan, Romanian
and Russian cyber criminals was busy to hack ATMs in Taiwan, Taipei citizens informed the
police that individuals were acting suspiciously in front of a bank. An off-duty police officer
later recognized a Latvian suspect in a nearby restaurant, and as a result, his colleagues
were able to make an arrest [465].
Current scholars connect deception to the commission of cyber crime, like so-
cial engineering of victims [466][220], and to defensive responses by law-abiding
entities to prevent and detect cyber criminal attacks, such as installment of hon-
eypots [467]. So, our current understanding of deception fits very much within
the dominant security course of the bad guys deceiving the good guys, and what
the latter should do to prevent and detect deception attacks, by applying - in
turn - security through deception [468]. The emphasis in these studies is on
malicious deceptive acts that make victims, and are primarily driven by sexual,
thrill-seeking or financial purposes. However, all malicious deception tactics
hold protective qualities, and can be categorized as i) deceptive tactics to com-
mit crime but with protective side effects, and ii) deceptive tactics solely for
deviant security purposes.
Deception with protective side effects Let us first study the current aca-
demic perspective on deception attacks by cyber criminals in detail. Two obser-
vations become apparent. Most papers - with few notable exceptions like [469]
- consider the target of deception attacks to be a (potential) victim of crime
[463, p.469][470]. Secondly, most papers focus on (preventing and detecting)
cyber criminal deception attacks on those victims, such as the use of Trojan
horses, IP-spoofing, ripping, spam marketing and social engineering techniques
[209, p.62][471][464][453]. In short, deception is predominantly regarded as part
of the commission of crime [79, p.4], especially to increase the conversion rate
of the attack against victims [150], and thus part of the good guy perspective
on security. Few studies, however, consider the DevSec-related side effects of
these attacks. Once the deception attack is completed and a victim is made,
threat agents to the cyber criminal may respond, but are obstructed in their
efforts due to the very nature of deception attacks. Deceptive crimes do not only
sideline victims who have solely defensive capabilities, but mandated breachers
as well, most notably law-enforcement agencies. Deception tactics further have
the potential to breach the security of law-abiding victims, and without any
additional efforts enhance the perpetrator’s security against (potential) threat
agents after the crime has been committed, usually private and/or public in-
vestigators. Thus, although deception attacks are solely launched to commit
a crime for sexual, financial or thrill-seeking reasons, they also simultaneously
have a beneficial side effect for cyber criminals as these attacks hold protective
qualities as well.
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Why do these commissions simultaneously have protective outcomes? John-
son and his colleagues refer to the actions of the deceiver as deception tactics.
They describe these tactics by reference to a deception core, which is the item
that the deceiver either intends to hide from the target, or whose fictitious prop-
erties the deceiver intends to simulate [472, p.361]. From a DevSec perspective,
the terms core and item translate as all tangible and intangible assets related to
the criminal and his/her crimes (see Table 6.3). Everything that points to the
true identity of the cyber criminal and his/her financial, thrill-seeking or sex-
ual behavior, would alarm a potential victim. To successfully commit his/her
crimes, a cyber criminal must apply deception tactics to shield his/her true
identity and the actions that reveal his/her true intentions. In order for an in-
dividual to groom a child, he/she might add, alter or remove certain identifiers
to enhance the credibility of his/her character and achieve his/her sexual goal
[473]. However, masking age, mimicking a youngster, and inventing a credible
character to sexually groom a victim will simultaneously enhance his/her secu-
rity against any responses from other threat agents. Similarly, job scam services
request a curriculum vitae and copy of the passport of unwitting moneymules to
appear as legitimate companies [212, pp.1082, 1084, 1085], and the spam emails
of the Pony spear-phishing campaigns that impersonated well-known companies
by using their logos and known subject lines [474]. Besides that personal data
are used to commit other crimes, requesting a copy of the victim’s passport
works also as a countermeasure. Law-enforcement agencies will have difficul-
ties to pose as potential employees as there are legal obstacles to create and
send fake personal details like passport copies. Using hacked servers for botnet
command-and-control purposes does not only benefit the commission of crime
as this practice saves money, but also because all registration and payment de-
tails of the misused servers lead to an innocent party. These examples show that
deception attacks with protective side effects are always of an offensive nature
(hence, the use of the word attacks), and hold deterrent and preventive func-
tionalities: they help to discourage potential threat agents, and stop successful
completion of attacks on the security of the cyber criminal. Because many of-
fensive deception attacks are illegal (e.g., phishing) but inherent to the MO of
suspects, cyber criminals would hypothetically enjoy more security than their








deception core, i.e., the
criminal and his/her
crimes.
Masking Eliminating or erasing crucial information so that
representation of key aspects of the item does not
occur, or produces an incorrect result.
Dazzling Obscuring or blurring information about the deception
core, without eliminating it.





deception core, i.e., the
criminal and his/her
crimes.
Mimicking Assuming somebody else’s identity or modifying the
core so it copies the features of a legitimate item.
Inventing Making up information about the core. The core might
not exist, or its characteristics might be utterly
unrealistic.
Relabeling Describing the core and its characteristics in a
questionably favorable way, expressly to mislead.
Double play Convincing threat agents that they are taking
advantage of the deceiver.
Table 6.3: Deception tactics as proposed by [463, p.472], and refined by [470, p.198]. Ter-
minology is further added from literature (Hiding the real and Showing the false [475]), and
made more explicit based on the findings of this study: deception core and core are specified
as the criminal and his/her crimes, and victim is replaced by the term threat agents.
Deception for deviant security purposes Deception tactics are also de-
ployed for the main purpose of being a deviant security control. In such situ-
ations, deceptive practices are necessary for the cyber criminal not because of
sexual, financial or other reasons, but primarily for security purposes. Again,
cyber criminals have to hide the real and show the false. If the Ponmocup
malware discovered that it was being analyzed on a security researcher’s ma-
chine, it delivered a fake payload. More precisely, the malware installed an easy
to detect and remove adware in a more obvious manner than the real payload
[391, p.32]. Encountered deceptive security tactics in this study are offensive
and defensive (such as honeypots), aimed at all threat agents, and of an admin-
istrative, physical and technical nature. Table 6.4 further shows that deceptive
security mechanisms not only have deterrent, detective and preventive [470,
pp.201-203][476, pp.101-102], but also corrective security functionalities.
Deception is truly the Swiss army knife of DevSec controls because of its
multitude of functions, flexibility, user-friendliness and low operating costs. For
instance, CSAM users generally have to deceive their immediate physical social
surroundings about their sexual preference for years in a row. An admin of
a cyber criminal forum was observed who posed as a legitimate security con-
sultant, called his malicious forum ‘a leading security platform’, and spoke on
major information security conferences. News media may also play a role by re-
labelling cyber criminals and their crimes as patriotic by linking cyber crimes to
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e.g., internal and external political conflicts [477, pp.235-246]; as corrective acts
in which cyber criminals are apparently modern Robin Hoods who steal from
the rich and give to the poor [478]; or as generally harm and victimless acts
conducted by creative nerds while having their own legitimate magazine that
explains how to commit cyber crime [479]. Moreover, accidents, failures and mis-
takes of cyber criminals may not only create disinformation [158, pp.131-132],
but are sometimes also patched by deception tactics as shown by the masking
example in Table 6.4.
Cyber criminal flocks
Cyber criminal groups may also improve the security of individual members because security
is a club good in certain communities. Large flocks of cyber criminals work as a deceptive
countermeasure as the share number of targets may dazzle cyber security communities
(see Data maximization in Table 6.4). Several Chinese cyber criminal fora have near a
million members. Target prioritization may therefore be a challenge for Chinese LEA.
Similarly, the Russian-language underground might also be too large for the Russian cyber
security community to handle. Moreover, the larger cyber criminal flock is safe when law-
enforcement is investigating and prosecuting a single individual member and/or organized
group behind botnets like Avalanche and Zeus: a labour-intensive process which may keep
LEA busy for years. Flocks do also work for non-human entities. Placing your botnet C&C
in a hosting country like the Netherlands underlines the same idea. As experienced during
this study, there is simply too much badness on servers in the Netherlands for Dutch LEA
to send official takedown requests to ISPs, let alone to preserve all the data on these servers,
while ISPs might have incentives not to respond to abuse notifications of other key players
[166]. Similarly, some online money launderers were observed who make large pools of
transactions from which clients can deposit and withdraw cryptocurrencies, while carders
mix large amounts of credit card credentials from various successful point of sale attacks.
Such deceptive actions provide confidentiality and affect integrity. More specifically, these
tactics respectively provide anonymity and unlinkability, and affect authenticity and non-
repudiation which as a consequence protect the criminal (e.g., financial traces that lead to
the identification of a suspect) and/or his/her crimes (stolen credit card accounts that are
blocked by financial institutions).
It further becomes evident that well-described techniques in computer sci-
ence such as obfuscation, spoofing and steganography are all deceptive security
controls. Nota bene, encryption is not based on deception, but on the tactic
of denial: overtly concealing communication, but not its existence [467, p.28].
However, encryption and its antithesis of secure-deletion (see Section 7.1) can
be combined with deception to create technical plausible deniability about infor-
mation assets (also known as content deniability [36, p.442]), more specifically





















After registering one of his very first domains
for a C&C with his true credentials, a botnet




Visitors are shown legitimate content when




Data maximization (also known as data
pooling [132, pp.2-3]) - Creating a hay pile, or
connecting to an existing hay pile of data (i.e.,
noise), to hide an important needle (read:
asset), such as deploying domain generation
algorithms for botnets, or having a very




Obfuscation - Malware developers obfuscate
their code in such a way that their personal




Admins of a cyber criminal forum use a




Steganography - Cyber criminals use
misleading data carriers to hide the existence
of communications and avoid detection, such












A bulletproof hoster poses as a legitimate




Malware mimics sleeping on an infected
machine for an extended period of time to
avoid detection by a sandbox.
Technical
deterrent
Imitation - A malware developer attempts to
write a code such that his/her writing style




Disinformation and lies - A member of a
cyber criminal forum falsely accuses another
member of being an LEA informant.
Sending a copy of a false passport to a virtual
currency processor as verification.
Relabeling Administrative
correction
The influencing of the public opinion about
cyber crime by projecting a favorable image of
criminal hackers in media (‘modern Robin
Hoods’ and/or ‘patriots’), and justifying
and/or downplaying their actions.
Double play Physical detection Cyber criminals deploy double informants to
deceive law-enforcement.
Table 6.4: This table structures observed deception practices with protective side effects as
well as those practices exclusively for security purposes.
Vulnerabilities in deviant deception countermeasures Although decep-
tion controls protect the identity and business assets of individuals, the related
tactics have serious blowback effects to the well-being of the larger cyber crim-
inal community as nobody knows which information is accurate. So, deception
fuels a tragedy of the commons on the accuracy of deviant security-related in-
formation in the cyber criminal community. Every individual applies deception
according to his/her own self-interest, but contrary to the common good of all
users by depleting the accuracy of information. This tragedy cannot be avoided
by cyber criminals as its root cause lies in inherent weaknesses of deviant de-
ception controls. As described previously, cyber criminals need deception for
the successful commission of crime, and cannot always rely on other types of
attacks that would create less information asymmetries. In other words, avoid-
ing deception attacks with protective side effects implies that cyber criminals
would paradoxically have to stop committing crime. The same line of reason-
ing can be extended to the use of deceptive tactics solely for deviant security
purposes. Deception is a necessary stepping stone to successfully implement a
range of other security measures, such as the use of a Trojan to install a RAT
for monitoring co-conspirers. In other words, without deception, a range of vital
deviant security countermeasures will be out of reach.
Similarly, because potential clients may lie about their true intentions - thus
know more about future actions than the transaction partner, i.e., hidden in-
formation - it is hard for DevSec providers to avoid adverse selection prior to a
transaction. BPHs, who are specialists in deception, might be deceived them-
selves by their clients who use rented servers for hosting CSAM or terrorist
related activities, albeit forbidden by the BPH. So, deception works as a feed-
back loop that brings some of the costs imposed to the cyber security community
back to the cyber criminal community that caused them.
Another vulnerability of many deception tactics is security through obscurity
[59, p.34]: the false assumption that threat agents will not find the hidden real.
Obfuscated information capital such as malicious code can be reverse engineered
by security researchers. House searches by law-enforcement agencies hold the
same effect: they are legally permitted to look for hidden physical assets such as
cash money. Still, security through obscurity reduces the adversaries’ rewards
and/or increases the efforts of their threat agents [317, pp.279, 282], thus works
as an effective delaying tactic.
Lastly, effective deception tactics should only target those threat agents that
have the power to negatively affect the deceiver’s assets. However, deceptive
countermeasures cannot be deployed against a single type of threat agent. They
target all possible threat agents indiscriminately with detrimental effects such
as harming criminal business relations. As a result, security through deception
fuels the need to install other deviant security measures. The next sections
show that cyber criminals weapon themselves against deception attacks and in-
formation asymmetries by deploying not only trust mechanisms, but also coun-
termeasures that rely on the opposite side of the coin: distrust mechanisms.
131
6.6 Trust and Distrust as Deviant Security Con-
trols
How do cyber criminals patch the information asymmetries that are caused by
deception tactics of key players? Much has been written about dealing with an
underground economy riddled with dishonesty with online trust (as compared to
offline trust in cyber criminal networks [196, pp.7-8]) [186, p.42][483][452][202].
However, no studies have been found that research online trust mechanisms
from a deviant security perspective, thus as a countermeasure. At the same
time, many cyber criminals do not solely rely on trust policies and mechanisms.
On the contrary, there are good reasons not to trust your (potential) business
partners at all. This section further shows that distrust is very much a deviant
countermeasure, yet academically neglected.
Trust as a deviant security policy Trust is an intangible asset [381, p.6],
and defined in terms of confident positive expectations regarding another’s con-
duct (i.e., words, actions and decisions) [484, pp.439-440]. From a deviant
security perspective, trust is a peer-produced club good [354, p.17], and about
the referent object’s expectations that a transaction partner is not a threat
agent who threatens his/her assets. So each referent object autonomously as-
signs trust to a transaction partner at his/her own discretion [64, p.49]. Trust
mechanisms generally follow the information asymmetries of person-to-person
(‘should I trust this person?’), person-to-system (‘should I trust this system?’)
and system-to-system (‘should my system trust this system?’) [485]. Although
system-to-system trust mechanisms do exist in botnets (see caption below Fig-
ure 6.7), observed deviant trust mechanisms are predominantly person-to-person
and too a lesser extent person-to-system. This is explained by the idea that De-
vSec is neither a product specifically designed for the criminal market, nor reg-
ulated by law. The underground economy has not developed system-to-system
trust controls. Cyber criminals do not have their own certificate authorities
(CAs) that provide system-to-system trust by issuing public key infrastruc-
tures. In fact, cyber criminals must rely on regular CAs for their security when
they apply SSL for e.g., their fora. The absence of law rather paves the way
for personal qualified trust providers. These facilitators operate on a decentral-
ized person-to-person level, such as the previously mentioned malafide escrow
services (nota bene, the exchange of trust for money in the form of a service
converts the intangible to a tangible asset). So, cyber criminals have no other
option than merely raising the issue of the trustworthiness of a particular system
on a cyber criminal forum, and discussing whether or not trust that system. No
matter how advanced these trust mechanism are - ranging from a mere discus-
sion, whitelists or advanced procedures as described in the next paragraph - the
outcome is that the actor or system involved ranges from trusted to not trusted,
and receives a corresponding security clearance (see Figure 6.7).
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Deviant trust mechanisms Trust as a deviant security control builds upon
the research on decentralized person-to-person trust mechanisms of netizens
(Johnson, Crawford and Palfrey [354]) and cyber criminals (Holt and co-authors
[197][453], Lusthaus [202], and Yip, Webber and Shadbolt [452]). Based on the
findings of this study, adjustments are made to the conceptual understand-
ing, structural order and terminology of trust mechanisms as security controls,
most importantly by aligning trust to attribution (establishing and subsequently
trusting who and what of a potential business partner). As depicted in Figure
6.6, assigning deviant trust is an authentication process that consists of three
successive steps:
1. Establishing cyber criminal identity (who). The first step is to establish
the criminal nature of the potential collaborator - read: confirm or reject
his/her criminal identity - which consists of e.g.,:
– Background checks [202][454, p.44]: Review of information related to
the business partner’s identity on closed and open sources, including
member status within cyber criminal community [200, pp.43-44]; and
– Criminal acts as signals and information hostages [453][202]: Review
of and/or requests for incriminating evidence about current or past
cyber crimes such as mandatory uploads of CSAM or stolen credit
card credentials.
These controls are especially effective against mandated breachers. Pseudo-
purchases by police officers are evasive investigative powers which are not
easily allowed by prosecutors and/or investigative judges, and might some-
times even be impossible in some jurisdictions, such as uploading child
abuse images to gain access to closed CSAM fora.
2. Establishing criminal conduct/outcomes (what). Once the criminal iden-
tity of the potential business partner is confirmed, the cyber criminal has
to assess the past and present conduct and produced fruits of his/her
future associate. He/she might ask and/or be given proof of past and
current crimes, such as screenshots of previous payments or samples of
compromised credit cards, similar to the previously described criminal
acts as signals. However, without prior businesses experiences, the cyber
criminal further has to rely on e.g.,:
– Referrals [202]: Recommendations by other cyber criminals on which
reputation is build [431], including positive reviews via public threads
on fora and mouth-to-mouth referrals via private chat messages; and
– Prowess demonstration [202]: Examination of an individual’s human
and information capital, which includes reviewing and testing prod-
ucts and services [197, p.166].
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These first two mechanisms underline what DevSec is: an asset that protect
assets. Referrals and prowess demonstration give information about intangible
assets of the cyber criminal, such as his/her information, human and organiza-
tion capital. This does not only relate to the future partner’s ability to commit
crime, but also his/her ability to protect his/her own and his/her counterpart’s
identity and activities. In a reviewed interview transcript, a convicted person
with a well-developed technical skill set and well-established reputation in the
underground economy stated that he would not trust individuals that do not
use the cryptographic protocol Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR) during instant
messaging conversations as this person probably lacks human capital on techni-
cal computer security and therefore poses a vulnerability. So a cyber criminal
has to assess whether he/she can trust his/her potential partner and related
business, and if that individual does not pose a vulnerability to his/her own
identity and/or business operations. If the criminal identity and business are
sufficiently confirmed, the cyber criminal has to make a decision: is the poten-
tial partner to be trusted to make a deal? If not, he/she might still proceed with
the transaction by making use of escrow services.
Viewed from a DevSec perspective with its emphasis on the protection of
crime and the criminal, these first two steps of the authentication process are of
a preventive nature about trusting the what and who of a transaction partner.
By assessing the identity, conduct and outcomes of the potential partner, the
cyber criminal hopes to prevent damage to his/her own identity and business.
If the business partner is trusted, they may stick together for many years. A
Russian-language job scam service, for instance, rented servers from a reliable
bulletproof hoster for over four years until the money launderer was arrested by
LEA. While the previous steps result in the decision that a partner is trusted,
that is not to say he/she is also trustworthy [36, pp.9-10][285]. Similar to CAV
services, credit card checkers test whether stolen credit cards have already been
blocked by financial institutions. Yet some of these underground enterprises
that offer their service to carders for free, secretly log the test results and use
the validated credit card numbers for their own gain before their customers can
[409, p.7]. In other words, although they are trusted by carders who upload their
stolen credit cards, these DevSec-as-a-service providers are not trustworthy as
their clients are unaware of the customer data monetization behind this free
business model . Therefore, the last step consists of:
3. Enforcing trustworthiness through extra-legal governance [202][454]. Mech-
anisms that enforce trustworthiness are of a corrective nature as these
mechanisms try to correct undesirable events that have occurred. Be-
cause cyber criminals can generally not rely on centralized governance
(e.g., states) when trust is betrayed [453, p.1], peer-produced security in
the form of extra-legal governance is needed by the community itself. Es-
crow services provide qualified trust services, and cyber criminal fora allow
naming and shaming of scammers and rippers, even banning untrustwor-
thy members and/or deleting their posts [368, p.7][266, p.6]. Negative
recommendations (‘a trusted partner was untrustworthy’) and positive
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recommendations (‘a trusted partner was trustworthy’) affect the reputa-
tion of the transaction partner, and subsequently provide input for the first
two steps of the authentication process of other cyber criminals. Thus de-
centralized decisions about about who and what to trust will increase the
security as a common good for the larger cyber criminal community [354,
p.17]. Other corrective controls are discussed at the end of this section.
Vulnerabilities in deviant trust countermeasures A first weakness of
trust controls has already been touched upon in the previous paragraph. Re-
search on trust in a cyber criminal context, most notably [202][452], focuses
very much on the cyber criminal’s assessment of his/her counterpart’s tangi-
ble and intangible assets that relate to his/her business partner’s commission
of crime and identity. But besides the cyber criminal’s decision that his/her
counterpart is criminal and able to commit crime, the cyber criminal also has
to assess whether his/her co-conspirer is able to protect the criminal’s and the
co-conspirer’s own identity and malafide business. Indeed, not only academics
overlook this assessment, but criminals as well. A cyber criminal was observed
who needed several critical services from another criminal to conduct online
scams. However, the real offline identity of this service provider was very easy
to discover on open Internet sources, which increased the chance that LEA
would intervene.
Another fundamental flaw - read: inherent weakness - in these trust mech-
anisms is trusting trust. Trust is very much an assumption [64, p.50], and no
amount of verification or scrutiny will protect a cyber criminal from collaborat-
ing with untrustworthy persons or systems [486]. In theory, each transaction
partner should autonomously assign deviant trust at their own discretion, and
be able to verify the trustworthiness of the other business partner [64, p.49].
However, this is not always possible in the cyber criminal underground. This
vulnerability is most apparent by the middlemen that launder virtual dirty
money for cyber criminals [487]. Besides theft by malicious Bitcoin tumblers
[403], the exit scams of the Evolution cryptomarket and Mt. Gox cryptocur-
rency exchange - essentially, qualified trust providers - are great examples of
trusted third parties for cyber criminals that were, ultimately and just a single
time, not trustworthy [488]. It has been suggested that even the fundraisers set
up by angry customers to sponsor doxing campaigns against the persons behinds
the exit scams were scams as well [489]. So, trusting trust promotes perverse
economic incentives for transaction parties in the cyber criminal underground
to take decisions that negatively affect the other parties involved.
Moreover, trust mechanisms protect the business between transaction part-
ners from attacks by other cyber criminals like rippers, but do not protect
identity against attacks from law-enforcement. On the contrary, trust mecha-
nisms may pose an inherent weakness to the protection of identity. In order
to establish and sustain a reputation and trust of transaction partners, indi-
viduals may share personal identifying information to one another. However,









































































ating such information might help attribution by threat agents. Indeed, Dutch
court cases show that some CSAM users exchange a lot of personal information
and incriminating evidence with trusted like-minded others [139]. Similarly, ad-
vanced computer-focused criminals were observed who discussed their private
lives with trusted partners during chat conversations over trusted lines.
Lastly, trust has obvious reputation benefits for cyber criminals as a re-
spected nickname indeed works as a trusted brand which generates new trans-
actions between individuals who have had no prior knowledge or experience
with each other [452, p.526][202, pp.80-81]. The downside of a well-established
trusted identity - read: reputation cost - is that it will attract the attention
of threat agents, most notably mandated breachers. Law-enforcement agencies
prioritize their proactive investigations on - amongst others - the reputation of
cyber criminals, a problem which trust mechanisms cannot overcome, but ac-
tually create. Assets that are considered competitive advantages for legitimate
businesses might well be competitive disadvantages for cyber criminals. Being a
trusted and well-known brand, having automated processes and the ability to
scale, offering high-quality products/services and features such as 24/7 support
does not only attract many customers and high revenues in the underground
economy [267, pp.170-174]. It will also draw the attention of threat agents that
do not want to enter the competition but will use all necessary means to take
the criminal out of business permanently. Thus, dynamic interplay on secu-
rity spending between referent objects - ‘I installed better security mechanisms
than my competitors, and therefore I am safe against threat agents’ [81, p.12]
- is not applicable in the underground economy. Cyber crime units of federal
and national law-enforcement agencies - most notably, the American FBI and
United States Secret Service (USSS), the British National Crime Agency (NCA)
and German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) - do not prioritize their targets on the
degree and kind of deviant security and related weaknesses, but on the suc-
cess level of committing cyber crime and financial damage to the cyber security
community, most notably victims.
Distrust as a deviant security policy Trust in general should be justi-
fied, and the referent object must have the opportunity to autonomously verify
the trustworthiness and control the actual behavior of his (transaction) part-
ners [64, p.49]. To do so, cyber criminals may install distrust mechanisms. As
depicted in Figure 6.7, trust and distrust are separate and distinct constructs
and not opposite ends of a single continuum [484, pp.439-440][490]. Similar to
bonafide environments [484, pp.448-449][491, p.29], both policies may well coex-
ist in malafide environments. This explains why cyber criminals simultaneously
deploy distrust mechanisms before, during and after the previously described
three steps of the trust process when operating on the cyber criminal market
and/or collaborate with co-conspirers. The security policy is: trust but dis-
trust. This indeed a variation on the Russian proverb ‘доверяй, но проверяй’
(‘doveryay, no proveryay’): trust but verify. As observed during this study,
members of Russian-language cyber criminal fora actually used this proverb to
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discuss e.g., the degree of anonymity of VPNs and spyware. The simultaneous
coexistence of trust and distrust mechanisms ensures a compensating layer of
security, thus an alternative control that provides similar protection as the orig-
inal control. This further shows that cyber criminals want to minimize ex-post
losses due to attacks by non-trusted and distrusted actors, by not only relying
on ex-ante trust mechanisms but also simultaneously invest in ex-ante distrust
controls.
Figure 6.7: The official status of CaaS forum members may relate to trust and distrust.
Some vendors are labelled as verified sellers. Buyers have positive expectations regarding the
seller’s conduct. They are trusted and therefore on a whitelist. Rippers are distrusted, and
for this reason on a blacklist. Buyers have negative expectations about their conduct. Those
who have the status unverified sellers on a forum are not on the whitelist, nor on the blacklist:
they are not trusted, but also not distrusted. In other words, buyers have neither negative,
nor positive expectations about these vendors. Be aware that whitelisting and blacklisting
is not only deployed as a person-to-person mechanism but also system-to-system in e.g., p2p
botnets. The GameOver Zeus botnet applied blacklists of IPs of crawlers and sensors of the
cyber security community to prevent bots from communicating with them. The Sality botnet
used a reputation system based on a goodcount, which reflects how well-behaved peers have
been in the past. The result of the latter system-to-system trust mechanism is that sensors
were only propagated to other bots if they had achieved a positive goodcount, thus positive
expectations about connecting to this peer. This reputation scheme worked against infiltration
attacks from the cyber security community [158, p.131][492].
Opposite to the former trust definition, distrust is defined in terms of con-
fident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct [484, pp.439-440]. In
other words, the referent object expects that an actor might be a threat agent
that threatens his/her identity or malicious business operations. Distrust in
general is expressed by wariness, skepticism, and behaviors as defensiveness,
watchfulness, and vigilance [484, p.446][284]. The outcome of this policy in a
deviant security context is that the actor involved is regarded in a range from
distrusted to not distrusted, and receives a corresponding ban (as compared to
a clearance).
Both distrust and trust protect business operations. Only distrust, however,
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protects identity as well, while trust mechanisms do not (see Table 6.5). On the
contrary, trust provides security for all parties concerned with each party having
their own protection interests and goals. This form of multilateral security is
based on exchange of information about each other’s identity which reinforces
the bond between co-conspirers. This smoothens business operations but poses
a vulnerability that the true identity of a cyber criminal will be revealed when
e.g., communications are intercepted or a criminal colleague is apprehended.
Distrust is unilaterally enforced, limits the autonomy of the distrusted party
over his/her own security, and prevents the distribution of sensitive data assets.
Cyber criminals have good reason to apply distrust: a false positive - a trusted
business partner is not trustworthy - holds a major impact for the safe-being of
their business and identity.
Countermeasures Identity protection Business protection
Distrust ! !
Trust # !
Table 6.5: Because trust only protects malafide business, cyber criminals simultaneously
apply distrust mechanisms to control the protection of identity as well.
Deviant distrust mechanisms Most observed distrust mechanisms are of a
predominantly preventive, detective and deterrent nature (see Table 6.6). These
mechanisms can be categorized as follows:
– Preventive controls:
Compartmentalization (or compartmentation): Cyber criminals isolate
data, software and hardware within different compartments (like a virtual
machine solely used to collect CSAM), or organizational cells within larger
collaborations (e.g., forum admins may only share some of their deviant
security mechanisms with each other, and not with members of a lower sta-
tus). As such, confidentiality is achieved via these respectively rule-based
and role-based controls. The isolation of information is closely related to
internal secrecy: keeping information from insiders - i.e., co-conspirers, fo-
rum members and so on - because of distrust. Internal secrecy differs from
the many examples in this study of external secrecy: keeping information
from outsiders which may actually promote trust between insiders [493,
pp.29-30]. The group behind the Tyupkin malware generated a unique
digit combination key based on random numbers for every ATM attack.
This ensured external secrecy as no person outside the group could acci-
dentally profit from the fraud. The hacker that physically operated near
the ATM then received instructions by phone from another group member
who knows the algorithm and is able to generate a session key [494]. This
internal secrecy policy (i.e., person-to-person) subsequently ensure that
the hacker who also collects the cash cannot act on his/her own.
Data-minimization: A common security policy for confidentiality, more
specifically anonymity and unlinkability [207, p.6], is to minimize the
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amount of content and metadata related to respectively the criminal and
crime, such as botnets that return only a small set of peer list entries
(i.e., system-to-system) [158, p.131]. A piece of advice which is frequently
posted on cyber criminal fora is not to reveal any personal details dur-
ing communications. Lawful intercept shows that some cyber criminals
strictly apply this policy, while others disable logging. They distrust the
technical line of communications, as well as their business partners and
systems (i.e., person-to-system).
Regulations: Bureaucratic and regulatory controls are also based on dis-
trust as they increase control [484, p.446][490, p.885]. Besides informal
norms and unwritten rules, many cyber criminal fora have access rules
[454, pp.39-40], and terms and conditions with do’s and don’ts. An ex-
clusive, paid membership Russian-language forum had, for example, over
40 rules. Admins and their helpers - official moderators, snitches and un-
official watchdogs - heavily enforce these rules by moderating the threads
and postings of members.
– Detective controls:
Investigations: Investigations by cyber criminals are very much a security
measure [59], yet of an offensive nature. These investigations are launched
because of suspicion, which is synonymous for distrust [491, p.41][284,
pp.587-590]. These investigations aim at detecting undesirable events that
have occurred and accountability of those responsible for failures, mistakes
and deliberate attacks. Investigations are frequently deployed on fora to
find duplicate identities, but are also launched after exit scams, rip deals
and DDoS attacks.
– Controls of a preventive and detective nature:
Labelling: Covert and overt labels of cyber criminals to (potential) threat
agents may also point to distrust when these are signs of limiting influence
of, or not granting authority to others [491, p.44]. Observed covert labels
are silent alarms on cyber criminal platforms. Forum admins had negative
expectations towards their members regarding screenshot leakage. They
secretly watermarked each user account with an unique graphic display
for detection purposes [495]. Examples of overt labelling are admins who
give members limited privileges or a distrusted status like ripper.
Testing: Tests are means by which the presence, quality and/or genuine-
ness of objects and subjects are established by cyber criminals because of
potential negative expectations. Human-to-system distrust mechanisms
are counter-antivirus services (‘should I distrust my malware?’). When
such a testing service reports to a crypter that his/her obfuscated mal-
ware is detected by antivirus products, the criminal is sure to distrust the
malware sample. If the service reports no hits that is not to say that the
malware should be trusted. CAV services produce false negatives, and the
underground community is well aware of this problem. Cyber criminals
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frequently test malware against a range of CAVs to prove that these mali-
cious services produce different outcomes, and subsequently publish these
results on fora.
Malware says no
Advanced malware frequently has system-to-system distrust functionalities (‘should my
system [read: malware] distrust this system?’) as it conducts a range of tests to make
sure that the system is not controlled by a security researcher. A reviewed ransomware
assessed the number of stored files on computer systems. If there were less than twenty
files, the computer was likely a security researcher’s honey pot. Rombertik malware ‘slept’
(read: was inactive) for a while to fool sandboxes, and also checked if it was not analyzed
in memory. The malware further examined if analysis tools modified the code by sending
invalid arguments and only accepting a specific error as compared to a general error from
sandboxes that suppress specific errors. Rombertik would also check the username and file-
name of the executing process for strings associated with security researchers like ‘malwar’,
‘sampl’, ‘viru’ and ‘sandb’ [336]. In other words, the malware checked its own integrity
prior, during and after installation. The Cobalt/Buhtrap malware checked if time and date
of the victim’s system was congruent with a clock functionality in the malware [496]. Lastly,
SpyEye malware would test a victim’s system if it was already infected with the competing
Zeus malware and subsequently removed the competing malware [497]. Similarly, Netsky
malware tested systems on Beagle and Mydoom malwares [498].
– Controls of a deterrent and detective nature:
Monitoring: Similar to regulations, monitoring - including surveillance,
supervisory controls and logging - is related to distrust as it aims at in-
creasing control [491, p.44][490, p.885]. Monitoring allows the detection
of suspicious traffic and/or behavior, and as such promotes two attributes
of integrity namely accountability and auditability [27, p.12][32, p.159].
While some suspects minimize the amount of data they generate, others
log metadata of incoming-outgoing server traffic and written communi-
cations with e.g., co-conspirers (sometimes even adding notes with per-
sonal observations to the logs). More offensive countermeasures were ob-
served within a very hierarchal cyber criminal organization. The leaders
secretly installed RATs on the computers of co-conspirers as a detection
control to technically monitor them and their activities, but also promoted
a manual reporting mechanism among lower tier members for the same
purpose. An example of physical surveillance/supervisory controls of a
more deterrent nature are moneymules that were escorted and observed
by moneymule managers whom used professional counter-surveillance tac-
tics. Cyber criminal fora also monitor members’ activities with the help
of administrators/moderators, forum bots and the larger community [368,
p.5].
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Table 6.6: The various security categories of distrust controls. Notably, sanctions for being
distrusted - such as exclusion - are corrective controls, while distrust itself is a compensating
control to trust mechanisms.
Vulnerabilities in deviant distrust countermeasures Deviant distrust
mechanisms show that cyber criminals face two (related) tradeoffs. The first is
efficiency versus effectiveness, more specifically complexity versus accuracy. Fo-
rum members expect that investigation, prosecution and verdict are conducted
as soon as possible by admins and their helpers, i.e., the trias politicus (see
Section 5.4). This requires efficient, thus cheap, simple and fast investigations.
However, the outcomes might be not that effective as they are more prone to er-
ror (i.e., not accurate). If the outcomes of applying distrust mechanisms lead to
too many false positives - cyber criminals are unjustly distrusted - and punished,
the conversion rate of successful transactions decreases. In such situations, cyber
criminals miss out on potential revenues because of failed transactions. Worse,
false positives work as an amplifier for even more distrust in the cyber crim-
inal community. Investigations by cyber criminals do not follow an evidence
standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Let alone that there are trained defense
attorneys and independent judges in the underground. These investigations will
likely produce incorrect conclusions about the truth (‘who did what?’), and as
a result create disinformation. This shows that cyber criminals have to strike a
balance in distrust and trust mechanisms between the false accept rate (fraud
rate) and false reject rate (insult rate). So, they face a second tradeoff, namely
reducing false positives by decreasing deviant security standards, versus reduc-
ing false negatives by increasing these standards.
Even if the distrust mechanisms produce the desired outcomes, they may
hold negative side-effects and vulnerabilities. Compartmentalization, bureau-
cratic rules, data-minimization and monitoring place a burden on the efficiency
of committing cyber crime and may even devalue a criminal product or service.
Many BPHs forbid certain illegal activities on their servers which decreases the
prospect of attracting new customers. Furthermore, audit logging and subse-
quently saving that data on application level (i.e., local storage on a laptop) will
pose a danger when LEA is able to seize that data, e.g., after a house search.
Cyber criminals who apply bureaucratic rules, compartmentalization and data-
minimization face an insurmountable problem that further negatively affects the
effectiveness of these distrust mechanisms: those who do not obey these rules.
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In many of the reviewed cases, important personal identifiers are revealed by
others. Some ask in online communications such questions as ‘How was your
vacation in [name country]?’ to ‘How are your kid [name X] and wife [name
Y] doing?’. Remarks like ‘Happy birth day!’ to ‘I spoke to your mother the
other day’ have also been observed. Lastly, distrust further fuels information
asymmetries in intertwined networks. Distrust leads to information distortion
[491, p.44], while compartmentalization and data-minimization specifically limit
the amount of information to make informed decisions about deviant security.
Corrective controls in trust and distrust mechanisms While trust mech-
anisms consist of three consecutive steps ending with the corrective control of
extra-legal governance, distrust mechanisms are less connected and ordered in a
linear fashion. Prevention and/or detection controls warn cyber criminals about
imminent threats or actual attacks, and are followed up by investigations that
are launched by cyber criminals. In the labelling example, a screenshot of the
forum was indeed leaked by an investigative journalist on the open Internet.
The admins launched an investigation to establish which user account was com-
promised, and subsequently applied a corrective control: they banned the user
of the account from the forum (see also [454, pp.43-44]). Such forum bans can be
temporary or permanent. On some fora, members with enough negative points
are automatically banned [368, p.7]. Alternatively, warnings, fines and restitu-
tion orders are given, including lowering the numeric or status reputation of a
member. Some forum admins share information about banned members, thus
provide DevSec as a club good to a larger cyber criminal community and avoid
coordination failure. Notably, not transacting business has been called the ‘ul-
timate weapon of the [...] distrustor’ as this financial punishment (as compared
to physical and psychological violence as punishments, see Section 7.4) leads to
unproductive isolation [490, p.885][64, p.49]. Other observed corrective controls
of cyber criminals include doxing and seizure of cryptocurrency assets. These
(threats of) punishments promote trust and distrust mechanisms and help to
sustain cooperation in cyber criminal networks [115, p.1048]. Be aware that
the malware in the distrust testing example also applied a corrective control.
If there were positive results, such as detection of a researcher’s sandbox or a
competitor’s malware, the malicious software respectively removed itself or the
competing malware from the victim’s system. Thus, besides many ex-ante costs
to prevent, deter and detect attacks, failures and mistakes, cyber criminals also
make ex-post costs to correct, recover and restore security violations. Be aware
that cyber criminals may also have negative expectations about the outcomes of
their own actions. Because referent objects are autonomous, they may choose
to correct themselves, and withdraw from the commission of crime during the
preparation, pre-activity, activity and post-activity phase. An example of such
a self-corrective control in the post-activity phase is the operators behind the
Crysis and TeslaCrypt ransomware who released the master keys to victims to
decrypt and unlock infected systems for free [499][500]. A last observation is
that these corrective controls generally focus on securing crime, namely: the
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protection of criminal business processes, products and services. Only a few
corrective controls have been observed that protect the criminal’s identity. Be-
sides offensive countermeasures such as bribery and violence (see e.g., [364, p.6]),
there is simply little suspects can do when personal data is in hands of threat
agents.
6.7 Interim Conclusion and Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the key players of deviant security
and their security-related interactions including associated countermeasures.
Many of the related vulnerabilities are explained in microeconomic terms such
as allocation problems, feedback loops, lemon markets and perverse incentives,
and tradeoffs as efficiency versus effectiveness, complexity versus accuracy and
false accept rate versus false reject rate. Because everybody can instantly be-
come a threat agent, the overall findings of this chapter suggest that cyber
criminals need the ability to protect anything, against anybody which adds to
the complexity of conducting an accurate deviant risk assessment. This insight
holds significant implications for understanding how law-enforcement agencies
can deal with the key players of deviant security, their security-related interac-
tions and associated deviant countermeasures. These appropriate responses are
discussed in Chapter 8.
On referent objects, providers and threat agents of DevSec The re-
sults of this study indicate that referent objects as a collective are to a certain
extent autarkic, and as individuals autonomous, in formulating DevSec policies
and subsequently implementing them. More research is needed to understand
how and when cyber criminals become increasingly autonomous in their security.
Thus besides an agenda for longitudinal studies how the cyber criminal’s career
path progresses in the commission of crime [345][215], research is equally needed
to understand how cyber criminals - as communities, groups and individual ref-
erent objects - mature and become more autonomous in the protection of crime
and the criminal. Another group of key players are providers of deviant security,
and they can be distinguished between those who intentionally supply security
to cyber criminals and those who unintentionally supply DevSec. The cur-
rent study presents a simplified crime script analysis of the various services and
products offered on the broader cyber-crime-as-a-service market. Future studies
could use this model to plot the various services of individual fora, and see the
similarities and differences between e.g., Chinese, English and Russian-language
market places, or high-threat platforms with advanced computer-focused crimi-
nals and low-threat platforms with less skilled members. Another application is
to make crime script analyses on a lower level of aggregation such as for different
types of cyber crime. While studies have used linguistic-based empirical analy-
sis on chat conversations of sexually-driven offenders to gain useful insights and
patterns in the commission of online grooming [501], future work that applies a
similar approach - e.g., using chat conservations of script kiddies behind DDoS
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attacks - should explicitly incorporate the protection of crime as well. Legal
practitioners need to know who holds what role in a group and provided the
necessary organizational, human and/or information capital, and tangible as-
sets like payments, in the preparation, pre-activity, activity and/or post-activity
phase of an attack. A last category of key players are threat agents to the se-
curity of cyber criminals. The research findings further provides evidence that
besides bonafide parties - like mandated breachers - other key players can be
threat agents to cyber criminals as well, including (victim) witnesses, security
researchers, other criminals and the referent objects themselves. It is, however,
unknown who the most important threat agent of cyber criminals is, both sub-
jectively and objectively, and whether there are differences on this issue between
computer-assisted and computer-focused criminals.
On intertwined networks & information asymmetries The study pro-
vided evidence that cyber security and cyber criminal networks are very much
intertwined as different key players may hold multiple roles in time. Future
studies, which take this insight into account, are needed to determine to which
degree e.g., computer-assisted, computer-focused and computer-enabled com-
munities are intertwined in the Russian-language underground economy [259,
p.7], and on English-language cryptomarkets such as Alphabay. Do suppli-
ers of computer-focused and computer-assisted crimes on these traditionally
computer-enabled crime platforms form separate or intertwined communities?
Do the former groups also buy products/services of the latter group, and vice
versa? Do some individuals act as a community bridge between these groups,
and why? Do cross cutting service providers (like online money launderers) or
certain nationalities, play a vital role in socially linking individuals to one an-
other, thereby decreasing the information asymmetry between other nodes in
the network? There is, for example, anecdotical evidence of bilingual (i.e., Rus-
sian and Romanian-speaking) Moldovans who act as intermediaries between the
Russian and Romanian-language underground economies. The present study
further argues that information asymmetries in these intertwined networks not
only exist between transaction partners, but that there are also information
asymmetries for cyber criminals about third party threat agents that are not
part of any transaction, such as law-enforcement agencies. There are still many
unanswered questions how cyber criminals generally cope with these informa-
tion asymmetries. How does corruption work in the cyber criminal underground,
including the little understood обнал (‘obnal’) fraudulent encashment services
and their clients - a reversed way of money laundering in which clean money is
made dirty for bribery purposes [376][405] - that are offered on cyber criminal
fora? Moreover, do cyber criminals with access to the security apparatus be-
have differently in e.g., their online communications? Better insights into the
who, what, when and how of information flows through cyber criminal networks
is also needed. One observation of this study is that very relevant information
about capabilities and/or sources of law-enforcement agencies sometimes spread
very slowly in cyber criminal networks, while irrelevant news about LEA in sev-
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eral occasions was discussed at great length and as such has the potential to
become common sense yet useless knowledge.
On deception as a countermeasure One of the causes for information
asymmetries in intertwined networks is the use of deception. This study demon-
strates that hiding the real and showing the false is not only used to commit
crime, but is also deployed exclusively for deviant security purposes. An existing
taxonomy for law-abiding entities is adjusted to the deceiving practices of cyber
criminals, and further refined by adding - amongst others - types and function-
alities of technical computer security. The study concluded that deception has
serious, but unavoidable, blowback effects for the larger cyber criminal commu-
nity. In other words, commission and protection may hold inherent weaknesses
which are inescapable for cyber criminals as compared to more optional vul-
nerabilities. In general, more work is needed on deception providers, such as
suppliers of preconfigured VMs, fake IDs and hardware modification. Their ser-
vices and products are vital for protection, yet it is unknown what their MOs
are as they operate in the background of the cyber criminal value chain and thus
have a low visibility for LEA. Future research might further explore if certain
deception tactics are specifically tied to certain cyber crimes. Bulletproof host-
ing resellers and connectivity providers, for example, must pose as legitimate
companies towards bonafide ISPs, thus heavily rely on mimicking, to ensure
business continuity and avoid being rejected as clients. It might well be that
other cyber crimes lean more towards alternative deception tactics.
On trust and distrust as countermeasures To overcome the problems
associated with information asymmetries in intertwined networks like the pre-
viously mentioned deception tactics, cyber criminals deploy trust and distrust
mechanisms. The key strength of the corresponding section is its usage of tech-
nical computer security concepts to understand the deviant security goals of
trust and distrust mechanisms. A noteworthy contribution is made by regard-
ing deviant trust as an authentication process that ex-ante assesses the criminal
identity (who) and the (the outcomes of) criminal conduct (what), and ex-post
enforces trustworthiness through extra-legal governance. As Section 7.2 de-
scribes, fora on the open Internet may have dysfunctional reputation systems
as deals are closed and paid via other channels [454], while cryptomarkets heav-
ily rely on reliable technical rating systems linked to actual payments to lower
information asymmetries between buyer and seller. Bearing in mind two ob-
served trends in cryptomarkets during this research project - i) the transform of
Russian-language computer-focused fora into cryptomarkets, and ii) the entry of
computer-focused and computer-assisted service providers to English-language
computer-enabled cryptomarkets - future studies could focus on what impact
these reliable technical reputation mechanisms have on the business transactions
of intangible assets like stolen creditcards, malware and bulletproof domain reg-
istration. This is the first study that reports about distrust as a deviant secu-
rity control. Based on empirical evidence, this study presents a taxonomy that
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consists of seven distrust tactics. Ultimately, the overall security policy ‘trust
but distrust’ serves preventive, detective, deterrent, corrective and compensat-
ing technical computer security goals. Taking into account the many studies
about trust in the cyber criminal underground, more work is required on dis-
trust mechanisms. Generally, deception and distrust mechanisms are associated
with more competitive environments, while trust policies are associated with
more cooperative environments [363, pp.242-243]. Is this also true for cyber
criminals? Are distrust mechanisms more prevalent in competitive profit-driven
environments like the CaaS economy than in noncompetitive and nonprofit en-
vironments like sexually-driven CSAM platforms? Lastly, future work could
also make a first step in exploring the unwritten rules and code of conduct of
the Russian-language underground, and if there exist a cyber criminal variation
on вор в законе (‘vor v zakone’ - thief in law).
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Chapter 7
When & Where? -
Temporal-Spatial Qualities of
Deviant Security
Good guy security has spatial and temporal qualities. Not only because secu-
rity has different meanings across and in time, but also because security only
endures as long as the referent object is able to defend him/herself against at-
tacks [31, pp.11, 18]. Yet we have seen in Chapter 5 that deviant security is
a legal construct and a subjective condition, and will therefore have different
meanings in time and space. The main question in this chapter is therefore:
how do dimensions of time and space affect deviant security? Several scholars
elaborated on how conceptions of time and space are altered in the Information
Age, and the effects on the commission of cyber crime [34]. Because much of
today’s social, economical, cultural and political structures evolve around IT,
new targets appear who experience the collapse of the temporal-spatial barriers
[28]. Potential victims who are located anywhere in the world can be rapidly
attacked in an automated fashion due to speedy Internet connections, from any
location at any time [80, pp.80-81]. So, information technologies create new
opportunities to commit crime because of the disappearance of time and space
barriers that Castells respectively dubbed timeless time and space of flows (the
latter is also known as placeless space) [45].
Since the commission of crime and the protection of crime and identity are
inextricably linked, these temporal-spatial dimensions also affect deviant secu-
rity. Scarce deviant security resources continuously change through time and
place, and create controls and vulnerabilities alike that are discussed in the
first section - see Figure 7.2 - about data volatility and retention as counter-
measures. A common thread of this chapter is further the glocalised nature of
DevSec. As shown in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1, both global and local dimen-
sions on a macro, meso and micro level impact the security of cyber criminals.
More specifically, DevSec policies are based upon threat agents and threats in
148
a specific local political, physical and/or social situation, and implemented by
globally available security mechanisms. These dimensions are noticeable in the
second and third section about two deviant temporal-spatial countermeasures,
respectively intercultural communication between cyber criminals and the dis-
tribution of criminal assets. While the emphasis of the previous chapters has so
far mostly been on administrative and technical controls, one might forget that
cyber criminals are human beings who live in a physical world. The last section
therefore moves from the online to the offline world, and discusses the physical
countermeasures of cyber criminals on a micro level. So when time and space
(when and where) are added to the what and who of the previous chapters, it be-
comes apparent that cyber criminals must be able to protect anything, against
anybody, anywhere, at any time.
Figure 7.1: The conditional and consequential matrix presents some of the key concepts
of this chapter that shape the glocalized nature of DevSec. Be aware that the term global
does not equal to macro, and the term local to micro. Some deviant security policies are
shaped by a local situation on a macro level (e.g., strong law-enforcement), and subsequently
implemented on a micro level by globally available dual-use technologies (e.g., encryption),
see Table 7.1.
DevSec levels Macro Meso Micro
Local National cyber laws Rare regional language Environmental design
Global Multipolar world Argot Encryption
Table 7.1: Deviant security is shaped on different levels of aggregation. While a rare regional
language is very local and argot has more global dimensions, both language-usages occur on
the meso level of closed fora and chat groups.
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Figure 7.2: This oversight visualizes the structure of Chapter 7 via a selection of key concepts
about the temporal-spatial qualities of deviant security. For a full oversight of descriptive and
explanatory key concepts of Part III and their inter-relation, see Figure 9.4.
7.1 Countermeasures Against Data Volatility &
Retention
Cyber criminals have an ambiguous relation with volatility and retention of
information capital. On the one hand, data volatility and retention work as
countermeasures against threat agents, as the respectively irrevocability and
availability of information capital for an infinite time might be beneficial to
criminals. On the other hand, data volatility and retention create vulnerabilities
that have to be patched by business recovery and continuity plans, using a single
entity a single time and for a single purpose, or either encrypting or secure-
deleting information capital.
Volatility as a countermeasure Because of changed time-space barriers,
information assets have become volatile. The problem of volatile evidence from
the viewpoint of private and public investigators is well-addressed in the aca-
demic literature [502][503][504], and frequently observed in this study. Besides
(secure) deletion that is also discussed in this section, cyber criminals try to
prevent the disappearance of disappearance by promoting volatility. They will
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not use, turn off or add functionalities on systems and software to avoid the
creation of unwanted data. Because cyber criminals may accidentally infect
themselves via their own malware landing page, some disable certain browser
functionalities. Others store browser history and cookies, and even run malware
[260][440, p.3], on random-access memory (RAM) of respectively their own and
their victims’ machines. Similarly, the restore system of an operating system
is turned off to avoid automated backups; antivirus software on a victim’s ma-
chine is disabled; virtual keyboards are installed to avoid the risk of keyloggers;
virtual machines are used that run on USB sticks; hibernation is turned off; and
digital kill switches are added to botnet systems [505].
So, volatility works as a deviant countermeasure especially if cyber criminals
have stopped committing crime after, for example, big hit projects with a longer
time-to-task as compared to ongoing business processes that have recency and
consistency as vulnerabilities. The latter campaigns have a shorter time-to-task
because they continuously generate new data like malware-as-a-service. Investi-
gating historic breaches of big hit projects - like on the US retailer Target [506] -
is difficult as the volatility of forensic traces works for the benefit of the criminal.
However, stolen information has to be sold and transactions will eventually be
detected with all the attendant risks as a result. Yet volatility may also hold
blowback effects to the criminal, and this occurred in the following case that a
policer officer explained during an informal interview. A member of an access
controlled CSAM community lost his collection of abusive images. He had to
upload new pictures in order to stay a member, which he desperately wanted.
But where to find new CSAM? He was now forced to download images in more
open online environments that were unknown to him, but well-monitored by
LEA. He was identified and arrested as a result. So, volatility is an example
of a benefit related to the commission of crime that may well lead to specific
costs in the protection of crime. Volatility further shows that deviant techni-
cal computer security is a double-edged sword with iatrogenic effects: a term
derived from medicine for practices and/or situations that are countermeasure
(i.e., medical surgery) and vulnerability (i.e., the complication arising because
of medical surgery) in one.
Do not forget your password A money launderer did not write down his very strong
password for his Bitcoin wallet as he was worried that LEA might find it during a house
raid. He learned the random combination of numbers, symbols and letters by heart and
as such it became human capital. Unfortunately, he forgot his password, and as a result
he was at the verge of loosing many Bitcoins of his customers which would definitely be
seen as an exit scam. He felt his life could even be in danger. Luckily, he remembered
that his password was equal to an expired password of a cyber criminal forum account. He
explained everything to the administrator of the forum, and begged the admin to recover
the expired forum password. The admin explained that he was unable to do so. As a DevSec
policy, members’ passwords were encrypted when they were in use, and deleted after they
were expired. The volatility of intangible assets that the money launderer considered a
countermeasure, became a vulnerability.
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Business continuity & disruption recovery against volatility Because
anything can happen at any time and place, cyber criminals have business con-
tinuity and disruption recovery plans to ensure the availability of their most
important assets. Police raids and search warrants reveal that because of the
possibility that information capital is erased due to interrupted memory’s power,
CSAM users have to rely on nonvolatile storage, like servers, computer’s hard
drive, USB drives and CD-ROMs to save their carefully collected series. Having
multiple C&Cs against botnet takedowns basically underlines the same idea:
they are backups. In another observed instance, an autonomous group re-
quested from a BPH previously used IP addresses for their C&C so that in-
fected bots could easily reconnect. Business continuity and disruption recovery
may also take other shapes such as the previously mentioned prevention-against-
prosecution service that comes to the rescue of suspects of cyber crime. A last
example are duplicate identities - also known as doppelgängers - on fora. Gen-
erally, having additional accounts on the same forum is prohibited by admins.
Indeed, this deception tactic is primarily used to falsely enhance the trust of
the main account on a platform by personally vouching for or writing positive
reviews about the main account. Additionally, duplicates support business con-
tinuity and disaster recovery. When his/her main account is banned because
of e.g., violation of terms and conditions, a member still has his/her duplicate
account [170]. Similarly, having multiple accounts on various market places
ensures that business continues when one forum is taken down.
The cyber-crime-as-a-service economy has responded to the need for business
continuity and disruption recovery. Many vital processes in the commission and
protection of crime do not have to be self-managed, but can be outsourced to
various providers [259, p.7]. Takedowns of botnets are ineffective as long as new
bots can be bought at pay-per-install services [399, p.13]. As a result, disrupted
processes can easily be fixed or replaced by third-party suppliers. However, the
availability of data that business continuity and disruption recovery generates,
especially through nonvolatile storages, has serious downsides for cyber criminals
as the next paragraph explains.
Data retention in a reversed electronic panopticon Opposite to volatil-
ity and going dark is the disappearance of disappearance and going bright. The
first refers to the ability of IT to create and retain informational data within
the intertwined networks [507], i.e., data retention. The latter is about the in-
creased visibility of cyber criminals and their crimes and related ability of the
cyber security to detect and monitor them [147][356]. As shown throughout
this study, cyber criminals need information capital to make informed decisions
about necessary countermeasures against threat agents. But data retention also
works as a vulnerability to cyber criminals. In order to serve a large criminal
population, CaaS providers apply automation to be scalable, and have client
management and support systems and (financial) databases. Criminal assets
are not only stored by criminals, but also by other key players, in open and
closed sources, in places that the criminal cannot avoid, delete or is even aware
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of, either saved mentally, physically, locally or in the cloud, and for an infinite
time. Malware stored on a version control repository, an account at an online
payments system, contact details in domain and IP registrations, a free web
based mailbox, but also historical criminal records of suspects who are recidi-
vating: the list of observed vulnerabilities is endless. So, although academics
and legal practitioners may report about ‘anonymity of cyber criminals’, true
anonymity is largely a myth in the Information Age. In many instances, there
is at most pseudonymity and/or perceived anonymity (see [194, p.107][328]). So
from a cyber criminals’ perspective, they surely live in an electronic panopticon
[50, p.57], which is not, as suggested by [28][34][80, p.80], a situation in which
few central bodies - most notably governments - have an information monopoly
on, and are monitoring and investigating, many suspects of cyber crime. For
cyber criminals, the electronic panopticon is reversed compared to the classic
idea of sociologist David Lyon [386].
The reversed version is a decentralized, distributed, fragmented and trans-
boundary panopticon in which important pieces of information about the cyber
criminal and his/her crimes are distributed among all key players of the inter-
twined network. These key players thus go beyond the ‘capitalist enterprise’
and a ‘multitude of state-run institutions’ [386, p.666], and includes - but is not
limited to - not-for-profit public-benefit corporations ICANN and RIPE NCC,
the non-profit digital library Internet Archive and numerous open government
initiatives such as commercial registers and tax administrations (see Figure 7.3).
After Paunch - the moniker of the creator behind the Blackhole exploit kit, and
on any informal most-wanted list of Western cyber crime units for years - was
apprehended by Russian authorities and his true name became known to the
press, investigative journalist Brian Krebs easily found many ‘bread crumbs’ on
open Internet sources that linked Paunch’s online identity to his offline identity
including his whereabouts prior to the arrest [366].
This case and comparable stories that are compiled by gathering bits and
pieces of incriminating evidence via a range of sources show that cyber criminals
not only assign value to intangible assets and physical objects, but also subse-
quently have to classify assets to indicate the required level of confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Evidence that links an online moniker to a true iden-
tity has to be kept confidential by cyber criminals, while IP addresses of spam
servers will be marked as public unclassified by the cyber security community
after they have been used. Cyber criminals may also classify data incorrectly. In
many instances, data is apparently labeled as public unclassified by the criminal,
instead of sensitive but unclassified. If sensitive data are disclosed, individual
snippets of information - timestamps, language configuration, country code top-
level domain (ccTLD) - may not cause serious damage. However, the sum of
these individual pieces help LEA to build or complete the investigative picture,
and may therefore cause grave damage to the well-being of the cyber criminal
and/or his/her business.
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Figure 7.3: In the reversed electronic panopticon, the DevSec referent object is in a watched
tower (instead of the watch tower). Multiple key players - the watchmen - might hold impor-
tant pieces of incriminating evidence about the referent object without him/her being able to
tell who holds what information.
A single entity, a single time & for a single purpose Because of in-
tertwined networks and the disappearance of disappearance, links are created
between various assets related to the criminal and his/her crimes when, for
example, multiple integrated Internet-related services and products of a single
technology company are used. Cyber criminals try to avoid such connections
- i.e., unlinkability, an attribute of confidentiality - by promoting association
deniability and/or association hiding (see [36, pp.442-446]). One way to achieve
this is a deviant security policy which is based on using tangible assets and/or
information capital as a single entity, for a single purpose and/or a single time.
Paying a prepaid telephone with cash money and changing its IMEI help to
avoid tracks to a true identity, thus enhance its existence as a single, isolated
entity instead of an entity that is linked to a subscriber, home address and bank
account. The degree of DevSec is increased if the cell phone is only used for a
single purpose, i.e., solely criminal usage or to call a particular co-conspirer as
compared to contact a range of bonafide and malafide entities with the same
telephone. To top it all, a stand alone entity that serves a specific goal should be
used only once, such as preventing reuse of cryptocurrency wallets and/or ad-
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dresses for transactions. Therefore, cyber criminals have been using throwaway
email accounts which meet these concerns to a certain extent [508], especially if
messages in draft folders are used to communicate with a co-conspirer instead
of sending emails to each other. Nevertheless, individuals have to access the
mailbox, and therefore leave a (meta)data trail. Moreover, some cyber criminal
fora even prohibit registration with a disposable one-time-usage email address
as compared to a valid one for structural usage [368, p.6]. The MoneyTaker
group applied this security policy - a single entity, a single time, for a single
purpose - as much as possible. For each round of attacks, the group deployed a
new infrastructure. The attack servers were thus one-time components, specif-
ically configured to deliver a malicious payload to a predetermined list of IP
addresses of a single particular victim [440, p.4].
The downside of this policy is that groups generate many more entities
that, if not classified correctly and e.g., secure deleted, increase the chance of
detectability and linkability by the cyber security community. Using single en-
tities, a single time, for a single purpose, also place a heavy burden on the
efficiency of the commission of crime, while traces - e.g., messages - still have to
be secure-deleted or encrypted. As described earlier in this section, many threat
actors opt for business processes, like ongoing malware campaigns. For reasons
of efficiency, they may use multiple identifiers, multiple times, for multiple pur-
poses including the same MO [509], additionally generating many live forensic
traces which are relatively easily detected and investigated by threat actors
which resulted in the discovery of hard links between, for instance, the An-
gler exploit kit and Bedep botnet [510]. Hypothetically, malafide profit-driven
projects - a single big hit operation, having the discipline to use a single entity,
a single time, for a single purpose - do not have the disadvantage of continu-
ous live evidence about the criminal and his/her crime. As explained before,
investigating historic breaches is notoriously difficult as the volatility of forensic
traces works for the benefit of the criminal. However, such truly one-off projects
seldom occur in practice as incriminating data are generally also created during
the post-activity phase of profit-driven cyber crimes (see Figure 6.2). For exam-
ple, stolen assets of such projects have to be sold on the underground market,
creating a path of evidence that will eventually be detected by threat actors
with all the attendant risks as a result. Of all investigative cases observed in
this study, only the short-lived ransomware outbreaks of (Not)Petya and Wan-
naCry did not lead to any significant post-crime activities. In fact, because the
financial schemes behind these crimes were badly drafted to non-existent, ex-
perts claim that these two ransomwares might actually have been state-driven
attacks disguised as profit-driven attacks by cyber criminals [417].
Secure-deletion of information capital In situations in which cyber crim-
inals cannot prevent the disappearance of disappearance or promote volatility,
they will (secure) delete assets to limit the availability of assets, or encrypt valu-
ables for confidentiality. In other words, data has to be wiped so that it is ir-
recoverable to both the referent object and threat agents, either encoded in such
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a way that only authorized referent objects can read it, but any threat agents
cannot [130, p.5]. Observed manual deletion practices include wiping C&C
servers before they are reconfigured by ISPs, deleting posts on social networks,
or erasing subscriber information because of data retention laws. Cyber crim-
inals also frequently apply automated deletion as part of their MO, especially
when malware distrusts an infected system, see Section 6.6. Rombertik mal-
ware overwrote the master boot record (MBR) of the distrusted system and/or
destroyed all files in the user’s home folder by encrypting each file with a ran-
domly generated encryption key [336]. The Cobalt/Buhtrap malware deleted all
its traces with a free and legitimate wiper tool and also removed the MBR [496].
However, because of the information asymmetry about third parties, suspects
have little knowledge when threat actors like LEA arrive at the crime scene and
what their capabilities are to retrieve deleted data [141][511, pp.39-41]. Figuring
out where all data is stored, including copies across systems, may simply prove
to be impossible. Even if all the relevant data on a system are found, many users
- including cyber criminals - delete data by simply unlinking the file in the file
system, while the file remains stored on the system. Dutch court cases against
CSAM users show that some users are unaware of the additional steps to truly
remove data from the system [512][513][514]. And even if they intend to sanitize
their storage media, it is hard to verify that all data traces are indeed made ir-
recoverable [511, pp.38-39][515][516][517]. This is notably harder if information
capital that relates to a criminal identity and business is not under the suspect’s
control. For instance, a cyber criminal suspect was arrested, and therefore asked
a DevSec-as-a-service provider to delete all his support tickets. The vendor did
not answer, nor did he delete the tickets with incriminating evidence. Thus both
secure-deletion (also known as artefact wiping, and data erasure and clearing
[125, p.2]) and, as explained in the next paragraph, encryption are difficult to
achieve for cyber criminals.
Encryption of information capital Essentially, encryption is about secur-
ing confidential data against a specific threat agent for a specific period of time.
In other words, after cyber criminals have classified their data, they have to
assess the attack capabilities of the threat agents, decide for how long they
want to keep their informational capital confidential, and subsequently choose
a matching encryption standard. Research shows that intelligence services of
nation states would have the resources to build a machine that cracks the most
common strength of Diffie-Hellman, and thus decrypt the connections of large
numbers of VPNs, HTTP websites and SSH servers [458]. If this is true, cyber
criminals - like BPHs - who engage or are misused in terrorist or state-sponsored
activities should transition to elliptic curve cryptography, which does not have
this weakness. But understanding and applying cryptography is hard for cy-
ber criminals [356, p.15]. In many instances, they are forced to be autarkic as
a collective and autonomous as an individual, and thus implement encryption
themselves. Yet correct implementation of encryption frequently goes wrong
because they lack the knowledge to do so, including the computer-focused crim-
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inals behind the Neutrino exploit kit, various ransomwares and the Zeus banking
trojan [518][155]. In several Dutch court cases it becomes apparent that some
CSAM users also failed to apply encryption correctly, or at least insufficiently
against the capabilities of law-enforcement agencies. Encrypted abusive mate-
rial was sent over an unencrypted but wiretapped line [519], while in other cases
material was also found on an encrypted virtual machine [520], and in an en-
crypted partition and hidden volume [521]. To avoid such problems, encrypted-
communications-as-a-service have come to the rescue of cyber criminals, like
bulletproof connectivity, hosting and telecom providers. But outsourcing (re-
lated to the vulnerabilities of dependency and centralization, see respectively
Sections 6.4 and 7.3, and [356, p.15]) of such vital DevSec services may come at
a cost. In 2016, the Dutch NHTCU took over several business enterprise servers
(BES) that were used exclusively for criminal purposes. The 19.000 users of
the network used smart phones which only allowed them to send and receive
encrypted messages from other users in the network. Besides their dependency,
they must have felt very safe as many of them bluntly spoke about their crimes
in the text messages and did not secure-delete this incriminating evidence. In
other instances during this study, servers that were discovered deep inside a cy-
ber criminal infrastructure did not have SSL encrypted connections, and could
be lawfully intercepted. In those cases, secure-deletion is no longer an option
for cyber criminals.
7.2 Intercultural Communication as a Counter-
measure
Intercultural communication (IC) as an academic discipline within computer
science studies promotes intercultural collaboration of bonafide entities such as
communication on computer science research between developers from differ-
ent cultures or in multi-lingual contexts, see e.g., [522]. There are, however,
very few papers about how cyber criminals collaborate and communicate in-
terculturally. Just like bonafide entities [363, pp.9-11], cyber criminals have
the opportunity to work online with co-conspirers from very different cultural
backgrounds. Computer scientist Ross Anderson argues that it is not technical
computer security protocols that tie one computer to another, but:
‘ultimately, at the deepest level, this is about anthropology. It’s
how systems get embedded in culture, in the interplay of verbal and
non-verbal communications’ [523].
Cyber criminals manage to do business with co-conspirers from very different
cultures. How do they succeed? The answer lies within intercultural commu-
nication: an academic discipline that evolves around the central question how
people understand one another when they do not share a common cultural ex-
perience [524, p.1]. The next paragraphs first explain the building blocks for
intercultural communication in cyber crime, before moving on to weaknesses in
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IC and introducing the concept of intercultural communication as a counter-
measure.
Intercultural communication in cyber crime: context Three building
blocks are of importance in IC: context, communication and culture [363, pp.52-
53]. While the emphasis in this section is on the latter two building blocks, con-
text is crucial to understand the economical, historical, physical, political, social
and technical situations and structures in which (intercultural) communication
between cyber criminals occurs [363, pp.52-53].
Because of the Great Firewall of China that probes and blocks circumven-
tion proxies, almost all Chinese CaaS fora are physically hosted in China; only
a single Chinese forum was discovered as a Tor onion site during this study.
Compared to Russian and English-speaking cyber criminals who opt for Jabber
chat protocol with OTR to interact online, their Chinese counterparts prefer
Chinese commercial chat services like QQ and WeChat [367][420]. In these in-
stances, we have to understand the political context of China on a macro level,
and its effects on technology usage in meso and micro environments.
Furthermore, there might well be differences in intercultural communication
between e.g., vendors and clients on fora, as compared to IC between cyber
criminal organized groups that do not sell any services on online markets. In-
deed, criminal organizations from different cultures also collaborate, but (so far)
in complete darkness to academics. Yet the Russian-language Carbanak group,
as a review of the related investigation reveals, used Chinese exploits and had
other (undisclosed) links with China as well in 2014. Such Sino-Russian cyber
criminal links were not observed so far. In this particular case, we have to
consider social contexts between cyber criminal individuals on a micro level.
Because the focus of this study is on intercultural communication on fora,
we further have to acknowledge that there might also be considerable differ-
ences between communication platforms as they have, for instance, their own
history. Cyber criminal forum Darkode resurrected as a Tor onion site after
its takedown by the FBI in which many members were arrested as well. The
Russian-language forum Verified was hacked, and its backend was subsequently
leaked on the Internet [525]. It might well be that the deviant security culture on
the fora changed after such events. In both instances, we have to acknowledge
the historical context of cyber criminals collectives on a meso level. In short,
context matters when we study intercultural communication of cyber criminals.
Intercultural communication in cyber crime: culture The above men-
tioned Darkode, dubbed the most prolific English-speaking hacking forum by
Europol [526], was taken down by the FBI in 2015. Although the forum had over
300 active users, over 70 arrests were made in at least 20 countries around the
world. So, English was a lingua franca for cyber criminals who came from non-
English dominant contexts. Similarly, Russian is the common language (lingua
franca) for citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States, large parts
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of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern and Central Asia - Русский мир
(‘Russkiy mir’) - but also on cyber criminal forum Verified [525]. Likewise, there
are also - amongst others - Brazilian, Chinese, German and Japanese cybercrim-
inal communities, and each community has their own (preferred) communication
platforms, such as CaaS fora on the open Internet, cryptomarkets or legitimate
social media [527][421][420]. Yet surprising cross-cultural collaborations between
communities can be found, such as computer-focused Brazilians who search for
help in the Russian CaaS underground [528], but also Dutch drug traffickers
who recruit computer-focused criminals to hack the computer systems of a sea
port terminal in Belgium [529], and traditional organized criminals who work -
as several investigators confirmed - with computer-assisted criminals to launch
phishing campaigns. But culture is much more than the nationality of these
suspects: they have different occupations, relation status, living conditions and
education, and belong to different socioeconomic classes, religions and sexual
orientations to name a few. They therefore probably also have different world
views, behaviors, norms, values and beliefs, feelings and emotions [363, p.32].
This is all known as subjective culture, and very much the focus of most inter-
cultural communication scholars [524, pp.2-3][530, p.211]. Culture is software
of the mind, and everybody, including referent objects of deviant security, are
programmed by culture [531].
Darkode and Verified as exclusive, unilingual/bilingual fora are not a stand-
alone cases. Fora are not homogenous, global and universal market places, but
differ in offered products/services, members, size, and very much in culture.
Cyber criminal fora have their own distinctive cultural features that go beyond
language. Private security researchers of antivirus vendor Trend Micro describes
how fora not only differ in accessibility and offered products/services, but even
atmosphere. For example, Russian fora have a ‘very standoffish feel to it’, ac-
cording to the researchers, as members do not reveal any personal identifiers in
their postings [532]. Cyber criminals may express the values, norms and beliefs
of their larger dominant legitimate culture on a macro level, that way shaping
the micro subculture of the cyber criminal forum. For example, a review of rel-
evant terms and conditions shows that CSAM is strictly forbidden on English
and Russian-language cyber criminal fora, and most BPHs from these under-
grounds claim to apply a zero-tolerance policy against the abusive material. So
indeed, taboo tradeoffs do exist within the underground. These vendors have
sacred values protected from material gains (similar to cyber criminals who will
not attack citizens of their home country, although they face tragic tradeoffs
when profits are so high that they reevaluate their principles). Yet CSAM is
allowed on Japanese CaaS fora [533], reflecting the relatively tolerant attitudes
towards sexual depictions of children in Japanese society [534]. Disdain for the
law in general [535][536][537], and approval of certain hacker values - like unli-
censed software usage - are widely accepted in Russian and Ukrainian society
[538, pp.114-115], even by state institutions and large enterprises [479]. In this
sense, the legitimate dominant culture may overlap with the criminal subcul-
ture. Thus, not only the commission of cyber crime is much more embedded
in local culture than many academics expect [539][364], but the protection of
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crime and the criminal as well.
Cyber criminal undergrounds differ in deviant security
The Russian-language CaaS underground can be characterized as an ecosystem with a
closed community that deploys many administrative controls that are separated from one
another such as trust, distrust and distribution mechanisms (e.g., multiple well-enforced
bureaucratic rules and referral mechanisms). The English-language cryptomarkets, on the
contrary, are open communities that have technically integrated security mechanisms (think
of the mandatory usage of Tor, and integrated escrow services, encrypted communications
and payment systems based on crypto currencies, see Figure 7.4). Chinese-language cyber
criminal fora, however, miss out on many ex-ante and ex-post controls to prevent, detect,
deter and correct insider and outsider threat agents. Chinese fora lack many of the above
mentioned administrative and integrated technical security mechanisms. Integrated tech-
nical countermeasures - Tor, cryptocurrencies - are difficult to implement in the heavily
regulated/restricted and monitored Chinese cyberspace. Apparently, the same goes for
many administrative countermeasures. Let us take the ex-post control of moderating as
an example to explain this issue. The observed Chinese fora and chat groups are poorly
moderated. This is not surprising with platforms that have so many members generating so
many posts and messages. Members frequently spam other members, while many of them
send off-topic messages. Furthermore, Chinese forums usually do not label vendors based
on trust as English and Russian-language do, i.e., VIP, verified seller, unverified seller, guest
and/or ripper. Instead, forum members expose rippers in public threads, usually with their
unique chat number, their forum alias and/or the modus operandi of the ripper. Cyber
criminals not only use this method of openly shaming rippers on illegitimate fora, but on
legitimate Chinese (commercial) communication platforms as well.
Figure 7.4: In the Russian-language CaaS ecosystem (depicted above), various channels -
from a forum with advertisements and private message system (PM) till payment services -
are generally separated, optional and non-consecutive. This means that customers visit an
advertised web shop and fill in an electronic purchase order (EPO), or close the deal directly
via a separate chat channel and thus place a non-electronic purchase order (nEPO). Moreover,
transaction partners can negotiate payment systems and the need of an escrow. Like a few
Russian-language ‘all-in-one outsourced online shops’ [540], English-language cryptomarkets
are technically integrated ecosystems with consecutive steps of mandatory EPO, escrow and
payment (depicted below).
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Intercultural communication in cyber crime: communication Com-
munication is an expression of culture [541]. Generally, communication consists
of language: nonverbal behavior/body language, speech/spoken language and
writing/verbal codes [530, p.454]. According to interviewed private security
researchers, cyber criminals do use audio and video conferencing technologies
to conduct interviews with potential co-conspirers, although voices might be
masked, video turned off and traffic ported through an anonymity service like
Tor. However, the emphasis in this section is predominantly on writings like
public posts and private messages via fora, chat and email.
The importance of written texts to cyber criminals is apparent throughout
this study as communications may reveal much about the criminal and his/her
crimes. Several previously mentioned deviant countermeasures (e.g., deception,
trust mechanisms) and legitimate attacks (e.g., authorship analysis) are mostly
based on written texts by a single individual (e.g., malware code) or between
persons (e.g., business transactions through chat or fora). Strikingly, when
criminals are communicating online through chat or fora, they have nothing
more than writings to develop complex relationships. High-context cultures -
like China, Great Britain and Japan - place much emphasis on nonverbal ac-
tions (e.g., haptics, kinesics and proxemics) and paralanguage (speech behavior
like intonation, pitch and volume) to communicate [542][363, pp.173-188][530,
pp.454-455, 531][524, pp.10-12]. Yet online intercultural communication be-
tween cyber criminals on fora largely occurs through writing and not through
face-to-face contact. This may have considerable benefits for the commission
of crime as online communication filters out much of the prejudices related to
physical attributes on which we base our first impressions such as age, clothing,
tattoos or race [363, pp.280-282]. At the same time, intercultural communi-
cation, and more specifically (sub)cultural language use, also affects deviant
security practices: it works both as a weakness and countermeasure against
threat agents.
Vulnerabilities of intercultural communication via conversations There
are serious vulnerabilities in intercultural communication that may pose a threat
to the assets of referent objects. The first weakness is due to conversations with
other persons, including co-conspirers and threat agents. Of course, authorship
analysis exploits the vulnerability that written texts and even system configu-
rations are attributable to individuals. Chat conversations of a known cyber
criminal might be used to identify his/her unknown moniker on fora. How-
ever, authorship analysis cannot always be applied, nor is constantly needed
in police investigations. Still, there are other weaknesses in communications
between cyber criminals that will help law-enforcement. Consider that there
are different fora for each stage in the career of a cyber criminal. Young and
aspiring, but unskilled offenders - script kiddies - are not allowed on professional
CaaS fora as they do not have the right referrals or offer any unique products
or services. Their criminal career starts by discussing minor crimes on online
game and piracy fora, and will then move on to more dedicated script kiddie
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fora [543, pp.474-477]. These fora may be in their own language (e.g., Dutch),
or in a familiar second language (English) as explained in the text box below.
Nevertheless, both their nonverbal behavior and writings are very specific and
local as compared to abstract and global. In other words, it is easy to identify
an individual in the early stages of his/her criminal career, because he/she still
misses human capital on DevSec, and conducts behavior which is related to
the legitimate dominant culture and less to the criminal subculture. They are
more likely to tell others in which country and/or city they live, which sports
team they support and which crimes they commit(ted). They are also more
likely to make specific linguistic errors in second language usage that will reveal
their native tongue (called interlanguage [363, p.163]). Writings in a common
language of a forum like English allows identification of the native language of
non-native English authors. This method is known as native language iden-
tification [544]. These examples further show that code switching - changing
communication styles between dominant and subcultures [363, p.153] - is still
difficult for aspiring cyber criminals with little human capital about DevSec.
The problem that criminals face is that native language identification is hard
to avoid, while changing language patterns might erode trust between business
partners.
Fora serve cyber criminal careers
Script kiddies start their criminal career by discussing minor crimes - e.g., defacements
and DDoS - on relatively harmless fora (read: low threat fora), like gaming platforms.
Although there are major English and Russian-speaking low threat fora, there are also
relatively many platforms in other national languages. These script kiddies are potential
key enablers of cyber crime. Some stay thrill-seeking adolescent-limited offenders, but
others become more persistent, financially-driven offenders and move on to medium threat
fora. The latter platforms evolve predominantly around the commission and protection of
cyber crime. Some nationalities are now forced to opt for a forum with a different language
as their linguistic group is just too small to cater them. For example, no professional
Dutch language cyber criminal fora were observed during this study. These tomorrow’s key
enablers are in the transition to grow from amateur to professional cyber criminals. The
impact of their profit-driven crimes and the degree of security are still relatively low but
increase as their human, organization and information capital grows in time. Their services
and products are largely unknown to the cyber criminal and cyber security community:
they are in the process of building a reputation among and relations with co-conspirers, and
searching for niches in the underground economy. They will have a presence on dedicated
carding fora/shops and fora with few well-known services/products (read: medium threat
fora), and/or have a low member status on more professional CaaS fora (read: high threat
fora). Today’s key enablers are financially-driven, and form the top tier of the cyber criminal
underground. As compared to the other two groups, they have the best and most (access
to) tangible and intangible assets. Their reputation, services and products are well-known
to the cyber criminal and cyber security community. They are very much brands, and are
high in the commission and protection of crime. They only work with other professional
conspirers, or are able to serve large groups of less professional cyber criminals as they
automated their business model. They solely advertise their services/products on exclusive
English or Russian-language high threat CaaS fora, and have a high status on these fora.
Some of these professionals will stop advertising their products/services on fora as they
want to limit their visibility and already have a fixed group of professional clients. Still,
they might have a presence on medium and high threat fora to buy services and acquire
knowledge.
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Vulnerabilities of intercultural communication via software and sys-
tems Individuals may also communicate through software and systems, and
indirectly and probably mostly unintentionally deliver a message to threat agents
as well (although intentional threat messages in ransomware code directed at
a specific AV vendor have been observed). Consider again malware code and
the associated threat of authorship analysis. The written code directly commu-
nicates with a computing system, but indirectly communicates with mandated
breachers and security researchers whom try to retrieve the code and apply re-
verse engineering and/or authorship analysis. Written texts - whether data or
software - are an inherent weakness of MOs, and reveal much about the crim-
inal’s gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, intelligence, skills, and, ultimately,
offline identity. Although research that goes beyond attribution of writings is
nonexistent, several security researchers in this study stated that malware can
be very ‘Chinese’ or ‘Russian’, based on the structure of the code and their
general look and feel. As witnessed in this study, a malware sample contained
the word ‘shokolad’ in Latin spelling that was probably translated phoneti-
cally from the Russian word in Cyrillic spelling шоколад (meaning chocolate
in English). Similarly, the instructions to business partners of the Ponmocup
botnet were written in Cyrillic [391, p.6]. Such clues are very important to
start and/or narrow down a criminal investigation (see also [19, p.19]), and/or
make informed decisions which private or public partners should be involved.
Using Dutch language in malware code as happened in Coinvault and TorRAT
[545][397], attracted unwanted attention of Dutch LEA, and resulted in arrest
of the suspects. Registration practices and IP behavior are other examples of
weaknesses in intercultural communications. Script kiddie fora have less a de-
viant security culture as compared to more professional platforms. Hence, their
members are still relying on the online practices of their dominant culture, and
are therefore more prone to use their real IP and email addresses when sub-
scribing to a forum. Because of the poor DevSec culture on the forum, they
indirectly communicate identifying information to potential threat agents. In
an observed instance, a Dutch script kiddie used his real IP address until he
gained the knowledge to hide his IP address. After he successfully tested a
VPN, he proclaimed online to others that the PET worked, but then continued
to use his home IP address again. Such cases prove that code switching is not
only necessary in written software code, but also in nonverbal behavior as third
party threat agents may extract important information out of criminal conduct.
A battle of nonverbal security behavior: VPN usage on fora
The identification and block of duplicates - members with two accounts - is a task of
administrators on fora. Admins may log all IP addresses and receive a notification when
two different accounts use the same IP address to access the forum. They may launch an
investigation, comparing registration and posting practices and time stamps. However, this
deviant security mechanism becomes useless when members use the same VPN connection
to securely access the forum because they have the same bulletproof connectivity provider.
The inbox of the admin will then be flooded with false positive notifications. This example
shows that referent objects not only have different security interests, but also that related
countermeasures may compete against one another, rendering one of the two useless.
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Third culture & deviant security culture It is argued that intercultural
dialogue between law-abiding entities is difficult to achieve in online environ-
ments because of - amongst others - anonymity [546, pp.225-226]. However,
professional cyber criminal fora like Darkode and Verified are examples of suc-
cessful online subcultures because of that very same anonymity. Indeed, even if
members understand each other linguistically, they still have different cultural
backgrounds and (thus) communications styles. Therefore, they try to adapt
to each other, and end up constructing a new communication style, i.e., a third
culture [363, pp.153-154][546, pp.223-226]. So, criminal subcultures may have
overlap with a legitimate dominant culture, but can also completely be distin-
guished from it [547, p.46]. Related to the former, investigative journalist Brian
Krebs discovered that the Russian-language CaaS forum Verified used ‘cultural
captchas’. Visitors had to answer a question that related to the Russian legit-
imate dominant culture in order to enter the forum [548]. Likewise, Japanese
cyber criminal platforms use captchas that requires visitors to enter only e.g.,
Hiragana or Kanji characters [533, pp.8-9]. DevSec culture is communication
and emerges, like any other culture (Hall in [549, p.777]), through interaction.
Because members face similar deviant security problems, the issue of protection
is an extremely important issue to its members to the extent that cyber crim-
inal third cultures can be characterized as deviant security cultures. In other
words, these third cultures provide a climate with unique security-related values
and norms in which individuals can safely interact with each other. A forum
should be an online home, i.e., a place of safety and security which is especially
true for CSAM fora where members are relatively free to express their sexual-
ity. Culture in general, including deviant security culture, is learned behavior
[363, p.32], thus involves human-, information-, and organization capital. If
members do not value security, they will not adopt security policies, nor buy
DevSec products and services. DevSec culture is achieved by promoting intercul-
tural communicative deviant security: the understanding of cyber criminals that
communication between individuals or groups of different cultural origins has
inherent vulnerabilities but simultaneously works as a countermeasure against
threat agents. Again, identity plays a key role to understand DevSec, not only
as a vital part of the definition for this study’s definition on modus operandi, but
also in intercultural communicative deviant security. Cyber criminals, similar
to law-abiding entities [363, p.94], express or hide their identities to or from oth-
ers through communications. Their online identities that evolve around DevSec
in order to be successful, are negotiated, co-created, reinforced and challenged
through communication with key players. Ultimately, deviant security will be-
come part of the newly created cyber criminal identity of - amongst others -
forum members which occurs through monocultural communication.
Monocultural communication as a countermeasure Although profit-
driven fora may have many members from very different dominant cultures,
some of these online market places exist over ten years. These fora - includ-
ing platforms for sexually-driven CSAM [550] - are therefore clearly long-time
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persistent as compared to adolescence-limited fora that never reach a sufficient
maturity level. Member activity on the latter fora stops because they do not
promote the commission of crime enough, e.g., too few members or unique
services/products (including content), or because they have too many vulnera-
bilities, and as a result are taken down by threat agents. An example of such
a failed forum for stolen credit card information was the platform Carders.de.
This forum was unable to distinguish rippers from ‘bonafide’ carding vendors
[454]. Indeed, successful fora apply necessary technical countermeasures against
a range of threat agents and related attacks. Yet another reason that these
places are successful safe havens is because of a softer control: their members
excel in intercultural communicative deviant security.
So how should we characterize this intercultural communicative security on
successful fora? The answer is that the writings and nonverbal behavior on
these fora are largely homogenous and abstract. In other words, these newly
created third cultures prescribe monocultural communication to promote the
protection of business and identity (see Figure 7.5). The nonverbal behavior
and writings of individuals are so homogenous and reveal so little about their
identities that they work as a security mechanism against law-enforcement. So,
convergence (see [530, p.456]) on monocultural fora occurs when members try
to minimize cultural differences by matching communication practices of other
members. As a result, intercultural conflict by internal threat agents is avoided,
while outsiders like mandated breachers are having a hard time to say something
about the cultural background of individuals, even if large amounts of written
texts (e.g., forum postings and chats) and metadata (timestamps, IPs, email
addresses) are available. Let alone that outsiders are able to blend in: cyber se-
curity researchers are frequently detected and subsequently expelled from cyber
criminal collectives like carding fora and shops [551][552].
Figure 7.5: A dominant culture influences a criminal subculture. A third culture, however,
is a newly constructed subculture with its own communication styles and could manifest itself
as a cyber criminal monoculture.
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Monocultural values, behavior and language Monocultural communica-
tion is similarity-based, and prescribes common i) values, ii) behavior and iii)
language [524, p.1]. The most striking example of prescribed monocultural val-
ues in third cultures is that members are united around a single goal and have
similar deviant security interests. Topic threads generally do not undermine
the main aim of a profit-driven or sexually-driven forum, respectively selling cy-
ber criminal products/services and sharing CSAM. So, members do not express
their political or religious views, as such avoid value conflicts (see [363, p.233]).
Terms and conditions of fora generally prescribe to their members not to insult
and/or offend others by means of hate speech, derogatory remarks and so on.
Prescribed monocultural behavior are mandatory usage of prescribed De-
vSec mechanisms on e.g., cryptomarkets: Tor to access the platform, electronic
purchase orders, mandatory escrow, member status and an integrated payment
system, see Figure 7.4. Through such rule-based and role-based controls that
provide accountability [454, pp.39-40], deviant security practices are simplified
for individual members, DevSec managers (like admins) and the larger com-
munity. These controls provide a paternalism solution as they enhance and
influence individual choices to increase the members’ security as a private and
club good [553, p.74].
Lastly, monocultures may further require that its members use just a single
language, therefore enhancing its monocultural climate, see Figure 7.5. So, some
cyber criminal fora only allow the Russian-language which works as a counter-
measure against any threat agent who do not speak Russian (see also [453, p.4]).
Members who are not fluent in Russian are admonished [320, p.11], while obser-
vations show how those who had used other languages or automated translations
were expelled from the fora. This security policy might be influenced by the
Russian dominant culture in which thinking in terms of ‘we are surrounded by
enemies’, ‘us and them’ and ‘ours and strangers’ is not uncommon (indeed, Rus-
sian exploit kit vendor Paunch knew English and sold his product on Darkode
[366]. This might be explained by the hypothesis that he is a Western-oriented
Russian citizen) [530, pp.90-94]. In reaction to this strict single language policy,
a number of cyber criminals have their advertisements translated manually into
Russian by translators then post them on the forum. So, national languages
can work as a countermeasure, and the next paragraph dives deeper into this
subject.
Argot and other languages as countermeasures Third cultures, includ-
ing monocultures, may further promote the use of argot: the language of the
underworld that supports the idea of intercultural communication as a counter-
measure against threat agents [554]. Albeit following the grammar rules of the
dominant culture, argot is the vocabulary of the third culture as it is artificial
and nobody’s mother tongue [547, p.47]. Argot is learning another language
(language acquisition [363, p.161]), and as such becomes human capital. Cy-
ber criminal argot, like other argots [555], supports the commission of crime by
promoting - amongst others - an online identity, inner group solidarity and an
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alternative social structure [543][547, pp.52-53, 56]. However, argot also works
as a countermeasure against threat agents, and can be further explained by
technical computer security concepts like the CIA triad:
– Availability: argot provides the technical language to insiders to discuss
the specifications and nuances of deviant security. In the Russian-language
underground, BPHs and their clients speak about дедики (‘dedyky’) and
абузоустойчивый хостинг (‘abuzoustoychivyy khosting’) when they are
talking about respectively dedicated servers and bulletproof hosting, while
money launderers and their clients use the words лошaдь (‘loshad’, liter-
ally meaning horse in English) and дроп (‘drop’) to refer to respectively
money mules and offline/online locations where fraudulent transfers are
sent to.
– Integrity: argot helps to exclude threat agents from a closed subculture.
Incorrect usage of argot, as well as a sudden change of communication
style, will raise suspicion among cyber criminals. The former situation
points to outsider threat agents like noobs and undercover agents who do
not have the vocabulary (i.e., human capital) to communicate with pro-
fessional cyber criminals. The latter situation may point to insider threat
agents, like co-conspirers who turned into criminal informants, and their
sudden change in communication style has been observed several times
during this study.
‘How ya doin, mate?’
A forum member was discussed by other members when one of them noticed that his lan-
guage usage was very different than usual during a chat conversation. Was his account
compromised and taken over by a threat agent? The member in question was later ap-
proached by some of the members via another communication platform and he explained
what happened. He stated that he had not logged out his chat session in an Internet cafe,
and that somebody else must have replied to incoming messages with his chat account.
– Confidentiality: argot further thwarts investigations by concealing knowl-
edge about malicious activities. Writings are very important to prove
criminal intent about cyber crimes. The legal difference between bullet-
proof hosters and bad hosts is that there is evidence that the former knows
what his/her criminal client is doing on his/her server, and therefore is a
co-conspirer for the crimes that his/her client commits [459, p.21]. Even
if there is correspondence between criminal hoster and client, argot may
conceal/obscure conversations about crime, and thus intent.
Besides argot, rare national, minority and/or regional languages may work as
a countermeasure against threat agents as well. For LEA specifically, language
works as a delaying mechanism that increases the double whammy effect of De-
vSec, hampering any police investigation as it absorbs scarce resources (i.e., ca-
pacity, access to linguists, budget and time). Generally, American and European
law-enforcement agencies have information positions on cyber criminal commu-
nication platforms where the common language is either a European (including
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English) or East Slavic language. Yet there are virtually no investigators in
these agencies that have the combined tactical, technical and cultural/language
skills to grasp the full extent, true nature and various aspects of cyber attacks.
For instance, Dutch police investigators encountered an organized money mule
group in the north of the Netherlands whom spoke the local Frisian language
mixed with argot. All intercepted telecommunications had to be translated to
Dutch, while the interpreters in turn had difficulties with the carder argot and
technical jargon. In such a situation, both automated and manual translations
may express the meaning of the words, but not the sense of the conversation.
This problem of identifying the meaning of words in context is also known as
word-sense disambiguation [556], and very relevant to those who are confronted
by deviant security. The focus, related investments and subsequent methods
of working of Western LEA - i.e., separation of digital, linguistic and tactical
investigative roles - to understand especially the Russian-language underground
economies have another downside, namely: undiscovered crime caused by other
language groups. According to a reviewed intelligence report, an individual
of Moroccan descent who lived in Europe sold his malware on predominantly
Arabic-language cyber criminal fora. He would probably not have been detected
if he had not revealed personal details on an English-language forum.
7.3 Distribution as a Countermeasure
Cyber criminals, infrastructure and victims are easily distributed across loca-
tions on various levels of aggregation with protective qualities against threat
agents. Indeed, mutual legal assistance treaties between states aim at over-
coming distribution as a countermeasure by harmonizing national procedural
and substantive laws. As mentioned before, states might intentionally and un-
intentionally provide deviant security. The next paragraphs dive deeper into
this issue and other issues, and show countries, including but not limited to
their laws and policies, play an important role in the protection of crime and
the criminal. This section subsequently discusses the impact of a geopolitically
multipolar world on deviant security and how countries can be distinguished in
various points of attack and low-risk and high-risk areas. Cyber criminal MOs
with little understanding of these dimensions are vulnerable when too much
centralization, while sticking to the same location for a considerable time, is
applied. Therefore, referent objects may distribute their assets as a counter-
measure. Ultimately, these temporal-spatial qualities add to the distributed,
decentralized and fragmented nature of a reversed electronic panopticon.
The multipolar world as a countermeasure Cyber criminals may well be
geographically stuck in jurisdictions that they cannot or do not want to leave for
private or professional reasons. On the one hand, they are increasingly a ball in
a game of power politics played by various political blocks, both for the better
and worse. The world is becoming increasingly post-Atlantic and multipolar
[557]. This fundamental shift in the global pecking order will have geopolitical
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repercussions and consequences for the international legal order [558]. The pre-
viously dominant legal doctrines and approaches of the US and EU have been
replaced by significant national and regional differences in Internet governance
[559]. These different views on Internet governance lead to legal pluralism on
security, privacy and executive power [560]. Similarly, IT is not necessarily a ‘lib-
eration technology’ that promotes fundamental rights and freedoms [561]. On
the contrary, information technology has helped multiple authoritarian regimes
to strengthen control over their citizens, leading to arrests of political dissidents
that were labelled as ‘suspects of cyber crime’ [39]. Moreover, governments ac-
cuse and counter-accuse private security firms of alleged ties with intelligence
agencies of other countries and subsequently restrict these companies from op-
erating in their jurisdictions [562][563], adding to the creation of cyber security
networks along geopolitical lines. Whether this multipolarity and diverse usage
of IT by governments will lead to more competition or cooperation on cyber
crime issues remains the question. It is, however, apparent that major political
blocks are opting for an Internet that is much more centralized in its governance
[564], because - amongst others - cybercriminals are empowered by the genera-
tivity of the Internet [565][163, p.107]. Although it is unclear what cyber crime
laws of which block will be the dominant rule worldwide, it is further apparent
that cyber crime laws, policy and investigations will increasingly become an
expression of, subjected to, and shaped by, geopolitical situations and interna-
tional relations. In other words, cyber crimes have become means of exerting
pressure on, and leverage between, states. As long as domestic cyber criminals
do not harm or even promote national interests, governments may have political
incentives to deliberately ignore, encourage, coordinate, order or even integrate
attacks by criminal citizens on overseas jurisdictions, by providing e.g., sup-
port, operational details and immunity [566][360][567][568]. As a result of such
government actions, suspects escape accountability. This practice further shows
how deviant security continuously changes through time and place because of
- amongst others - dynamic macro level geopolitical situations. Ultimately, the
distinction between deviant, public and state security is becoming increasingly
blurred. Instances have been observed in which there was substantial evidence
that financially-driven cyber criminals were conducting state-permitted, state-
sponsored and even state-forced attacks, while simultaneously receiving neces-
sary protection of their government against the law-enforcement agencies of the
countries under target.
On the other hand, cyber criminals adjust their security to specific events,
settings and situations that occur on a macro level. Reasons why many Russian-
language cyber criminal platforms are hosted outside the Russian Federation
might well be tightening Russian Internet regulations [569], and/or the evasive
Russian lawful intercept and surveillance program SORM (Система Оперативно-
Розыскных Мероприятий - ‘Sistema Operativno-Rozysknykh Meropriyatiy’)
[570]. Cyber criminals actively exploit legal and policy loopholes in jurisdictions,
international conflicts and geopolitical blocs as many other examples show in the
next paragraphs. However, such ‘smartness’ may turn against them, precisely
because national laws on cyber crime still widely differ and jurisdictions set dif-
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ferent priorities for various offenses [262]. For instance, an observed individual
only delivered technical support to a cyber criminal organization knowing that
such acts were not punishable under his national law, i.e., nullum crimen sine
lege. Yet under law of another jurisdiction, he was considered a co-conspirator -
i.e., a suspect of crime - that knowingly provided vital services to cyber criminals
that attacked victims, and received stolen money as a payment.
Points of attack origin, linkage and occurrence To understand how a
geopolitically multipolar world and the disappearance of time and space bar-
riers further help cyber criminals in commission and protection, we first need
to recognize that cyber crime consists of three interrelated components that
give LEA jurisdiction to start an investigation. Simplified: i) cyber criminals
need ii) infrastructure to make iii) victims (see also [571]). Each of these three
components may be located in different places which make cyber crimes indeed
truly transnational. Legal scholar Susan Brenner calls the location from which
cyber criminals operate points of attack origin [17, pp.409-424]. She further
names the areas where (potential) victims are based points of attack occurrence
[17, pp.425-429]. Unmentioned in the literature are those locations where finan-
cial, legal and technical infrastructure of the cyber criminal are located. Cyber
criminals have to connect to the victim’s network via botnet C&Cs, process
stolen money, and register offshore shell companies to protect their assets. As
Figure 7.6 depicts, these financial, legal and technical networks are best dubbed
points of attack linkage, as they connect the referent object to others like cyber
criminals and victims. From a legal perspective, these connection points are
just as important as the other two points of attack because state authorities
will have jurisdiction to start an investigation when e.g., a single bank account,
legal person or malicious server is in their territory. The geographical location of
cyber criminals, infrastructure and victims, and the political, economical, and
cultural situation in those areas, have a major impact on the security practices
of cyber criminals. These three points of attack can be placed on a contin-
uum that ranges from low to high-risk areas. The former locations contribute
to the security of cyber criminals, while the latter hold serious security-related
exposures to cyber criminals.
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Figure 7.6: The introduction of points of attack linkage helps to understand how referent
objects, (financial, legal and technical) infrastructure and victims are inter-related. Offenders
who are located in jurisdictions A and B may use infrastructure hosted in jurisdiction C to
communicate with each other via chat, email and/or fora. They may further use infrastructure
in jurisdiction D - such as a C&C server - to attack victims in jurisdiction E.
Low-risk macro environments The physical locations that pose the lowest
risks for cyber crime are safe havens. Reasons why areas become safe havens
are the existence of cyber criminal communities that are well-developed in both
nature and extent. Not only are there large numbers of active cyber criminals
based in such an area, but their members also have (access to) high quality and
large quantities of tangible and intangible assets such as investment capital,
highly skilled co-conspirers and optimized criminal business processes. Gen-
erally, the cyber criminal communities in low-risk areas have the upper hand
as the cyber security community experiences opposite circumstances. Besides
deliberately abetting to deviant security, key players from the cyber security
community in these jurisdictions may also be cooperative in confronting cyber
crime but are inadequate, and thus unable, to do so [566, pp.2-3]. Safe havens
lack an active, well-developed cyber security community, and are plagued with
a large double whammy effect. These locations have no effective cyber crime
laws, policies and/or enforcement because of corruption, few adequate resources
and little cross-sector collaboration [364]. Generally, safe havens are associated
with point of attack origin [572][573][283][54][574][575][538]. However, points of
attack occurrence and linkage can also be safe havens as shown in Figure 7.7.
Distributors of child sexual abusive material regularly shift their material be-
tween jurisdictions that are considered weak on enforcement [20, p.394]. Servers
in countries that have internal conflicts have been used by cyber criminals as
enforcement against misuse will be low. So, C&Cs of the botnet GameOver Zeus
have been hosted in Eastern Ukraine since 2014, while BPHs have been offering
servers in Syria since the year 2012. Servers in the latter country lend them-
selves for confidentiality as few countries could successfully send an MLAT for
a preservation request to the Syrian government. Yet botnet herders, phishers
and spammers may choose availability over confidentiality, and may therefore,
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besides techniques such as double fast flux [576, p.1], prefer countries without
an effective Internet governance policy to reduce the amount of malicious traffic,
like the Netherlands [577][578][579]. Besides low costs and high-uptime of Dutch
servers (needed for the bots to contact the C&C server), botnet traffic to and
from the Netherlands will be a less detectable anomaly for intrusion and detec-
tion systems of Western European banks and ISPs than traffic to and from, say,
Iran. Equally, established ISPs in relatively well-governed jurisdictions control
the bulk of botnets, and Dutch ISPs might have incentives to hold a passive at-
titude towards botnets such as the cost of mitigation and pressure of regulatory
involvement [162].
Just like traditional criminals [283, p.173], cyber criminals attack preferen-
tial markets where benefits are high and costs are low, like malware that are
sold as pay-per-install and exclusively target the UK and US [399]. Points of
attack occurrence might simultaneously be a preferential market and a low-risk
area. CSAM offenders target vulnerable children in economically disadvantaged
countries. Financially-driven criminals successfully hacked financial institutions
in less IT-advanced countries like Bangladesh, Gabon, Iraq and Vietnam, and
transferred large sums of money via SWIFT [580]. Both areas hold high bene-
fits (e.g., children, money) and low security risks because of an ineffective cyber
security community.
Figure 7.7: This visualization is an example why some jurisdictions can be regarded as
low-risk areas. From e.g., a Dutch LEA perspective, cyber criminals who are located in
jurisdictions (read: points of attack origin) with whom the Netherlands has no effective legal
treaties operate from low-risk areas. They may misuse Dutch technical, legal or financial
infrastructure (read: point of attack linkage) - e.g., servers, legal persons or bank accounts -
to make victims in other jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, the US or their own country
(read: points of attack occurrence).
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High-risk macro environments On the other side of the spectrum are ju-
risdictions that are labelled as high-risk areas. These countries have installed
effective cyber crime laws and policies, and dedicated cyber crime public in-
stitutions that serve the public interest. The larger cyber security community
proactively shares intelligence and collaborates against threats and attacks. A
multistakeholder Internet governance model is installed, and prevents, detects
and takes down malicious server activities. Potential victims keep their secu-
rity up-to-date, while actual victims are willing to inform appropriate public
agencies by filing a complaint. The hypothesis is that suspects of cyber crime
who operate from high-risk areas must take more precautions against the cy-
ber security community than cyber criminals who are located in low-risk areas.
Referent objects that are based in high-risk areas are less developed compared
to the cyber security community in their jurisdiction. They possess fewer assets
and do not get the opportunity to mature into a well-developed cyber criminal
community as explained later in this paragraph.
Whether an area becomes a high or low-risk is not solely determined by
the quality and quantity of bonafide threat actors of cyber criminals. Macro-
economic factors may have an impact as well, such as the technical educational
level of the working population [538, p.114], and gross domestic product (GDP),
Internet users per capita and unemployment rates [581][582]. This position is
also backed by a game theory experiment that indicates that crime in economies
with plenty of well-paid IT jobs only pays for average hackers: ‘very good pro-
fessionals who have high probability of getting maximum payoffs from legiti-
mate activities are not prone to engage in criminal activities’ [583, p.53]. Less
talented hackers will have little DevSec-related human and organization capi-
tal, and as a result, are more vulnerable to successful legitimate attacks from
well-resourced LEA. For instance, the Netherlands has a well-developed cyber
security community [270], unique language, and a chronic shortage of qualified
information technology workers [584][585]. With some notable exceptions like
the autonomous TorRAT group and very specialized CaaS providers like bul-
letproof hosters, one could therefore consider the Netherlands as a relatively
high-risk point of attack origin with generally mediocre home-grown computer-
focused criminals. This position is not only backed by empirical findings of this
study, but also by research of other scholars. Leukfeldt, Kleemans and Stol
reviewed eighteen Dutch police investigations on phishing networks from the
Netherlands. They concluded that the majority of networks only targeted the
Netherlands with low-tech attacks. Only two high-tech and two low-tech cases
had some international links with victims and offenders operating from multiple
countries [179]. To conclude, there is not only a digital divide between cyber se-
curity communities from low-risk areas and high-risk areas [56], but also a divide
between cyber criminal communities in low-risk and high-risk areas, see Table
7.2. The next paragraph takes a look at how location and time-boundedness
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CRI-LR avoids direct interaction
with CRI-HR as a co-equal
transaction party. CRI-HR might
become clients of CRI-LR for
automated bulk CaaS, such as
selling stolen credit card credentials
or email addresses, or when
collaboration is absolutely necessary
like the provision of moneymules
(known as drops).
No instances have been found in
which CRI-HR targets points of
attack occurrence that are both
preferential markets and SEC-LR.
Yet this observation might be caused
by a dark figure of undiscovered
cyber crime. SEC-LR in point of
attack occurrence will not have the
means to investigate these attacks,
while SEC-HR in point of attack
origin rather focuses on attacks that
target their own jurisdiction (i.e.,





SEC-HR focuses on CRI-LR when
the latter regards the former’s
location as a preferential market
(i.e., point of attack occurrence).
However, SEC-HR can only
successfully arrest and prosecute
when CRI-LR travels to SEC-HR
[358].
SEC-HR faces a collaboration
paradox with SEC-LR. One the one
hand they need SEC-LR for
execution of their legitimate
offensive countermeasures against
CRI-LR such as arrests and
takedowns. On the other hand,
SEC-HR risks damage to these
countermeasures because of the large
double whammy effect in SEC-LR,
including corruption.
Table 7.2: This matrix describes the digital divides and collaborations between cyber crim-
inal and cyber security communities in high and low-risk areas.
Location and time-boundedness & centralization as vulnerabilities
Cyber criminals may use malicious servers, or bank accounts where stolen money
is deposited, for too long. If criminal practices are conducted on the same loca-
tion for a considerable time, they become noticeable to the outside world. As
a result, these spaces may become high-risk areas, thus increasing the chance
that legitimate interventions against the malicious activities are launched. This
happens when the three points of attack are continuously located in the same ju-
risdiction, including larger jurisdictions such as of the sum of states that ratified
the Cyber Crime Convention, or within the same geopolitical bloc. Although
the administrators behind a large DDoS booter and main technical infrastruc-
ture were located in different jurisdictions, all points of attack origin - Canada,
Croatia and Serbia and United Kingdom - and points of attack linkage - Ger-
many and the Netherlands - ratified the Cyber Crime Convention, with arrests
and takedowns as a result [272][586]. Many simple cyber crime investigations -
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considered low-hanging fruit by law-enforcement officers - start because cyber
criminals, used Internet infrastructure and victims are in the same jurisdiction
for a considerable amount of time, like the multiple DDoS attacks that were
launched by Dutch script kiddies on one of the largest access providers in the
Netherlands [587]. So, cyber criminal assets are bounded by temporal-spatial
dimensions which work as a vulnerability. This is also apparent in the fixed
9AM-5PM working hour patterns of criminal hackers that subsequently reveal
the time zone in which they are located [588], after workday peak hours of
CSAM downloaders [589], or the tradeoff of Bitcoin tumblers between mixing
chunks with many mixes for a short escrow period each or few mixes with a
longer escrow period [403, p.497].
The problem of location and time-boundedness does not end here. MOs with
too much centralization, while sticking to the same location(s) without interrup-
tion, make things even worse for cyber criminals. Centralization of assets leads
to a single point of vulnerability (or single point of failure, [156, p.121]), and
has been observed at different aggregation levels. More specifically on the level
of countries, legitimate security and DevSec providers (respectively bonafide
email providers [356, p.13], and the previously mentioned criminal BES with
19.000 users), IP-ranges and individual servers, and even software and data on
these servers like cyber criminal fora. According to Moura’s research on online
bad neighborhoods [213], twenty ISPs were responsible for half of the spam-
ming, while one Nigerian ISP was found having 62% of its IP addresses involved
with spam. Phishing and spam were mostly located in respectively the United
States and Southern Asia. During this study on DevSec, many instances were
encountered in which cyber criminals centralized too many functionalities on
a single server. In a successful attack on several financial institutions, a dedi-
cated server was simultaneously a connection to the victims’ systems, storage
room for attacker tools and stolen data, a Tor hidden server, and a place from
which a hack on a shared web hosting server was launched. Lastly, dominant
cryptomarkets such as Alphabay, Hansa and Silk Road, and cyber criminal fora
like Dark Market and Darkode are also examples of locations with too much
centralization. They were places where too many high value targets of LEA
met (for a similar problem with Bitcoin mixers, see [456][590]). For today’s key
enablers of cyber crime, there is actually little choice in suitable high threat
fora with enough equally skilled peers whom offer quality products/services.
This lock-in relates to both legitimate and illegitimate products/services, and
is a major vulnerability for the cyber criminal underground. Cyber criminals
subsequently face a tradeoff between on the one hand access to and availability
of other cyber criminals and a range of products/services, and on the other side
their own individual security, e.g., confidentiality of identity.
Asset distribution as a countermeasure Cyber criminals, and even com-
plete underground economies as previously shown in Figure 7.4, may avoid cen-
tralization and location-boundedness and time-boundedness. They make com-
partments of assets, and separate information, (malicious) software, systems
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and individuals and their duties and roles within organizations. Cyber crimi-
nals may use several servers in attacks, and separate their functionalities. One
server is used as a C&C, a second and third server function as backup C&Cs,
another server is used as storage, while a fourth server is used to host a carder
shop. Similarly, organized groups may have strict job positions, thus apply
role-based functions, such as crypters, hackers, money mule managers, malware
developers and web designers. If a group member stops due to resignation or
arrest, he/she is easily replaced which protects business operations.
We now link assets (what), compartmentation and rule-based and role-based
controls (who) to the when and where. The subsequent distribution of these
compartments in intertwined networks not only provides availability but may
also increase confidentiality. More specifically, distribution limits the visibility
of assets to threat agents because of the attribute of unlinkability, and as such
the anonymity of the criminal and the unobservability of crimes (see [207]).
More specifically, criminals will extent the evidence trail, and replace, scatter
and/or rotate assets in a decentralized manner. In other words, distribution is a
countermeasure and can be executed through extension, replacement, rotation
and dispersion (see Figure 7.8).
Figure 7.8: Distribution as a countermeasure consists of four techniques: extension, replace-
ment, rotation and dispersion.
The following examples of transnationally operating botnets further explain
distribution as a countermeasure:
– Extension: Super peers of p2p botnets work as proxies that extend the
chain to the valuable botnet panel. Cyber criminal sites like fora and
DDoS booters may use anti-DDoS services, re-directing authorized traffic
through an additional server, and filtering out any attacking bots [591].
However, these services also work as an extra link - a proxy - in the
chain which obscures the true IP address of the forum, and delays any
interventions taken by LEA.
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– Dispersion: Many of the observed botnets in this study usually have num-
ber between three to five C&C servers at any given time. These points of
attack linkage are often scattered among multiple jurisdictions and ISPs
to exploit low-risk areas in today’s multipolar world.
– Rotation: Botnet C&Cs may rotate between ISPs in different jurisdictions
after a certain period of time or particular event, like a newly infected,
high-value victim. This tactic prevents LEA in the affected country to
respond adequately [592, p.586].
– Replacement: Botnet C&Cs may use DNS fast flux to protect a fully
qualified domain name by having an enormous amount of IP addresses
assigned to it which are frequently swapped [593]. Furthermore, malware
developers frequently repack, thus replace, their wares up to twice daily
to evade detection by antivirus software [399].
Be aware that extension, replacement, rotation and dispersion might be jointly
executed, on various levels of aggregation, in an automated fashion, and not
only by botnets like Ponmocup [391, p.30], but in other cyber criminal schemes
as well. To avoid attribution, cryptocurrency tumblers (see e.g., [403][328][330])
not only work as an extension, but essentially separate incoming transactions,
replace them with other transactions, and scatter the outgoing transactions
among the users of the service. Distribution as a countermeasure can also be
mixed with other controls, providing additional proof for how deviant security
is very much applied in compensating layers. The example about online dead
drops for CSAM in Section 3.2 is generally a combination of i) distribution as a
countermeasure (i.e., extension via a third party file sharing service), ii) usage of
a single entity, a single time, for a single purpose (a hyperlink to the service for
each individual CSAM download), and iii) automated deletion after the material
is downloaded.
Still, extension, replacement, rotation and dispersion are difficult to accom-
plish. Besides additional implementation costs, these policies only work if cyber
criminals avoid repetition and apply a degree of randomness. Repetitive pat-
terns in MOs not only provide linkability to attacks on victims, but also generate
a new weakness - i.e., predictability - which is frequently exploited by defend-
ers and mandated breachers. Ultimately, cyber criminals face an unavoidable
tradeoff between deviation versus conformity. Outliers in e.g., time patterns -
a lot of activity on Sunday morning, instead of standard weekly working hours
- will raise the interest of the cyber security community, while that same con-
sistent working pattern is exploited by LEA to make informed decisions when
a suspect is at home to make an arrest and/or search his/her house.
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Fight, flee and/or serve your country
How do successful cyber criminals deal with high-risk areas in macro environments? They
have to adapt to the situation (an intangible asset), and either fight or flee. To fight in
this sense means staying in the high-risk territory, and trying to turn their micro envi-
ronment into a low-risk area (see Section 7.4). The Dutch cyber criminal group TorRAT
that targeted victims in the Netherlands were presumably forced to apply this strategy,
and implemented a security-driven approach. Their MO was extensively built - amongst
other things - around being highly autarkic, including developing their own malware and
laundering the stolen money themselves, and applying countermeasures against data re-
tention and volatility (deletion, prepaid cards, privacy enhancing technologies), deception
(installing Zeus malware on infected machines as disinformation) and distrust (usage of
preconfigured dongles) [348]. Another option is to target victims in-, misuse Internet in-
frastructure of-, and/or allocate other assets in low-risk macro environments, including the
cyber criminal’s own physical presence (flee). There are a number of relevant stories from
interviewed participants about such distributions of cyber criminals, infrastructure and
victims. Several Russian cyber criminals who targeted Russian businesses fled to Ukraine
because Moscow was not in contact with Kiev after the civil unrest that started in Eastern-
Ukraine in 2014. In another instance, an American cyber criminal went to Moscow, and
subsequently targeted the US. He was later arrested by Russian authorities as requested by
American LEA. The Moscow-based group that used the malware Dyre tried not to attack
Russia and the US. The group probably expected that were operating in a low-risk area
as they avoided making Russian victims: according to several participants of this study,
Russian legal proceedings require de facto an identified victim to open an investigation
in Russia while suspects subsequently have to be caught in the act of заливы (‘zalivy’ -
the act of stealing money from a victim’s bank account as compared to merely delivering
e.g., technical support to such a financially-driven computer-focused MO). Nevertheless,
group members were arrested by Russian authorities in 2016. These examples underline
that the sequence of cyber criminals from the CIS who attack the preferred markets of the
United States and Western Europe, does not necessarily apply. Still, there are many ex-
amples in which East Slavic-speaking cyber criminals did intentionally avoid attacking the
Russian Federation and/or the larger Russian-speaking world (see also e.g., [418, p.83]).
The CryptoWall ransomware did not infect computers with Cyrillic configurations, and
Russian-speaking victims could request a decryption key for free. This corrective counter-
measure was presumably applied to prevent Russian LEA from acting against CryptoWall.
Similar to the banking trojan Dridex [594], the Wildfire ransomware code excluded IPs of
infected machines from the larger Russian world such as Belarus, the Russian Federation
and Ukraine. Lastly, profit-driven cyber criminals stated to potential business partners
that they would never attack their motherland, while sociocultural norms of the dominant
legitimate culture may dictate that stealing from the West is not necessarily a bad thing
[538, p.114].
7.4 Physical Deviant Security
So far, this study has addressed mainly administrative and technical controls
of cyber criminals against threats from cyberspace. The physical, offline world
is important to referent objects as well, not only for commission [215, pp.41-
42, 68], but also because of protection. From a good guy perspective, physical
controls protect assets like facilities, personnel and other resources [59, p.28].
Yet this section shows that deviant security of a physical nature may differ
from prescribed industry standards. This section starts with the vulnerability
of asset conversion from the online, intangible world to the offline, tangible
world. In the physical realm, cyber criminal referent objects opt for limited
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territorial control and operate from micro external and internal security zones.
This section then focuses on physical DevSec on the most micro level: physical
protective objects and subjects, more specifically access control, surveillance,
and violence. Lastly, the vulnerabilities of deviant physical security standards
are discussed while Table 7.3 summarizes the observed physical controls of this
study. A methodological remark is that many of the collected data sources of
this section are derived from a single point of attack origin, more specifically
the Netherlands, which is considered a high-risk area for cyber criminals. Data
about cyber criminals located in other countries are used to a lesser extent. It
is expected that this difference between points of attack origin - being either a
high-risk or low-risk area - has an effect on the nature and degree of physical
security controls.
Online & offline asset conversion As described in Section 5.4, both tan-
gible and intangible assets are an inherent component of cyber crime. How to
interpret the relation between the tangible and the intangible from a deviant
security perspective, more specifically the cyber criminal’s online and offline
world? Events in the cyber criminal’s online micro environment are threats to
his/her assets in his/her offline micro environment, and vice versa. In many
cases, digital forensic research on a server may discover a home IP connection
that points to a physical location. Subsequent house searches, preservation of
hardware and possible arrests may generate, in turn, evidence and intelligence
about (other) crimes in the online world. There is such an interplay between
the online and offline world, that the distinction between what is digital and
what is physical has become blurred. This is especially visible in online sexual
violence against children [85, pp.46-48, 114]. A victim of CSAM may disclose
the exploitation at some point in time, while the images can provide lasting
evidence that sexual abuse indeed has taken place. Similarly, besides data car-
riers like USB sticks, passwords written down on pieces of paper and printed
out information security manuals were also found during house raids.
The psychological and technical merge of these two worlds [595][596][192,
pp.66-67], may wriggle for cyber criminals because of - amongst others - the
previously mentioned removal of time-space barriers. While they are physically
bounded by time and location, their online activities are not. In an operation
against Blackshades - a malicious trojan horse that controlled computers re-
motely - law-enforcement found new investigative leads after a house search of a
Blackshades administrator located in one time zone, and quickly preserved data
in other time zones. An associated Blackshades administrator, who was still
asleep because he was located in a different time zone when the preservations
were executed, could only respond hours later when much of the damage to
his infrastructure had already occurred. Notably, many non-IT focused objects
are in the transition to become IT focused objects. Nowadays, automobiles are
rather hardware and software on wheels, and help legal practitioners by gen-
erating - amongst others - incriminating information capital (read: evidence)
about the cyber criminal and his/her crimes [597].
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Computer-enabled criminals buy physical assets on cryptomarkets that will
be send by legitimate postal delivery services to a physical location and this
practice promotes detection by LEA (see also [598]). Computer-focused and
assisted criminals face a similar but slightly different problem: the conversion
from intangible to tangible valuables, and vice versa. In other words, transfers
from the online world to the offline world and the other way around. Indeed, the
previous example about child abusive material points to this issue of asset con-
version. CSAM are depictions of physical sexual abuse, and as such, conversions
from the tangible to the intangible. The audio, images and videos frequently
contain important clues about the who, where and when of the physical world.
Based on child sexual abusive images, the Dutch police reconstructed the room
in which the abuse took place, and successfully showed the three dimensional
model to the general public: the mother of the child victim recognized the room
of her house and called the police. Likewise, several cyber criminals have been
observed who posted clips on social media in which they showed events that
occurred in their private life. More than once, such uploads revealed to investi-
gators - amongst other - the suspect’s place of residence, car ownership and/or
associates. The vulnerability of asset conversion also works from online to of-
fline. Profit-driven cyber criminals may prefer to cash their stolen virtual money
in hard currency. In several instances, money mules had to visit corrupt bank
employees, or ATMs to withdraw money which made them visible, thus vulner-
able. The Lurk group launched a campaign in Russia to re-issue SIM cards of
ordinary citizens in order to commit online banking fraud. However, sending
and collecting the physical SIM cards made them vulnerable for detection by a
variety of threat agents from the cyber security community [260].
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‘We had a drink together the other night’
It is striking how little information there is in academic studies about the direct physical
surroundings of cyber criminals. Most research about cyber criminals and their crimes
evolves around their digital world, such as used forums, malware and botnet infrastructure.
Yet cyber criminals need physical subjects and objects for the commission of crime as well
as the protection of the criminal and his/her crimes, as shown in Section 5.4. Similar to
findings by Leukfeldt et al. [196, pp.6-8][195], an observation of this study is that some
cyber criminals know their co-conspirers physically. Communications between computer-
focused cyber criminals proved they are acquainted in real life as well (hence the title
of this box which is derived from two cyber criminals who discussed a third individual:
‘[He] is doing great. I had a drink with him the other night’). Other examples include
the group of 80 individuals behind the Dyre malware that worked from an office in the
financial district of Moscow [253], and several Dutch CSAM users who met in person to
exchange encrypted hard drives with abusive content and/or discussed plans to sexually
abuse children. Furthermore, several cyber criminals, especially cross-cutting criminals such
as online money launderers and money mules [599, pp.20, 56-57], were detected because
of offline crimes, such as shoplifting, physical abuse or illegal possession of firearms. For
instance, a woman fled out of a department store because of shoplifting and lost her bag with
her passport, birth certificate and some letters with her postal address in the Netherlands.
Because of a hit based on that personal identifying information in Dutch police systems,
she was linked to an ongoing investigation against the group behind the MYFL malware
[600]. Lastly, several occasions were observed in which co-conspirers had to install malware
on, or withdraw money from, ATMs and reported to malware developers whom were based
in another jurisdiction. These are additional arguments why cyber crime has more local
and offline dimensions than one may expect at first glance [539][364]. Cyber criminals live
in a physical world, and are as such affected by their direct physical surroundings.
Limited territorial control Physical security is part of many industry stan-
dards on technical computer security, and includes crime prevention through en-
vironmental design (CPTED) and target hardening of IT facilities [59, pp.435-
442]. Researchers have looked at how traditional criminals - especially drug
dealers - have applied defensible space principles for law-abiding citizens to pro-
tect themselves from their own threat agents creating offensible spaces: a safe
place to conduct crime [601][602]. What are the characteristics of the cyber
criminals’ offensible spaces? Let us start with their territorial definition - the
physical micro environment that is under control of the cyber criminal, more
specifically, point of attack origin. The participants of this specific section about
physical security - mostly computer-assisted and computer-focused criminals lo-
cated in the Netherlands - differ from traditional criminals in reviewed literature
(most notably, drug dealers based in the US [317]) in the sense that they do not
control public spaces, but merely their direct private surroundings. Dutch cyber
criminals live in a high-risk physical area, and must minimize their visibility.
Thus, they opt for a limited physical sphere of influence. This is explained by
their cyber criminal MOs. Physical environments - especially public spaces - are
less important for the commission of cyber crime as it is to - let us say - drug
dealers. Physical space is far more important for the protection of the cyber
criminal and his/her cyber crimes. In other words, control over large territories
does not help cyber criminals in generating more financial profits. Similarly,
cyber criminals do not opt for territorial reinforcement to emphasize or even
extend their sphere of influence so potential threat agents feel unwelcome. On
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the contrary, reinforcement strategies over large territories rather work as a vul-
nerability. Thus, cyber criminals have to limit their control to mostly non-IT
focused physical objects in which vital IT focused physical objects reside, or
in other words, to the buildings in which the necessary hardware is located to
commit cyber crime. An undercover agent rang the bell of a suspect’s house
and played a script. The suspect did not buy the excuse, and talked to the dis-
trusted stranger while using the chain door lock. He closed the door, shut down
his computer and even called the police to report the incident. The argument
of limited territorial control is further supported by the limited physical control
that cyber criminals have over objects and subjects in points of attack linkage
and -occurrence. These points do frequently not coexist with point of attack
origin, and can thus not be physically governed but rather via administrative
and technical countermeasures. For point of attack linkage, bulletproof hosting
resellers and their clients rely on ISPs with physical data centers. The bullet-
proof reseller makes upfront costs by renting these servers from the ISP prior to
reselling them to their criminal clients. He/she then protects these IT focused
physical objects through administrative security mechanisms like moving activ-
ities from one server to another and technical security measures such as full disk
encryption on a dedicated server. However, the installment of physical coun-
termeasures - e.g., CCTV - to detect whether a law-abiding ISP collaborates
with LEA against him/her and/or whether his/her servers are preserved or in-
tercepted is generally not an option (nota bene, fast flux service networks suffer
a comparable restriction of no physical subject/object control, see [576, p.5]).
Similarly, when points of attack physically converge, such as ATM malware that
have to installed physically on the cash machine like Alice, ATMitch, Ploutus
and Tyupkin, territorial control is also limited. On the contrary, the physical
protection measures of ATMs - alarms, CCTV and guards - may actually harm
the criminal and his/her crimes [494].
Micro external & internal security zones How could we further define
the physical security policies related to the building form in which Dutch cy-
ber criminals reside and have their operations room in point of attack origin?
To answer the question, we first have to divide the building form in a contin-
uum. This continuum ranges from a micro external environment, the exterior
with more potential threat agents, attacks, vulnerabilities, risks and less control
by the cyber criminal, to a micro internal environment, the interior with less
potential threat agents, attacks, vulnerabilities, risks and more control by the
cyber criminal. This raises the next question: which security policies deal with
these continuum? House searches show that Dutch cyber criminals divide their
physical environment into security zones with different protection levels. On the
outer sides of the spectrum - the micro external environment - cyber criminals
opt for an environmental design that allows them to blend in into their direct
physical surroundings as much as possible. Cyber criminals who are based in
the Netherlands need to deceive their direct physical surroundings about their
true intentions. To prevent becoming an anomaly and to avoid the suspicion
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of outsiders, they have to hide the real and show the false and merge with the
area around them. The premises in which Dutch cyber criminals operate did
not differ from the surrounding buildings. No cases have been found in which
cyber criminals had installed physical countermeasures that were seeable from
the outside such as barb wire, outside CCTV and additional concrete walls
while neighboring houses did not have such visible security. These observations
support the idea that highly visible security mechanisms in the cyber crimi-
nal’s micro external environment rather work as a vulnerability as they alarm
potential threat agents.
In the inner core of the spectrum - the micro internal environment - referent
objects have their operations room and apply target hardening - read: install
more visible protective measures - which are discussed in the next paragraph.
For young criminal hackers who live with their parents or law-abiding room
mates, bed rooms provide the best place as an operations room. This is un-
derstandable as parents and room mates may detect the criminal activities and
are thus potential breachers. According to investigators, CSAM users who live
with their family may create a restricted and controlled ‘hobby room’ where
they can view the material in relative safety. If individuals within the direct
social surroundings are not deemed potential breachers, other rooms can be
used on the premise as well. A cyber criminal in his mid-twenties lived with
his digitally illiterate mother. He conducted his digital crimes from the dining
table in the living room. His shocked mother stated to the investigators after
his arrest that he frequently showed her on his laptop ‘how he earned his money
with something called “Bitcoins” ’ without any further explanation where the
cryptocurrency came from.
Physical protective objects and subjects Two physical security mech-
anisms are most apparent in the micro external and internal security zones:
access control and surveillance. Natural surveillance exploits physical features
of the micro environment to observe threat agents. Based on observations, re-
view of investigations and interviews with investigators, both computer-focused
and computer-assisted offenders (like suspects of CSAM) who did not live on
ground floor, placed their computer purposely near a window that allowed them
to overlook the street in front of their apartment for any potential threat agent.
Conversely, a CSAM user was caught by window cleaner while he was watch-
ing the abusive material. Technical surveillance was discovered during house
searches; a rogue spy shop, for example, had deployed hidden cameras. Besides
these physical protective objects, cyber criminals can also covertly monitor (po-
tential) threat agents like LEA, co-conspirers and victims. In other words,
physical surveillance conducted by physical protective subjects. Similarly, ac-
cess control can also be divided in natural, physical and technical access control.
The former and latter consist of the installment of physical objective objects,
the middle is conducted by subjects. Natural access control includes armored
doors and hiding objects. Technical access control includes digitally remote-
controlled and analogue kill switches. No instances of physical access control
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were found. This would require a situation in which - amongst others - front
desks and security guards (read: protective subjects) would limit the access of
unwanted visitors which is imaginable in the Dyre case. The group behind this
malware rented an office in the financial district of Moscow, and subsequently
pretended to be a legitimate movie company [253]. Because surveillance mostly
has preventive and detective goals, it must be followed up by other counter-
measures including access control. A reviewed investigation showed how two
high-value CSAM suspects lived next to each other in a small village. Both
had installed kill switches that could be operated from their own house. Like-
wise, computer-focused criminals had established a text message system that
informed co-conspirers to destroy evidence when ordered. All these physical
access control and surveillance mechanisms are very much of a defensive nature.
Yet defensive countermeasures alone might not be sufficient to protect assets.
In an operation against the Avalanche botnet, a cyber criminal used an assault
rifle to shoot through an armored door at a SWAT unit of the Security Service
of Ukraine (SBU). This incident is one of many examples in which physical pro-
tective subjects apply the offensive countermeasure of violence. Violent acts are
of a physical or psychological nature, and are executed for preventive, deterrent
and corrective purposes. Violence further points to physical security layers for
which there is substantial evidence that this is also a security practice for cyber
criminals. Examples are cyber criminals that sent heroin, a funeral cross and a
SWAT unit to a security researcher [603][604]. CSAM producers may threaten
a victim to prevent that he/she discloses the abuse. A cyber criminal heavily
resisted (read: fought back) during his arrest by a SWAT unit. He succeeded
in pulling a kill switch connected to his desktop, and as such avoided that LEA
could access his turned on computer system. Overt observations by handlers
discourages co-conspiring money mules to commit acts that harm the collective.
Lastly, violence can be corrective, for example, when a co-conspirer is respon-
sible for an incident. Physical or psychological punishment may rehabilitate
him/her and allow him/her to reintegrate into the group. For instance, two
clients were unhappy with the attitude of a malware developer and stated that
‘he is the type of guy that needs to be taught a lesson by beating him up’.
Similar to deception, violence can be inherent to the commission of crime and
have protective side effects. ‘How-to-abuse-children’ manuals on CSAM fora
recommend preventive controls such as abusing very young children whom are
unable to disclose about what happened and using lubricants to avoid detectable
bruises [390].
The vulnerabilities of deviant physical security standards Physical
countermeasures of cyber criminals may differ from industry standards. No
good guy guidelines or principles on physical security are found that stipulate
that individuals must place computer displays in front of a window, use violence
against intruders or hide objects. What are the vulnerabilities of deviant physical
security standards? Firstly, instances were observed in which cyber criminals did

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are able to harm assets. The absence of physical security is understandable. In
some situations, physical security is very hard, if not impossible. Besides the
described situations in which points of attack converge like physical ATM hacks,
other examples include a construction worker in the Netherlands shared a small
bungalow with multiple fellow workers. His room mates watched a movie on his
computer while he was gone, and easily discovered his CSAM collection on his
computer. Another CSAM user was noticed by a passenger while viewing the
material in the train. In other instances, observed physical protective objects
were installed, but not of a state-of-art nature. Although available in legitimate
spy shops in the Netherlands, no biometric access controls or professional power
backup systems were encountered during house searches. Most encountered
measures were part of a very limited and improvised toolbox. Not complying
to industry standards may further lead to extremely dangerous work places
for the referent object. A cyber criminal attached a self-made kill switch to a
door. When the door was opened by unauthorized individuals - read: threat
agents - the computer would turn off. However, the switch generated electric
sparks and could easily cause a fire. Similarly, not obeying direct orders of law-
enforcement officers may lead to the risk that legitimate violence is used against
the referent object of deviant security, and may constitute a new crime and/or
be an aggravating factor in sentencing.
7.5 Interim Conclusion and Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the temporal-spatial qualities of de-
viant security. Not only can DevSec practices be explained in microeconomics
terms such as information monopolies, (value) conflicts, preferential markets,
paternalism, taboo and tragic tradeoffs, and tradeoffs as availability versus con-
fidentiality and deviation versus conformity. Protection of cyber criminals is also
understood by concepts derived from linguistics and social sciences - notably an-
thropology and criminology - such as association and political deniability, code
switching and subjective culture.
On countermeasures against data volatility and retention Data volatil-
ity and retention can both work for and against cyber criminals which shows the
iatrogenic nature of DevSec: some practices and/or situations are vulnerability
and countermeasure in one. To protect themselves against losing assets, cyber
criminals have business continuity and disruption recovery plans installed. At
the same time, so many data nuggets about the cyber criminal and his/her
crimes are retained by a number of key players in intertwined networks that
there is a reversed electronic panopticon. The referent object of DevSec is in a
watched tower (as compared to a watch tower) without him/her being able to
tell which threat agent holds what information against him/her. Cyber crimi-
nals have several policies to deal with both data volatility and retention. Such
strategies include using a single entity, a single time, for a single purpose, and
secure-deletion and encryption of information capital. Despite evidence that
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especially autonomous cyber criminal groups apply business continuity and dis-
ruption recovery after takedowns of infrastructure by the cyber security commu-
nity, questions remain what patterns can be found in their plans. For example,
on what moment do referent objects have the most upfront costs. Equally, re-
searchers have shown how basic pay-per-install (PPI) providers use plain HTTP,
hard coded URLs and unencrypted downloaders, while advanced PPI providers
have encrypted C&C protocols and executables [399]. The question remains
what the adversarial evolution is for both commission and protection providers
on DevSec in general and encryption specifically. In the light of the current
going dark debate, a further study could assess what intangible assets are gen-
erally encrypted and which not, and if cyber criminals in general, and malware
crypters specifically, have certain encryption preferences, and if so, why.
On intercultural communication as a countermeasure Another signif-
icant finding to emerge from this study is how cyber criminals communicate
interculturally for both commission and protection as cyber criminals do not
necessarily share the same linguistic and cultural origins. The research first
applied the three general building blocks of intercultural communication - con-
text, communication and culture - to the cyber criminal underground. This
subsequently allows to understand the vulnerabilities of IC for cyber crimi-
nals, whether weaknesses that occur because of writings (thus data) between
persons, or through written code in software or non-verbal behavior on sys-
tems. This study then explains how intercultural communication works as a
countermeasure against threat agents to the extent that successful cyber crim-
inal platforms can be characterized as monocultures. Moreover, the specifics
of protective language, e.g., argot which is so important in the underground in
general and monocultures specifically, is researched. Language issues in general
are an important topic for future research. It is unknown if native language
identification is applicable to short messages full of slang and argot. Further-
more, there is also a need to identify the native language of individuals who
use automated translation services to communicate with e.g., Russian-language
cyber criminals. Other research directions may include applying the organiza-
tional and national cultural dimensions theory of psychologist Geert Hofstede
on cyber criminal communication platforms, and measuring the power distance,
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and
indulgence of these collectives [531]. Other questions point to the relevance of
the cultural, linguistic and social anthropology of deviant security. Why are
certain Russian-language cyber criminals using the Latin alphabet to commu-
nicate with Russian-language conspirers, and how that is perceived by other
cyber criminals?
On distribution as a countermeasure Criminal assets are distributed for
protective purposes because of macro level geopolitical situations such as an in-
creasingly multipolar world. Basically, there are three important locations that
give LEA jurisdiction: i) cyber criminals are located at point of attack origin,
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and ii) use infrastructure at point of attack linkage, iii) to attack victims whom
are located at point of attack occurrence. These points of attack can be placed
on a continuum that ranges from low-risk to high-risk areas with respectively
weak and strong cyber security communities. A major vulnerability for cyber
criminals in these points of attack are MOs with too much centralization, while
sticking to the same location(s) without interruption (i.e., location-boundedness
and time-boundedness). Therefore, they distribute their assets through four De-
vSec policies - extension, replacement, rotation and dispersion - which might be
jointly executed, on various levels of aggregation, and in an automated fashion.
To develop a full picture of distribution as a countermeasure, additional studies
will be needed that provide descriptive and, ideally, predictive statistics about
how frequently e.g., specific C&C servers are rotated, replaced, extended and/or
diffused. What is the abuse cycle of of bulletproof servers, i.e., the purchase,
configuration and usage by cyber criminals, subsequent identification and no-
tification by the cyber criminal community, and response by the BPH? What
are working day/hour and travel patterns of referent objects, which events cre-
ate outliers, and why (like interventions by the cyber security community, or
bank/national/regional public holidays, e.g., the finding that Dridex banking
trojan activities dropped significantly in the week of Orthodox Christmas [605])?
On physical deviant security The last section of this chapter moves from
the online world to the offline world of cyber criminals, and addresses their phys-
ical deviant security. The interplay between the intangible and tangible - such as
asset conversion - poses a vulnerability to the security of cyber criminals. When
solely looked at the physical surroundings of cyber criminals in the Netherlands,
this study concluded that cyber criminals who are located in a high-risk area
opt for limited territorial control. Their micro external zone, which is visible
from the outside for potential threat agents, have to blend in into their direct
physical surroundings. Conversely, target hardening is more apparent in their
micro internal security zone in which the operations room is located. Two of
these physical security mechanisms stuck out of the research data: access control
and surveillance. Besides such physical protective objects of a defensive nature,
multiple occasions have been observed in which the referent object him/herself
applied the offensive countermeasure of violence against threat agents for se-
curity purposes. Lastly, this chapter ends by briefly summing up some of the
vulnerabilities of the observed deviant physical security standards. Further work
needs to be done to establish whether there are differences in physical security
between high-risk and low-risk points of attack origin, and differences between
motives, age and computer-focused and computer-assisted criminals. Which IT
and non-IT focused objects are found in which spaces? Are there differences
in hiding passage usage between profit-driven computer-focused criminals and
sexually-driven computer-assisted criminals? The data to conduct such statis-
tical research is available. LEA generally maps on which specific location what






While this study acknowledges that the regulatory toolbox of Internet gover-
nance to confront cyber crime goes beyond law-enforcement [606][607, p.502][608][609],
the legal end of this study aims at producing outcomes that benefits legal prac-
titioners from the cyber security community who work on public policy, legis-
lation and especially investigations on profit-driven computer-focused crimes.
This occupational group nowadays includes many professionals with a technical
background such as data scientists, digital investigators and software developers.
Based on the findings of the previous chapter and empirical evidence, and tak-
ing into account the general standpoints of the human rights-driven multistake-
holder approaches against cyber crime of the International Cyber Strategy and
the National Cyber Security Strategy 2 of the government of the Netherlands,
and an underlying study of The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government
Policy [564][610][611], suggestions for investigative approaches have been devel-
oped for the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit and implemented by the
Central and Regional Criminal Investigations Divisions of the Dutch national
police. The suggested approaches as presented in this study are further refined
by reviewing i) four investigations that actively applied the suggested approach
of Section 8.2 in practice, ii) an independent process evaluation of such an inves-
tigation [415], iii) numerous investigations that did not apply the approach in
practice, and iv) the No More Ransom Project - an award-winning cross-sector
platform against ransomware.
Good guy security against the commission of crime, and bad guy security
against police investigations, are cat and mouse games with all key players con-
stantly improving, innovating and implementing lessons learned, while having
good reasons to hide their capabilities [612][102][317, pp.288-289]. The para-
dox is that both sides - law-breaking and law-abiding entities - may strive for
perfect security which is an illusion as described in Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and
5.2, and may end up with insecurities and/or decreasing security for them-
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selves and others [58][612]. Any investigative approach against DevSec should
therefore aim at reducing the double whammy effect of deviant security, while
avoiding erosion of public security because of e.g., securitization and commod-
ification. The overall vision as laid down in this chapter is that police in-
vestigations on cyber crime should evolve around different notions of security.
More specifically, investigations should be understood as security-driven means
that breach deviant security and affect the criminal’s CIA triad to provide hu-
man security. Within this normative framework, investigations on profit-driven
computer-focused crimes should transform into a public service model and work
towards multiple outcomes that go beyond attribution of offenders for prose-
cution purposes. This study further provides empirical evidence how deviant
security affects the current global investigation system, and argues that technical
harmonization between law-enforcement agencies of democratic states governed
by the rule of law might be a fix for that problem. Lastly, this chapter zooms
in what kind of investigations should target which types of cyber criminals, and
concludes that proactive public-public investigations should focus on ‘protection
providers’, while reactive public-private investigations should aim at ‘commis-
sion providers’ and autarkic cyber criminal organizations. In other words, this
chapter elaborates on cyber security for whom, from what and by what means
[72]. The suggested approaches further take notice of the underlying problems
that cause the current effectiveness crisis in investigations.
8.1 Security-Driven Investigations That Provide
Human Security
No doubt, most, if not all, law-enforcement agencies will proclaim that their
investigations contribute to the security of law-abiding referent objects by pre-
venting, deterring, detecting and correcting those who commit crime. However,
are these law-abiding referent objects defined by the border-centric view on cy-
ber security and cyber crimes, or by the borderless view on cyber security and
cyber crimes as described in Section 2.3? More specifically, should investiga-
tions on cyber crime solely contribute to national security, or to a broader, richer
concept of security? While this section predominantly discusses normative as-
pects of investigations that go beyond national interests, the next Sections 8.2
and 8.3 provide arguments for the many practical reasons why investigations
should not be solely based on national interests. Albeit far from perfect, crim-
inal justice systems of liberal democracies, including police investigations, are
best equipped to ensure the equitable distribution of security as a basic public
good and positive presence for all individual Internet users, i.e., human security,
not merely for citizens within specific national borders. Yet the goal of this rich
security concept is threatened by both the cyber criminal and the cyber security
communities. To protect investigations against attacks from both communities,
government actions against cyber crime have to become security-driven. Thus,
investigations are security-driven tools that breach deviant security to provide
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human security. These notions outline the normative framework - the core prin-
ciples and prerequisites - in which the other investigative concepts of the next
sections have to be viewed and tested against.
Investigations to provide human security & Internet as a global pub-
lic good On the one hand, investigations in the Netherlands and elsewhere
are hardwired to national interest. They are enshrined in national law, and can
generally only be launched when crimes are committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, or in other words, when national interests are violated.
On the other hand, Dutch governmental policy documents postulate that cy-
ber security - read: investigations - should protect universal interests such as
fundamental rights, freedoms and values. Given the transnational nature of
cyberspace in general and glocalized nature of deviant security specifically, safe-
guarding these interests has nowadays indeed an international dimension [564,
pp.2-3]. Bringing together national, international and universal aspects of in-
vestigations on cyber crime is a challenge, yet possible when legal practitioners
aim at providing i) human security and ii) regard the Internet as a global public
good - two academic concepts that both fit within the borderless view on cyber
security and cyber crimes.
Human security puts the individual - read: citizens - at the receiving end of
all security concerns [613][318][37], and has a ‘clear resonance with the historical,
continental European understanding of policing as integral to ideas of good gov-
ernance, the condition of order in the community, and the prerequisites to good
order’ [31], and ‘the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilat-
eralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and
the appropriate use of force’ [614]. In other words, what is ‘best’ for the state is,
by definition, best for individual citizens [72, p.50], including for those who may
have trespassed substantive law. As Section 5.3 explains, public security is a
non-excludable and non-rivalrous good that in many instances also must protect
suspects of crime. As human security is deliberately loosely defined and may
even encompass threats to the environment or human dignity, this study follows
a more narrow concept of human security that focuses upon violent threats to
individuals and threats to their property [613][615][31]. More specifically, Dunn
Cavelty’s concept of human-centric information ethics is helpful for applying
human security in cyberspace. These ethics evolve around a common ground
for all stakeholders - namely, vulnerabilities - and include human beings as well
as non-human and non-individual entities [97, pp.710-712].
Translating human-centric information ethics to the world in which legal
practitioners operate means that the fruits of investigations on profit-driven
computer-focused crimes should be an inclusive public good which all citizens
should be able to enjoy [98], and not as a private commodity that only a happy
few can afford [31]. Law-enforcement agencies of liberal democracies should
take the findings of Section 7.3 into account that a single offender can distribute
his/her victims all over the world. Many of these victims cannot rely on basic
state protection while, controversially, some offenders can. In other words, re-
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lated police investigations should consider its global impact on the physical and
psychological integrity of all human beings, and those artificial and distributed
entities that affect these citizens such as the integrity of the financial system.
The implication of this proposition is that legal practitioners should regard and
respect the Internet’s core as a non-excludable and non-rivalrous global public
good that provides benefits to everyone in the world [611]. Cyber security re-
stricted to physical national borders is in today’s technically, economically and
socially networked societies of the Information Age not only impossible, but will
especially harm citizens in low-risk points of attack occurrence as explained in
Table 7.2. As sociologist Broeders states: ‘an open Internet is so beneficial to
countries with an open economy and international outlook that it should be
considered an “extended national interest” ’. Therefore, this study argues that
investigations must indeed find ‘areas where national interests align with strate-
gic global issues that can be defined as global public goods’ as well [611, p.42].
Strong encryption technologies are such a global public good. While some gov-
ernments - like the Netherlands [616] - reject the idea of backdoors, this study
also shows that Dutch law-enforcement agencies have successfully bypassed the
deviant usage of encryption during investigations on DevSec providers, largely
by exploiting other vulnerabilities in MOs. Based on the findings of the previous
chapters, we now understand why these weaknesses occur on a meso and micro
level. A few niche facilitators become too central (read: successful) in the under-
ground and miss the intangible (e.g., knowledge) assets to correctly implement
dual-use encryption products. This is understandable: the added value of most
DevSec providers lies in additional technical computer security controls of an
administrative nature such as deception and distribution as countermeasures.
Although human security acknowledges that many actors - including the in-
dividual - may provide security, it regards the state as the entity that is most
capable to guarantee security to citizens [318]. In other words, human security
is state-led protection with programs, like investigations, aimed at empowering
all people to secure their own interests [31]. Yet investigations that protect the
Internet as a global public good are also means of Internet governance for which
the Dutch government favors a multistakeholder model [611, pp.16, 33]. Taking
this position into account, this study continues by explaining in the next para-
graphs and sections how such a multistakeholder approach can also be applied in
investigations on computer-focused crimes to protect Internet as a global public
good. Such investigations should further ensure the state’s public mandate to
restore human security by means of investigations and help those who are in
need of help and/or prosecuting suspects.
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The provision of human security and Internet as a global public good in practice
Ransomware affects both the systems of vital infrastructures as well as of citizens around
the world. The No More Ransom Project is a great example that the provision of human
security and Internet as a global public good in cyberspace is very much possible. This
initiative of the Dutch NHTCU, Europol and two AV vendors offers over 50 free decryp-
tion tools against more than 100 types of ransomware to victims all around the world, and
explains to the general public in over 25 languages how to prevent becoming a victim. The
website further explains the importance of filing victim complaints and forwards victims to
their applicable national police force. Similarly, the No More DDoS Project of the Dutch
NHTCU detects and takes down DDoS booters, regardless which country, victims and/or
networks are affected most. When young Dutch clients of these services are identified, the
Hack_Right initiative - a consortium of Dutch law-enforcement and child protection agen-
cies and several universities - will execute alternative sentences for these vulnerable suspects
with more emphasis on deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution and restorative justice [617].
Security-driven investigations against multiple threats When discussing
the concept of human security, scholars stress the importance of democracy, rule
of law and respect for human rights [614][618]. This means that ‘if the pursuit
of security [by the cyber security community] comes at the expense of human
rights, then not only is the quality of that security compromised, but the very
principles of democracy are threatened’ [31]. As Sections 5.3 and 6.2 show, au-
thoritarian regimes provide state security to their home-grown cyber criminals,
while corruption within the security apparatus of e.g., weak democratic states
makes state protection a private commodity for those who trespass substan-
tive law. Ultimately, liberal democracies governed by the rule of law are best
equipped to deal with both threat agents - i.e., cyber criminal and cyber security
communities - and promote, provide and restore the public good of human secu-
rity [98]. While the Dutch government uses similar language in its International
Cyber Strategy and emphasizes that security and freedom are complementary
rather than conflicting interests in cyberspace [564], it is so far unclear how
to provide human security in practice by means of investigations. Based on
the findings of the previous chapters, a first step forward is by making cyber
crime investigations security-driven. This means that states need to install a
variety of administrative, physical and technical security measures that are able
to simultaneously protect investigations on cyber crime from i) conduct of the
cyber security community that harms citizens, ii) offensive countermeasures of
cyber criminals for deviant security purposes and iii) other states for reasons of
national security.
Investigations protected from conduct of the cyber security commu-
nity that harms citizens Let us begin with the first and main concern of
the borderless perspective on cyber security and cyber crime, and for which
this study provides proof: citizens are indeed threatened in their security by -
amongst others - geopolitical and financial incentives of the larger public and
private cyber security community. Additionally, law, policy and investigations
hold the ability, according to criminologist David Wall, to unleash ‘an uncon-
trollable drift [...] to a control society where post-event [...] policing models
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will be replaced by a ‘pre-crime’ mentality based upon simulations of crime and
behavioral predication’ [262, p.202]. Indeed, law-enforcement agencies that are
subjected to democratic scrutiny and constitutional control have administrative
accountability mechanisms installed to protect citizens. These mechanisms hold
both individual police officers, as well as complete organizations, responsible
for effectively delivering basic services of crime control and maintaining order,
while treating individuals fairly and within the bounds of law. Yet the findings
of this study raise the question if these traditional mechanisms are sufficient
for today’s challenges, and provide additional arguments why, as legal scholar
Bert-Jaap Koops states, we have ‘to rethink the legal protection of citizens in
the form of new checks and balances in the criminal legal system’ [619, pp.358-
359]. As explained in Section 6.4 and throughout Chapter 7, today’s challenges
include the impact of the distributed, glocalized and intertwined nature of de-
viant security on transnational investigative collaborations. Investigations are
propelled by decisions in other countries [620, p.42], while many investigative
efforts will not be scrutinized by the judiciary of the countries involved when
suspects are not identified and brought to court. These and other problems
associated with cyber crime investigations undermine fundamental legal princi-
ples such as mutual recognition of judicial decisions and police accountability in
criminal matters (see [621]). Many of the vulnerabilities of cyber criminal MOs
can be exploited by the collection, analysis and usage of large data sets by means
of ‘intelligent forensics’ [622][504, pp.26-27][623, pp.224-225], like artificial in-
telligence techniques, natural language processing or social network analyses.
Yet legal principles that are associated with the collection of evidence, such as
data minimization, seem disconnected with the realities of today’s cyber crimi-
nal underground. These disconnections are best explained by - amongst others
[624, p.256] - the economics of deviant security. Data minimization for LEA
is near to impossible when cyber criminals themselves apply data maximiza-
tion (a deception tactic, see Section 6.5), and outsource their security to cen-
tralized providers with automated business processes and large historical client
databases who keep law-abiding outsiders at a distance (see Sections 6.1 and
7.3). A shift to regulating analysis and usage of such large data sets for investiga-
tive purposes - called algorithmic accountability [625] - is absent [626, pp.19-20],
although Dutch courts have reviewed the outputs of such intelligent forensics
and concluded that these techniques are allowed for investigations [627]. While
the latter applies to accountability of quantitative methods of working in in-
vestigations, many existing traditional accountability mechanisms supervise the
qualitative investigative methods in which the police investigator him/herself is
the main instrument to collect, analyze and use evidence. Fortunately, these ac-
countability mechanisms like complaints procedures, evaluation, monitoring and
transparency also reveal the human vulnerabilities in police organizations that
cyber criminal organizations try to exploit such as bribing and/or threatening
LEA officers.
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Investigations protected from offensive countermeasures of criminals
and states This brings us to the second issue of securing investigations against
attacks from cyber criminals that is discussed in, for example, Sections 5.1 and
7.4. The confidentiality, availability and integrity of evidence - i.e., evidence
security [628] - must be ensured at every investigative phase [629]. Security-
driven in this regard does not only mean investments in administrative security
measures to avoid human vulnerabilities, but also ensuring appropriate tech-
nical and physical measures against other offensive attacks by cyber criminals
for DevSec purposes. Besides preventing computer-focused crimes against law-
enforcement agencies - such as the hack of Anonymous on a conference call
between law-enforcement officers [630], or DDoS attacks on a police website
with evidence about a case after a request for public assistance - there is also
a need to install physical security procedures for police officers. As this study
shows, cyber criminals take physical countermeasures of a defensive and offen-
sive nature to protect their criminal assets, while turned on IT-focused objects
- hardware like a laptop - might be more important to an investigation than
physical subjects like an arrested suspect. Based on the findings of Section 6.4,
law-enforcement agencies should further increase the information asymmetry
that cyber criminals face about who these legal practitioners are and how they
execute their investigative powers, including their security-driven investigative
approach and capabilities.
Lastly, LEA should be aware that their investigations might become targets
of intelligence agencies and/or national politics. As shown in Section 7.3, cyber
crime has become a ball in a game of power geopolitics in an increasingly multi-
polar world, and as such, states can be intentional deviant security providers to
cyber criminals. This means that legal practitioners should receive appropriate
training and procedures to understand and effectively deal with this particular
threat. Besides making investigations security-driven, other means to provide
human security through police investigations are discussed in the next sections.
8.2 Investigations as a Public Service With Mul-
tiple Outcomes
While many academic and policy papers discuss the need for public-private
partnerships on Internet governance in general or against cyber crime in partic-
ular [631][149][35][632][85][564][610], few zoom in how operational public-private
investigations on profit-driven computer-focused crimes (ought to) work in prac-
tice outside the US [72][633]. This section argues that these investigations should
be modeled as a public service model within public-private alliances, and aim
at i) damage mitigation for potential victims, ii) assistance of actual victims,
iii) disruption of the cyber criminal process and iv) attribution for prosecution
and alternative sanctions. Each of these goals will also limit confidentiality,
integrity and availability and related attributes of deviant security, and as such
harm assets of cyber criminals.
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Investigations as a public service within alliances Joining forces with
key players in the public and private sector will help law-enforcement agencies
to have added value in the larger cyber security value chain. Investigations
should become a public service within operational public-private partnerships
(also known as multi-agency cross sector partnerships [34]). The idea of investi-
gations as a public service is a practical implementation of the concept of nodal
governance: the acceptance that the monopoly of the state as the sole provider
of security is not a durable condition and that policing has become plural in the
sense that various actors play a role in policing cyberspace [634][635]. During
this study, many starts of and breakthroughs in investigations were the result
of private and public partners. It is therefore vital that police intelligence and
evidence can be shared with, and external specialists can be brought in from, a
range of public and private third parties for academic, compliance, intelligence
and investigative purposes (as arranged in e.g., articles 16 to 24 of the Dutch
Police Data Act).
Why work with law-enforcement agencies (or private partners)?
While most key players in the cyber security community are only allowed to take defensive
countermeasures, LEA as mandated breachers have a monopoly on launching offensive
countermeasure against cyber criminals, i.e., exploit vulnerabilities in cyber criminal MOs
to collect unique data. These investigative methods and techniques breach intangible and
tangible protective assets of cyber criminals to collect criminal tangible and intangible
assets, and includes seizure of IT and non-IT related physical objects, interrogation and
interviewing of physical subjects, lawful intercept of information capital in motion and
preservation of information capital at rest, and the collection of metadata like subscriber
and payment details, netflow and the like. Other key players need the outputs of these
investigative means - e.g., malware samples, IoCs, TTPs, and the like - to increase their
security against cyber criminal attacks. This study identifies at least four incentives why it
is beneficial for public and private parties to closely collaborate in alliances, and how the
double whammy effect of DevSec is reduced as a result. The first benefit is cost reduction as
scare public resources are more efficiently deployed, less work has to be conducted by each
party and any additional expenses are shared. Victims save costs as well as data collected
by offensive countermeasures may greatly shorten the research time of private security
researchers. Secondly, public-private partnerships will lead to product improvement as the
use of additional data, tools and competencies will increase the quality of investigations.
Thirdly, PPP may lead to a reputation boost for LEA among the general public, (victim)
witnesses and other key players as more effective results are achieved. Hopefully, these
positive messages sustain and restore trust in government actions, have a general preventive
effect and help victims of cyber crime to come forward and file a complaint. A last incentive
is customer acquisition. In multiple instances, other private agencies shared evidence about
advanced computer-focused crimes with, and offered their services to, the NHTCU after
media outlets reported about successful public-private partnerships.
Section 7.1 explains why the reversed electronic panopticon forms a major
vulnerability to cyber criminals. Based on this finding, far-reaching investigative
collaborations with non-profit organizations, public agencies and the private (se-
curity) industry are vital to exploit this weakness and put together the pieces
about who did what. Key players hold unique intelligence, evidence and in-
sights that will help LEA to overcome the information asymmetry of Section
6.4 about cyber criminals and their crimes. Such partnerships allow national
law-enforcement agencies to specialize and thus only do what they do best in-
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stead conducting all the investigative work from A to Z themselves. In practice,
it is hard for LEA to beat AV vendors in malware analyses; CERTs are better in
notifying victims and distributing threat analyses to potential victims; and pri-
vate digital forensic services are preferred by victims to research their infected
systems over public agencies. In several of the reviewed operational public-
private collaborations, each partner collected, shared and analyzed operational
data, and provided specialized services to the investigation. So these horizontal
partnerships can more specifically be characterized as public-private alliances,
ranging from one-off, unilateral acts to structural collaborations that are for-
mally enacted by legal contracts and legal persons (such as the Dutch ECTF and
US NCFTA) [415, pp.9-10, 19]. Although law-enforcement agencies outsource
parts of their investigation to third partners, public-private investigations are
conducted within the appropriate public legal frameworks and under the super-
vision of the relevant public authorities, including the judiciary. Moreover, that
public and private organizations become increasingly equal partners does not
mean they serve equal legal and ethical interests as shown in Figure 8.1 (see
also [72, pp.54-55]). Public interest must prevail over private interests, hence
the term investigations-as-a-public-service. In the reviewed investigations, the
NHTCU aimed at finding horizontal, non-hierarchical arrangements and ‘win-
win situations’ by consensual decision-making (see text box above), but always
had the leading role in alliances [636]. Besides the legal monopoly on offensive,
technically advanced and evasive means of data gathering of law-enforcement
agencies, officers were also organizationally and technically in the lead during
the observed public-private investigations. Private parties generally accepted
their subordinate role in these operations. They have to: obstruction of police
investigations is a crime under Dutch Penal Code for both legal and natural
persons.
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Figure 8.1: In investigations on profit-driven attacks against financial institutions, both
public and private interests contribute to the integrity of the financial system. In situation BC,
the private security industry (read: contracted security) closely collaborates with (read: in-
house security of) private financial institutions by helping to increase their protection against
threats and/or clean infected systems. Especially when the nature and extent of threats and
attacks on financial systems are persistent and severe, the integrity of the financial system
is also very much a public affair. The private security industry and private financial sector,
together with mandated breachers and other public agencies, than very much serve a public
interest that prevails over any private interests (situation ABC).
A multistakeholder approach with multiple outcomes The next step
is that law-enforcement agencies combine, manage and supervise the combined
data set, i.e., the information collected by the offensive countermeasures of inves-
tigations and the data collected through defensive countermeasures from other
key players. The big question is which products law-enforcement agencies can
extract from these enriched data sets. Traditionally, investigations are deployed
for attribution only - namely: who did what for prosecution purposes - and has
few possible outcomes that go beyond punitive sentencing. Because points of at-
tack origin, linkage and occurrence may not be located in the same jurisdiction,
and perpetrators frequently operate from safe havens, bringing suspects to jus-
tice can take several years and is in many instances even impossible. Therefore,
LEA should explore additional outcomes and related outputs that go beyond
attribution. Indeed, attribution for prosecution purposes is inextricably linked
to repression of crime. Opposite to repression is prevention of crime. However,
prevention and repression of crime do not form a dichotomy in this study’s in-
vestigative approach, but are rather two ends of the same continuum. As Figure
8.2 depicts, four outcomes and related outputs can be derived from these in-
vestigative data sets that go from prevention to repression of cyber crime. The
198
central idea behind this approach is that law-enforcement agencies should af-
fect intangible and tangible commission and protection assets of cyber criminals
by deploying their monopoly on offensive investigative powers, exploiting their
unique information position and serving a wide audience of stakeholders, most
notably citizens.
Figure 8.2: There are two victim-based and two offender-based outcomes in the approach
that can be achieved by collaborating with and serving as many Internet governance stake-
holders as possible.
1. The first and most preventive outcome is damage mitigation. Police inves-
tigations may generate data about crimes that are still in the preparation
and pre-activity phase. Moreover, data may also be available about ongo-
ing crimes in the activity or post-activity phase that are about to target
other industries or jurisdictions in the imminent future. In both situations,
there is a need for key players in the cyber security community to be aware
about these threats. Mitigation is focused on helping these stakeholders to
increase their security against cyber criminal threats before they turn into
successful attacks. As such, harm to systems will be limited or even pre-
vented. In other words, damage mitigation aims at generating actionable
cyber threat intelligence for a range of public and private actors, and as a
consequence, reduce the effectiveness and conversion rate of future attacks
on potential victims. Related outputs and audiences include warnings in
media outlets for the general public, threat analyses for private industries,
and actionable insights for potentially vulnerable individuals, groups and
organizations about upcoming attacks. Damage mitigation limits the con-
fidentiality, and related attributes of undetectability and unobservability,
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of criminal assets like MOs.
2. Next follows a key task of many law-enforcement agencies, and prescribed
in article 3 of the Dutch Police Act 2012: give help to those who are
in need of help, i.e., victim assistance. During investigations, LEA may
discover victims in e.g., the system of a C&C server. Incoming bots and
stolen company and personal data on such servers are not only assets to
criminals, but also to their lawful owners. This particular outcome does
not focus on potential victims and threats, but actual victims and past
and ongoing attacks. In such a situation, victims are detected, identified
and subsequently notified about their victimization and MOs. Help is be-
ing offered to stop the attacks and/or further damage to systems, software
and personal and company data, including blocking of credit cards. Vic-
tim assistance limits the availability of criminals assets such as infected
machines.
These victim-based approaches - damage mitigation and victim assistance -
affect many cyber criminal assets related to crimes (as compared to the crim-
inal). The role of the police in this approach is supporting multistakeholders
like CERTs and other key players of vital infrastructures in their responsibili-
ties to ensure that networks and users are safe and secure, thus promote human
security and the Internet’s core as a global public good.
3. This study further argues that investigative powers are always disruptive
to MOs, even when not put in action as even the mere threat of investi-
gations affect the cyber criminal business process. So, after the previous
two victim-based approaches comes the first offender-based approach of
disruption of modus operandi as defined by this study. In other words,
hindering the processes of committing crime and protecting crime and the
criminal. Outputs and interventions should go beyond existing interven-
tions that aim at skimming profits of the commission of crime such as
seizing financial assets like hard cash or cryptocurrencies. Disruption may
not only consist of increasing the commission costs [382], but also the to-
tal costs related to protection such as taking down vital criminal servers
or adding false positives into the cyber criminal process. In such cases,
cyber criminals will either over spend on security or under protect assets.
Other disruptive interventions may focus on bringing either collective un-
derground economies or individual MOs to a suboptimal level by respec-
tively promoting market failures via increase of information asymmetries
[637], or disturbing the balance between commission and protection via
e.g., targeted messages to individual suspects to act in a particular way
or omit certain behavior (as compared to elevated media attention after
takedowns of cryptomarkets that seems to increase drugs trade [638]).
Disruptive interventions like seizure of stolen money limits the availability
of criminals assets, while false positives affect the integrity of assets and
direct messages to cyber criminals affect the assets’ confidentiality.
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4. The last and most repressive goal of investigations is attribution for pros-
ecution purposes and alternative sanctions. An important remark is that
prevention of potential offenders as a primary goal of investigations has no
place on the continuum. Investigations differ from supervision of compli-
ance, and exclusively deal with suspects and violations of substantive law
as compared to behavior of high-risk but still law-abiding groups. Indeed,
repressive punishments may hold general and specific deterrent effects.
They send respectively an important message to the general public, and
help to avoid reoffending by the suspect and further damage inflicted to
victims. Nevertheless, many alternative sentences - e.g., community ser-
vices, financial transactions, fines, official warnings and probation - for
low-threat offenders such as young offenders hold punitive effects, and are
therefore primarily forms of repressive punishments. Yet these sanctions
are less far-reaching than incapacitation, with more emphasis on other
goals of punishments such as the previously mentioned deterrence, and re-
habilitation, restitution and restorative justice. Public verdicts limit the
confidentiality of criminal assets, incarceration limits the availability of
the criminal, while the overall truth-seeking process sheds light on who
did what, thus limits deception and increases the integrity - i.e., account-
ability, authenticity and non-repudiation - of who did what.
These last two offender-based approaches damage assets related to the criminal
and his/her crimes. The latter harm is of course to the physical subject of the
criminal in case of an arrest, while disruption damages tangible non-IT objects
include seized cash money and intangible assets include lowering of the status
and/or reputation of a member in the cyber criminal community.
The snowball effect of a multistakeholder approach with multiple outcomes
In practice, these multiple outcomes do not only stand on their own, but are also com-
municating vessels and can be executed in a linear fashion. During an investigation of a
cyber criminal advanced persistent threat (APT), private security researchers started by
writing a threat analysis for financial institutes about the observed attack based on pre-
served C&Cs. The report contained many IoCs and was distributed by the Dutch CERT
to other national CERTs that subsequently sent the report to the associated members of
their national financial Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (FI-ISACs). This allowed
banks to take necessary countermeasures against the threat. Based on the enclosed IoCs
and TTP, some financial institutes discovered that they were not potential but actual vic-
tims, and requested the assistance of the private security company that wrote the report.
Other actual victims were discovered through analysis of the incoming bots of the C&C
servers, and were notified by their national CERT. Identifying the victims and helping to
remove the infections before financial harm was done does not only assist victims but is
also disruptive: the cyber criminal made upfront investment costs to infect and monitor
the machines, but did not yield any profits yet. A suspect was in sight during the exe-
cution of these interventions, yet this did not harm the attribution process. There might
be a pattern in this: many cyber criminals do not necessarily stop their criminal activities
after LEA interventions. During an operation against ransomware, the Dutch police and a
private security company offered the decryption keys to victims for free. Yet the suspects
continued their activities even after they keys were published. They were forced to alter
their MO to a suboptimal level in which new mistakes, failures and vulnerabilities occurred
that provided further evidence against them.
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8.3 Technical Harmonization for a Global Inves-
tigation System
While the previous section focuses on public-private investigations, the current
section describes global public-public investigations. Firstly, the current global
investigation system is explained, and how deviant security practices thwart this
informal and unwritten system that is based on information economics. As Fig-
ure 8.3 depicts, four stages of international collaboration are subsequently iden-
tified, resulting in the conclusion that investigations have to go beyond national
interest and move towards technical harmonization between law-enforcement
agencies of democratic states governed by the rule of law.
‘Hellooo, I am a botnet operator! Does anybody hear me?!’
During this study, the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit identified a botnet operator
who did not take many precautions to hide his true identity and malicious activities. Still,
this criminal remained active for years, while a private non-profit researcher continuously
provided public updates about the botnet C&Cs. Apparently, national police organizations
had more incentives not to start an investigation on the botnet, than incentives to start
an investigation against the botnet. Based on the intelligence about the botnet and the
findings of this study, a questionnaire - including a case study - was developed for the EU
Policy Cycle EMPACT on cyber crime 2013 (European Multidisciplinary Platform Against
Criminal Threats). The questionnaire focused on what the incentives are that trigger team
leaders and case agents of national cyber crime units to initiate an investigation on a
botnet. The subsequent case study presented nineteen characteristics related to the botnet
operator (e.g., true identity known but located in a country affected by the Arab Spring),
technical infrastructure (e.g., multiple C&Cs that rotate every few months, hosted in over
40 countries) and victims (e.g., number and total damage unknown). 25 team leaders and
case agents from Asia, Europe and the United States, filled in the questionnaire. The
results of the questionnaire were afterwards presented to and discussed by the heads of the
EU national cyber crime units in 2014 and summarized in Table 8.1.
The current global investigation system If cyber criminals, infrastructure
and victims are distributed as a countermeasure, then surely law-enforcement
agencies must respond in an effective, global manner. However, no official
transnational response system exists today that prescribes which country has
to take that very important first step to start an investigation of transnational
cyber crimes. This is left to individual countries to decide for themselves. The
initiative to investigate a transnational cyber crime is predominantly a national
affair as police organizations are organized within sovereign states and must
serve national interests. For this reason, it is unlikely that country X will start
the investigation and/or takedown of a botnet of which the majority of infras-
tructure, victims and perpetrators are based in country Y. However, it could be
argued that there exists an unwritten and informal response system that deals
with transnational cyber crimes and is based on information economics. Na-
tional police organizations have specific incentives - i.e., violations of national
interests - that trigger them to start an investigation of transnational cyber
crimes. Countries that initiate such investigations are, for example, dispropor-
tionally affected by the crime in terms of victims or misused infrastructure.
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As the investigation progresses, this initiating country cooperates with other af-
fected countries on the basis of mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) or joint
investigation teams (JITs) in time. In the Bredolab botnet case, the operator
did not apply distribution as a deviant countermeasure. Because virtually all
C&Cs were continuously hosted in the Netherlands, centralization and location-
boundedness and time-boundedness worked as a vulnerability. As a result, the
botnet became too noticeable to the outside world. Subsequently, the Dutch
NHTCU started an investigation with a private partner on this botnet and
subsequently exploited its vulnerabilities. As the investigation progressed, the
NHTCU collaborated with the Armenian police who arrested the operator of
the botnet. In other words, one country felt responsible to start an investiga-
tion, because their national interest was evidently violated for a considerable
time. Other countries responded as well, but only after the initiator of the in-
vestigation - i.e., the Dutch NHTCU - officially requested to cooperate. Still,
the majority of affected countries – notably, victims of the Bredolab botnet were
located all over the world – were free riders. They benefitted of the initiative of
the Dutch NHCTU and cooperation of the Armenian police, without making any
contribution or paying the costs of this benefit. The current global investigation
system, however, has no problem with these free riders: it is expected that when
these countries are heavily affected by another botnet (in other words, have an
incentive), they will take the initiative to start an investigation themselves. In
such a situation, other (previously initiating) countries will benefit and become
free riders themselves.
‘See you in court’
While the emphasis in this section is on DevSec practices that thwart the start of an inves-
tigation, countermeasures of cyber criminals resonate till the very end of the postactivity
phase of an MO, namely during court proceedings. Besides the predicted shift from pri-
mary evidence to corroborating evidence [20, p.393], prosecutors face other challenges as
well. According to legal practitioner participants during this study, evidence is collected
and presented as such that suspects are forced to make ‘concrete, more or less testable, not
a priori unlikely statements’. Yet DevSec is focused on avoiding verification by hiding the
real and showing the false, and minimizing linkability by e.g., distributing entities. As a
consequence, legal defenses consist of - amongst other things - respectively drawing alter-
native scenarios and pointing towards loose ends in investigations that might provide ex
culpa evidence. These tactics place a heavy burden on police investigators who have to go
back and find answers, in some occasions even years after they sent the dossier to court.
Deviant security affects the current global investigation system How-
ever, the informal response system not only fails when cyber criminals, mis-
used infrastructure and/or small or low-impact multiple victimizations are dis-
tributed among many jurisdictions, a legal problem known as de minimis non
curat lex [34][80, p.91]. Other deviant security practices, such as deception,
secure-deletion and encryption, have taken a flight as well, making it difficult to
determine the identity of perpetrators and victims in the preparatory investiga-
tive phase. Especially the latter two are important incentives for deciding to
precede to an official investigation which allows the deployment of more evasive
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investigative powers. To conclude, today’s deviant security practices effectively
take away the incentives of countries to start an investigation. Still, every coun-
try – unconsciously – expects that other countries will take the initiative.
All respondents (N=25) indicated that they would not start an investigation
against the botnet of the case study. The botnet administrator made sure that
no country felt the responsibility to start an investigation, because his deviant
security practices gave them no incentive to do so. The incentive problem af-
fects both individual countries and the collaboration between countries. Thus,
initiatives focused on tackling the incentive problem should function on both a
national and international level.
The four most important incentives of
25 managers and case agents of cyber
units to start an investigation on
botnets
Related DevSec practices that affect the
incentives to start an investigation on
botnets
! ‘Indications that the perpetrator or his
henchmen are residing in your country.’
# Botnet herders operate from low-risk
points of attack origin and apply a range of
countermeasures to protect their identity, such
as deception tactics for security purposes.
! ‘The expectation that you will work with
trusted private companies or foreign public
agencies that are willing to cooperate.’
# The cyber security community is
intertwined with the cyber criminal
community; public and private agencies can
be DevSec providers; and the increasingly
multipolar world works as a countermeasure
for cyber criminals.
! ‘Indications of considerable amount of
damage or high value targets in your country.’
# Victims are distributed among many points
of attack occurrence, have relatively little
damage, and barely file complaints and as
such are not visible for LEA.
! ‘Indications that a considerable amount of
C&C servers are hosted in your country or for
a considerable amount of time.’
# C&C servers are continuously extended,
dispersed, replaced and rotated among
multiple points of attack linkage.
Table 8.1: Prior to the questionnaire, 24 incentives related to victims, infrastructure, cyber
criminals and the cyber security community itself were identified based on interviews and
observations. These incentives were included in the questionnaire and presented to managers
and case agents of various cyber units in Asia, Europe and the United States. They could
rate these incentives on a scale of five options ranging from Not at all important, to Very
important, including the option No opinion. The above left four incentives were mentioned
by the respondents as the most important incentives to start an investigation on botnets.
Four stages of international collaboration International collaboration
is an important means to deal with deviant security practices that affect to-
day’s global investigation system. This study argues that international inves-
tigative collaboration against cyber crime progresses through four stages (see
Figure 8.3). On the most basic level, governments first have to acknowledge
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each others strategic importance for their national interests in cyberspace on an
administrative and/or political level. The output of such contacts are three-
fold, and might be set in formal documents like memoranda of understanding
(MoU). Firstly, agreements are made on a policy level, such as organizing peri-
odic meetings, sharing best practices on investigations or simply being present
on international conferences hosted by the other party. Secondly, acknowledge-
ment of strategic importance includes agreements made on an operational level.
Thus, even countries that cannot legally or politically conduct joint investi-
gations or share investigative information with other nations are still able to
make agreements about fighting domestic points of attack that are a problem
to the other party. Lastly, nations can make agreements to work towards the
next step in international collaboration: legal harmonization/unification. Be-
fore parties can share investigative data and/or conduct joint investigations,
relevant substantive and procedural laws and data protection acts have to be
harmonized. Legal harmonization of cyber crime laws occurs on both a bilateral
and multilateral level of which the Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Convention
is the most far-reaching international treaty on cyber crime [82, p.215]. Legal
harmonization and unification paves the way to closely collaborate on investi-
gations through MLATs, JITs and dedicated cyber crime police liaison officers.
As such, the next phase is operational alignment between partners as there is a
need to coordinate and even converge investigations against transnational cyber
crimes. The coordination between the US FBI, a German Landeskriminalamt
(LKA), Dutch NHTCU and Europol of the takeover and takedown of the two
largest cryptomarkets is a great example. While Alphabay was shut down by
the FBI, the Dutch NHTCU had Hansa already under control. The latter mar-
ket was subsequently flooded with so-called ‘Alphabay refugees’ that had to
find a new secure marketplace. The current last step in international collabo-
ration is organizational integration in which various agencies come together at
a single physical location (and increasingly online environments as well) to in-
vestigate crime, share and analyze evidence and/or execute a joint operation as
happened during operation BlackShades [414]. Examples of such international
law-enforcement platforms are INTERPOL’s IGCI (that houses INTERPOL’s
Global Cybercrime Programme), Eurojust, Europol’s EC3 and JCAT initiative,
and public-private working groups, partnerships and even mailing lists like na-
tional ISACs, the US NCFTA, the Dutch ECTF and various ad-hoc consortia
against specific malwares.
As shown in the previous paragraph, deviant security controls easily play
out any assessment based on national interests whether to start an investiga-
tion or not, while Section 7.3 describes the digital divide between different but
interconnected cyber security blocs. These international initiatives do a great
job in overcoming the incentive problem by bringing together parties with dif-
ferent security goals, and the digital divide by means of capacity building [364,
pp.7-8]. They also prove invaluable in solving the subsequent organizational
and legal issues that public and private agencies face when jointly fighting cyber
crime, and thus integrating all the previous steps in transnational collaboration.
Despite inherent challenges of sharing intelligence and evidence between non-
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trusted parties [639], governments and law-enforcement agencies should further
make an effort to overcome geopolitical barriers and search for common interests
with other governments and public and private agencies to turn low-risk areas
for cyber criminals into high-risk areas. In several investigations on advanced
computer-focused attacks, the Dutch NHTCU has collaborated with Russian
authorities, CERTs and the private security industry to assist affected financial
institutions worldwide and prevent further damage to the integrity of the finan-
cial system [640]. The No More Ransom Project united over 70 competitors in
the private security sector, and public agencies from over 40 countries including
Iran, Israel, Russia and Ukraine. In these collaborations, human security indeed
prevails over national security.
Towards a fifth stage: technical harmonization Besides the incentive
problem, an additional challenge in international collaboration is the technical
processing of large cyber criminal data sets - think of the vast amount of data
related to a takeover of a cryptomarket like Hansa - that are shared between
networks of law-enforcement agencies. In other words, the investigative input of
these networks - i.e., informational capitalism, read: the evidence about cyber
criminals and cyber crimes - and their desired output (e.g., prosecution) might
be obvious, but the processes between input and output are not. In reality,
virtually all law-enforcement agencies only process the data they need to build
a case (known as netto evidence), and are unable to fully index and access the
total of collected data (known as bruto evidence), let alone that they have the
means to normalize large raw data sets in unknown formats from other agen-
cies, load those sets in their police systems, conduct advanced analyses on these
sets, select suitable targets for investigations and overcome the incentive prob-
lem. The absence of uniform technical processes to process data increases the
double whammy effect of deviant security, especially for less equipped agencies
that share their operational data with third parties but are not able to process
any received data. Scarce resources are wasted because of duplicate efforts of
agencies and expensive commercial products to mine their data, and even lead
to situations in which agencies are technically unable to use evidence for their
investigations. The current situation also pushes towards the creation of a single
connected ecosystem dominated by the few nodes that do have the resources
to collect, process and analyze investigative data, often helped by closed-source
technologies of a limited number of private security companies. Indeed, many of
Ross Anderson’s concerns about networks of government surveillance - informa-
tion monopolies with network effects, low-marginal costs and technical lock-ins
- are also real for the closed networks in which LEA operate, if only because
law-enforcement and intelligence networks are increasingly intertwined [641].
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Figure 8.3: These five stages represent the different steps in international collaboration
between law-enforcement agencies. Acknowledgement of strategic importance and legal har-
monization/unification occur on a legal/policy level, operational alignment and organizational
integration occur on an organizational level of harmonization while technical standardization
is an outcome of technical harmonization. The model is now in use by the Dutch NHTCU
to plot with which international public agencies the unit wants to increase, decrease, explore
or consolidate investigative collaborations, i.e., the kind and degree of harmonization. The
NHTCU might try, as an hypothetical example, to go from a situation of legal harmonization
with another unit in which both units merely execute each other’s MLATs, to a situation in
which both units align operations, thus first explore and then increase collaborations.
One of the capstones against the above mentioned threats to human security
and the double whammy effect of deviant security might well be technical har-
monization between law-enforcement agencies of liberal democracies governed
by the rule of law. Technical harmonization is about establishing universal
ethical and technically uniform norms, criteria, methods and principles to pro-
cess operational data by law-enforcement agencies. The term harmonization
is purposely used. Harmonization between law-enforcement agencies implies
alignment, fine-tuning and collaboration while preserving diversity. The term
further relates to a degree of agility and flexibility which is needed for agen-
cies in a dynamic world with rapidly changing technologies and (geo)politics
whilst harmonization might also lead to more rigid standardization when needed
[623][642, pp.91-92][643, p.52]. A practical implementation of this approach is
that it promotes public consortia to develop databases, software and analyti-
cal models for law-enforcement agencies as much as possible, and subsequently
share these technologies with like-minded public partners. This decentralized
approach opens an opportunity to reduce the above outlined double whammy
effect of deviant security and digital divide between law-enforcement agencies
as investigative resources are more equally and fairly distributed among public
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partners. Indeed, only a single well-equipped public partner has to develop the
technologies to normalize and/or analyze operational data.
Mandated breachers should develop their own technologies to process their
evidence and avoid core technologies of commercial parties because this ap-
proach promotes human security and avoids the commodification of security.
A first argument is to prevent a vendor lock-in. Investigations on cyber crime
need a flexible range of tools to process ever-changing data sets without being
dependent on the services of a private monopolist or having substantial switch-
ing costs. The second argument is far more important: power depends upon
who owns code [607, p.534]. Any code used in investigations to process evi-
dence must be transparent to legal practitioners, including the judiciary and
defendants. Therefore, universities and other non-profit and non-governmental
organizations are ideal partners to normalize data and subsequently exploit vul-
nerabilities of cyber criminals by developing advanced analytical models. Simul-
taneously, they can formulate and implement human-centric information ethics
that provide human security, while helping to avoid securitization through bu-
reaucratic processes and routines of legal practitioners [644, pp.125-127]. To
conclude, technical harmonization is solely about processing data in a uniform
and bottom-up manner between law-enforcement agencies, and not about bind-
ing rules or obligations mandating the sharing of any collected data. Sovereign
democratic states governed by the rule of law are and ought to be in control of
their own data, and subsequently have the legal, organizational and technical
means to decide in which situations they want to share what data with which
party. This might mean that independent oversight mechanisms such as the
judiciary are not only needed in situations where data is shared, but also for
the technologies that subsequently process data for investigative purposes.
8.4 Reactive & Proactive Investigations on Com-
mission & Protection
The last research question of this study is: which profit-driven computer-focused
suspects should be targeted by cyber crime units of national and federal law-
enforcement agencies? There is a distinctive pattern found in investigations on
profit-driven computer-focused crimes. This pattern is more in line with the idea
of deliberate (read: targeted, by choice) and opportunistic (read: untargeted, by
chance) resource-limited attackers [382, pp.24-25][645], than the idea of the ‘all
powerful attacker’ that generates attacks for whichever vulnerability exists [646].
In general, advanced law-enforcement cyber crime units that operate on an
international level conduct reactive public-private investigations on commission
providers and autarkic cyber criminal organizations, while launching proactive
public-public investigations on protection providers.
Autarkic/autonomous organizations and commission & protection providers
Advanced cyber crime units of federal/national law-enforcement agencies gen-
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erally focus on three particular organized groups that commit profit-driven
computer-focused crimes with an international impact. The first group con-
sists of:
1. Autarkic/autonomous cyber criminal organizations. These closed groups
have the assets to execute large parts of their MO themselves and make
decisions autonomously. They may, for example, develop and operate
their own malware, and subsequently launch deliberate APT-style attacks
[647, p.9], like the Cobalt group that directly targeted financial institu-
tions and took active measures to ensure that their malicious programs
remained unknown to the cyber criminal and cyber security community
alike [496]. Such a private group may have distinctive roles including their
own in-house system administrator who sets up their bulletproof technical
infrastructure, e.g., C&C, chat and VPN servers. Although they do not
sell their home-grown valuables to (less-skilled) clients, and avoid relying
on outsiders and outsourcing to the CaaS economy [251, p.3], they still
might need others for e.g., post-activities such as money laundering. These
organized groups are directly responsible for making high-value victims in
- amongst others - the financial sector and as such affect the integrity of
the global financial system. This is both a blessing and curse for them.
The downside of generating high profits is that their malafide activities
become noticeable to a very competitive cyber criminal community that
is keen to identify the latest threats in cyberspace and share their find-
ings with a broad audience, including law-enforcement agencies. Yet some
of these private groups have shown that they have the assets to post-
pone their operations for a period of time when under attack by threat
agents, only to reappear in a more robust - read: more secure - manner.
In other words, they have the ability to work on projects instead of pro-
cesses, and thus avoid recency and consistency as a vulnerability. They
can also opt for a more security-driven approach in which confidential-
ity (via e.g., a closed-circuit MO and distrust of outsiders) and affect-
ing integrity (through e.g., deception) is more important than availability
(CI>A). (Investigations on) autonomous cyber criminal organizations in-
clude the groups behind exclusive banking malware that is not for sale in
the underground economy as Buhtrap, Carbanak, Cobalt, Dyre, GCMan,
Lurk and Metel [648][260][649][496]; and the Lazarus/Bluenoroff group(s)
behind the SWIFT attacks [580].
Less autarkic groups and autonomous individuals, i.e., opportunistic attackers,
may outsource large parts of their MO to criminal facilitators because they have
too few intangible assets - human, information and/or organization capital - to
set up their whole business process and security system themselves. Figure 6.2
shows the many products and services in the CaaS economy that support the
commission of crime and protection of crime and the criminal. These facilitators
enable large volumes of less-advanced, opportunistic cyber criminals to safely
commit untargeted crime, and for this reason these providers come in sight of
the cyber security community. Especially very successful providers have their
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own particular weaknesses. They are too centralized in the underground econ-
omy, offer (partly) automated services/products, have client databases and 24/7
support, and are generally not very transparent about their security to their cus-
tomers. In other words, providers work in processes and have a more business-
driven approach in which availability and integrity of their product/service is
more important than confidentiality (AI>C). So the next classifications con-
sist of two types of organized service and product providers within the CaaS
economy:
2. Providers of the commission of cyber crime. Investigations on these providers
include botnets-as-a-service like Mirai Botnet #14 [650], Cutwail [651],
GameOver Zeus [416], and Simda [652]; exploit kits like Angler (related
to the autonomous Lurk group [653]) and Blackhole [435]; banking tro-
jans, e.g., Gozi [654]; hacking-as-a-service providers [655]; or ransomware-
as-a-service such as Philadelphia [432], RaaSberry, Satan and Wildfire
[656][657].
3. Providers of the protection of crime and the criminal. Investigations
on these providers include bulletproof telecom providers like Ennetcom
and PGP Safe [658][659]; secure markets like Alphabay, Darkode and
Hansa [526][660]; bulletproof hosters like Virus/Powerhost and Maxided
[661][662]; the CAV targeted in Europol’s operation Neuland [663]; crim-
inal spy shops as PSS Spyshop [664]; cryptocurrency launderers like a
British citizen operating from Amsterdam, the Netherlands [665]; or re-
shipping services like the one mentioned in this academic paper [212].
The next paragraph shows that there are two distinguished approaches in in-
vestigating these three organized groups.
Avalanche as a hybrid commission and protection provider: a one-off exception
today, but a common practice in the future?
The observed client panels of commission providers in this study generally only allow alter-
ations related to making victims as compared to options to customize the usually pre-baked
security features. The panel of ransomware-as-a-service Philadelphia, for example, only has
functionalities as querying victim passwords, geographically locating victims, checking fi-
nancial transactions, or changing the amount of the demanded ransom [432]. So, while
we have seen several providers that offer multiple related services and/or products that
either promote commission or protection - i.e., BPHs that also sell domain registration and
DDoS protection - and collaborations between protection and commission providers like
ransomware developers and crypters [666], Avalanche was the first major CaaS provider in
the underground economy that offered a single integrated good with multiple components
related to both commission and protection. The Avalanche hosting infrastructure was taken
down by a consortium of academic, law-enforcement, private (security) and other public or-
ganizations in 2016. 800.000 domains were seized, sinkholed or blocked, and five individuals
were arrested. Amongst other things, Avalanche functioned as a fast flux network for mal-
ware families like Qakbot, Rovnix and TeslaCrypt, and as a bulletproof infrastructure for
Citadel, Marcher and Tinba [667]. In other words, the organized group behind Avalanche
delivered a hosting infrastructure for the commission of financial malware and ransomware,
and simultaneously double fast flux, bulletproof infrastructure and recruitment of money
mules for the protection criminals and their crimes. Whether Avalanche remains a one-off
exception of a hybrid commission and protection provider, or is a foretaste of what we can
expect in the near future, remains the question.
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Reactive public-private investigations on commission providers & au-
tarkic cyber criminal organizations Interestingly, investigations on com-
mission providers and autarkic collectives/autonomous groups have two com-
monalities. Firstly, operations are reactively initiated by law-enforcement agen-
cies. Secondly, they are mostly conducted with substantial help of the private
security industry. These two attributes are understandable. Autarkic cyber
criminal organizations and the products/services of commission providers di-
rectly make victims, and are therefore vulnerable for detection by the private
security industry. Because of the industry’s bonafide security products and
services for customers (read: potential and actual victims), private security
researchers not only have a major financial incentive, but also a far better infor-
mation position than LEA, to swiftly detect pre-activities and activities related
to the commission of cyber crime. Compared to mandated breachers, most
parties in the cyber security community are proactively identifying, collecting,
sharing and analyzing the victim-related activities of commission providers and
autarkic groups. Law-enforcement agencies understandably do not have that
information position: they cannot install intrusion/detection systems on the
networks of potential victims, nor do actual victims easily file a complaint when
a breach is not made public. Because of this information asymmetry on vic-
timization between the public and private sector, it is hard, if not impossible,
for law-enforcement agencies to independently locate C&Cs servers or discover
new malware. That is not to say that LEA and their investigations do not
have added value within the border-centric view on cyber security and cyber
crime. On the contrary, the information of the private security industry - such
as malware samples, access logs on infected machines and IP-addresses referring
to C&C servers - can provide input for hit/no-hit searches on existing data in
police systems and for executing a range of offensive countermeasures such as
information requests and the preservation of servers [228, p.69]. As depicted
in Figure 8.4, the subsequent data syntheses and newly collected evidence can
be used to link the observed what by the private sector to the observed who
by law-enforcement agencies. This process of attributing criminal activities to
suspects is indeed very much the core business of law-enforcement agencies for
which they have the competencies, means and data.
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Figure 8.4: The private security industry generally has a better information position on the
green circles as compared to the public cyber security community. Circle A may represent
traces found on an infected machine of a victim such as malware. These traces may point to
a C&C server as represented by circle B. LEA may preserve the server and request subscriber
details. They now can match this evidence to data in their police systems or identify and
preserve e.g., new servers or criminal communications like a mailbox (red circle C), and link
that evidence to an online identity (red circle D). Red circle E may represent a DevSec provider
who uses infrastructure C to communicate his/her product/service to client D. This client is
now able to safely commit crime and make victims, while the DevSec provider stays largely
out of sight to the private sector. Autarkic and autonomous criminal organizations execute
large parts of an MO themselves, and are therefore represented by all circles from A to E.
Proactive public-public investigations on protection providers Inves-
tigations that successfully breach the security of protection providers hit the
cyber criminal underground in the heart: the deviant security that ought to
protect the cyber criminal and his/her crimes. DevSec services and products
may fail in protecting their customers, and as a result many of these end-user
criminals face little to no security at all. Suddenly, the unforeseen consequences
of outsourcing their security to others are far greater than the original purpose of
the countermeasure. Besides taking down their infrastructure and prosecuting
the suspects involved, the reviewed investigations generated many new inves-
tigations on the clients of these services, read: end-user criminals with little
or no capital to organize their own security. Moreover, while most commis-
sion providers on the CaaS market offer services/products that are specifically
designed for computer-focused crimes, many of the DevSec providers offer ser-
vices and products that can be used for the commission of computer-focused,
assisted and enabled crimes as depicted in Figure 8.5. Thus, targeting successful
DevSec brands with a good reputation, like bulletproof hoster Maxided, cryp-
tomarket Hansa and bulletproof telecom provider Ennetcom [662][668][658], will
not only have an impact on the cyber criminal underground, but potentially on
computer-enabled crimes as well. The arguments of Section 3.3 suggest that
investigations on DevSec providers are disruptive to the underground economy.
Cyber criminals that are not arrested have to find a new DevSec provider, thus
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are forced to apply a suboptimal MO, with the associated risks of under protect-
ing assets or over spending on deviant controls. When cryptomarkets Hansa and
Alphabay were taken down, vendors and clients were forced to search for a new
secure platform and moved to a legitimate chat service [669]. The encrypted
communications might indeed help to protect identity but lacks a functioning
reputation system as compared to cryptomarkets. As a result, ripping - read:
harm to business assets - may increase.
Figure 8.5: From a good guy security perspective, DevSec providers (ABC) that offer
fake IDs, bulletproof connections and hosting, encrypted telecommunications, preconfigured
virtual machines and money laundering services are cross-cutting crime threat agents [599,
pp.20, 56-57]. They not only protect those who commit A: Computer-focused crimes (e.g.,
ransomware operators), but also B: Computer-enabled crimes (e.g., online drug traders) and
C. Computer-assisted crimes (e.g., identity fraudsters).
The reviewed investigations on DevSec providers have two common denomi-
nators. In general, they were proactively initiated by law-enforcement agencies.
Secondly, the subsequent alliances were of a predominantly public-public nature,
as compared to public-private collaborations. How can these two commonalities
be explained? An unavoidable key problem for any successful CaaS provider is
that they generate many data, and therefore become sooner or later noticeable
to key players in the cyber security community. Generally, the private security
industry and their clients - potential and actual victims - do not hold an in-
formation position on these DevSec providers in the preparation, pre-activity,
activity and post-activity phase. Firstly, these commercial parties mostly focus
on the what of end-user cyber criminals who are directly responsible for launch-
ing attacks and making victims. Secondly, they have difficulties to attribute a
used C&C server or VPN connection to a specific bulletproof provider, let alone
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they can attribute a fake ID or preconfigured virtual machine to the responsible
CaaS provider. As a consequence, LEA should not expect, and thus wait for,
victims to file a complaint against a DevSec supplier or the private security
industry to en masse provide intelligence reports about these providers.
In contrast, especially mandated breachers with offensive countermeasures
have the ability to attribute DevSec products and services to specific providers.
Because bulletproof connectivity and hosting providers sometimes mimic to be
legitimate entities, they may use their real credentials to set up their finan-
cial, legal and technical infrastructure. If the credentials of a particular DevSec
provider are significantly more often found compared to credentials of other fa-
cilitators than alarm bells might sound at a police office. Besides such statistical
analyses, LEA have the qualitative research methods and techniques to identify
DevSec providers. They can, for example, interrogate cyber criminals about fake
ID providers or request subscriber information about bulletproof VPN servers at
legitimate ISPs. Thus, law-enforcement agencies are the designated key player
in the cyber security community to identify DevSec providers. As a consequence,
they need a proactive attitude towards this particular group of cyber criminals,
and launch investigations through their own analytical efforts. That is not to
say that LEAs have to conduct investigations without outside help. A number
of other public nonprofit bodies, including academia, CERTs and NGOs, have
the competencies, means and data to target DevSec providers. No wonder that
a consortium of - amongst others - bulletproof hosters launched major DDoS
attacks in 2013 on the technical infrastructure of The Spamhaus Project - a
nonprofit organization that collects and publishes data about BPH servers.
8.5 Interim Conclusion & Discussion
This purpose of this chapter is to present evidence-based approaches for appro-
priate investigative responses against deviant security practices of profit-driven
computer-focused criminals with an international impact. Much of the norma-
tive frameworks are derived from security studies, while microeconomics helps to
explain how investigations on transnational cyber crime work on a global level.
Solely regarding the ultimum remedium of criminal law as the prime instrument
against DevSec is a too narrow focus. Therefore, besides the recommendations
for future work in the next paragraphs that will improve police investigations,
researchers should also look at other tools of the regulatory tool-box of Internet
governance to steer unwanted human behavior and affect deviant security prac-
tices [619]. Social norms, market mechanisms and architecture of technologies
enforced by a range of cyber security key players other than LEA might have
an impact as well [609]. These insights will hopefully lead to a truly multidisci-
plinary multi-stakeholder approach against the protection of cyber criminals.
On security-driven investigations that provide human security and In-
ternet as a global public good This study sets out a normative framework
for investigations on profit-driven computer-focused crimes. Basically, investi-
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gations in liberal democracies governed by the rule of law should become means
to provide human security. This form of security predominantly focuses on the
vulnerabilities of citizens, and related non-human and non-individual entities
that affect citizens such as critical infrastructures. However, investigations that
provide human security can be threatened by i) LEA and the private security
industry when harming citizens, ii) offensive countermeasures of cyber crimi-
nals for deviant security purposes, and iii) other states for reasons of national
security. Therefore, this study argues that LEA need to install a variety of
administrative, physical and technical controls to make investigations security-
driven. Further debate is needed with the cyber security community at large -
including academics and legal practitioners - what human security in cyberspace
encompasses and what not, and how to implement related human-centric infor-
mation ethics in legitimate actions against cyber crime. For instance, the Dutch
NHTCU and a private security company were criticized after taking over and
subsequently using the Bredolab botnet to inform its victims in 2010 [670][671].
Yet there are as of today no efficient (read: scalable) and effective mechanisms
to identify, notify and assist botnet victims to disinfect their systems. A further
limitation of the proposed approach is its implementation of an inherently Dutch
governmental policy view on cyberspace. Indeed, more comparative research is
needed on investigative approaches of other liberal democracies. Yet investiga-
tion units of smaller states, like the Netherlands, are well equipped to make a
diplomatic effort and promote the approach on a global level [611, pp.90-91].
The Dutch NHTCU, for example, is well represented in many international cy-
ber security platforms and holds a strategic position in the larger cyber security
network as Dutch servers are frequently misused as point of attack linkage.
On investigations as a public service with multiple outcomes Tak-
ing into account the normative framework of investigations as security-driven
means that breach security to provide human security, this study argues that
law-enforcement agencies should transform their investigations into a public ser-
vice model within public-private alliances that have multiple outcomes. These
investigations, in which the public interest prevails over private interests, evolve
around two victim-based and two offender-based outcomes. The former are
damage mitigation for potential victims and victim assistance to help actual
victims. The latter outcomes are disruption of the cyber criminal process and
attribution for prosecution purposes. While victim assistance and attribution
have a firm legal basis, damage mitigation and disruption by mandated breachers
have not, respectively e.g., sharing intelligence about suspects, like nicknames,
with the larger cyber security community, or spreading disinformation about
cyber criminals to undermine trust mechanisms. The power of cyber crime
law is affected by its few possible outcomes, and primary focus on investiga-
tion, trial and sentence. Because convictions in absentia of suspects who are
located in safe havens are inadequate, legislators need to discuss if disruption
should become an alternative tool for LEA to confront cyber crime and turn
the tide on the effectiveness crisis in investigations. Several academic scholars
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have already made similar arguments [92], while others proposed to disrupt, for
example, cyber criminal fora [197, pp.169-170][672][269, p.5]. We therefore need
to understand which interventions effectively disrupt MOs of successful cyber
criminals and the cyber criminal underground at large, and research the legal
feasibility of these methods. Although this study has reviewed few investiga-
tions on the computer-assisted crime of CSAM, a limitation of this chapter is
that the investigative approach is not specifically made and tested for opera-
tions against sexually-driven online crimes. How can CSAM units exploit their
data to the fullest and provide human security? Which stakeholder parties can
contribute to these investigations? At the same time, investigations on profit-
driven computer-focused crimes can learn from investigations on child sexual
abusive material how to provide human security as the well-being of a child
victim, irrespective of its nationality, gender or age, is of primary importance
to legal practitioners of the latter type of investigation. Additionally, this study
does not discuss online supervision of potential key enablers of cyber crime.
Future studies should therefore focus on identifying high-risk individuals who
are vulnerable to commit cyber crime, and what effective deterrence strategies
would look like. Ultimately, new findings about supervision and investigations
will help law-enforcement agencies to confront cyber crime in a more holistic
manner.
On technical harmonization for a global investigation system This
study further describes the current global investigation system on transnational
cyber crimes, and provides evidence why this system does not work as deviant se-
curity practices take away incentives based on national interests to initiate an in-
vestigation. Before providing solutions to this incentive problem, this study first
describes how international collaboration between law-enforcement agencies pro-
gresses through four stages, namely acknowledgement of strategic importance,
legal harmonization, operational alignment and organizational integration. Be-
sides overcoming geopolitical barriers and searching for common interests in
human security over national security, a fifth phase in international collabo-
rations - technical harmonization between law-enforcement agencies of liberal
democracies governed by the rule of law - might be a first step to structurally
fix the global investigations system. Smaller states as the Netherlands not only
have a vested interest in channeling the discourse on the Internet’s public core
towards standardization [611, p.91], but also in investigations. Therefore, the
Dutch NHTCU invested in technical harmonization by developing and subse-
quently sharing tools with other law-enforcement agencies. The next break-
through for technical harmonization, however, will be the participation of other
public stakeholders, such as but not limited to the academic world building
software for law-enforcement agencies. While academics have acknowledged the
need for standardization for research on cyber crime [345], too many investiga-
tive tools seem to be merely developed by academics as proof of concept and are
not adopted by law-enforcement agencies. Scholars and legal practitioners both
claim to serve the public interest. If this is true, than academics have a starting
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point to do multidisciplinary research with the police, and subsequently have
the opportunity to have a lasting impact on how investigations in cyberspace
are conducted by building software that does human security by design. Indeed,
as Lawrence Lessig argues, code is law as software has the ability to determine
the behavior of, in this case, law-enforcement agencies [607]. Moreover, besides
having the same technical standards for data processing, equal investments are
needed for international legal standardization for collecting, preserving and pre-
senting digital evidence [619, p.358].
On reactive & proactive investigations on commission & protection
The last section of this chapter focuses on what the targets should be of security-
driven investigations that provide human security. There is a distinctive pat-
tern found in law-enforcement operations against profit-driven computer-focused
crimes. Reactive public-private investigations focus on commission providers
and autarkic/autonomous cyber criminal organizations. Proactive public-public
investigations generally aim at protection providers. So investigations as public
service with multiple outcomes will predominantly serve the first type of op-
erations, while technical harmonization will also help public agencies to gain
insights into the hidden world of DevSec providers. What is so far missing,
however, are metrics to determine which successful providers and groups LEA
should target to have the biggest impact on both the cyber criminal as well as
cyber security communities, including potential and actual victims. Some ser-
vices and products might be more important in the cyber criminal value chain
than others, and identifying the choking points in their preparation, pre-activity,
activity and post-activity phases are crucial. Moreover, are there displacement
effects of clients migrating from successful, thus noticeable, CaaS enterprises to
other, less known service/product providers that are not yet on the radar of
the cyber security community, as suggested by experts [434]? In fact, in-depth
research on specific commission and protection providers is still missing at large.
While Europol names fake IDs as one of three ‘cross-cutting crime threats with
a significant impact across the spectrum of serious and organised crime’ [599,
pp.20, 56-57], no academic studies are found that describe the methods of work-
ing of this online CaaS provider, nor of e.g., suppliers of preconfigured VMs
while their product poses a forensic challenge to investigators [673]. Moreover,
governments should also find ways to increase the number of victim complaints
of cyber crime. Victims do not only provide valuable evidence for reactive
public-private investigations [635], but their official and unofficial complaints
are foremost means to notify the state that their security has been breached by
cyber criminals, and as such a request to restore human security and security
as a collective public good. It is therefore of utmost important that all key
players in the cyber security community notify the police, not only when they






The Outlook of Deviant
Security
Over the last years, there has been an ongoing debate about how cyber criminals
are ‘going dark’, and how investigations are becoming less effective as a result.
The security practices of cyber criminals are one of the underlying reasons of
this problem. This research project takes predominantly profit-driven computer-
focused criminals, and to a lesser extent sexually-driven computer-assisted crim-
inals (read: child sexual abusive material users), as referent objects of security
to subsequently describe their technical computer security practices, and explain
the economics behind these practices in the Information Age. In exploring this
research direction, the study offers the first structured and systematic, in-depth
analysis what these deviant security practices encompass, having unprecedented
access to, and using public and confidential data from, the cyber criminal and
cyber security communities. This chapter reiterates the thesis objectives, fills
in the deviant security process cycle, summarizes the normative/empirical and
descriptive/explanatory findings, and presents directions for future research.
9.1 Thesis Objectives Reiterated
This section discusses how successful the thesis goal and objectives are achieved.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the overall goal of this study is to:
– Present a new security paradigm, i.e., a first picture on deviant security
to an academic and legal practitioner audience.
The specific objectives in support of this overall goal are to:
– Describe and explain the technical computer security practices of cyber
criminals; and
– Explore investigative responses against their protective practices.
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This thesis introduces a new paradigm with cyber criminals as referent ob-
jects of security of which the findings are summarized in Sections 9.2 and 9.3.
More specifically, a first picture on deviant security practices is presented that
describes and explains in a structured and systematic manner the defensive
and offensive administrative, physical and technical controls of predominantly
financially-driven computer-focused criminals and their cyber-crime-as-a-service
providers, and to a lesser extent of sexually-driven computer-assisted criminals
(i.e., CSAM offenders).
The granularity of the research lies in the sum of its truly multidisciplinary
data usage, methodology and outcomes. Firstly, this study is based on norma-
tive and empirical - i.e., qualitative and quantitative - data from public and
confidential sources of the cyber criminal and cyber security communities. This
variety of data sources allows triangulation, while categories on deviant security
are matured to a point in which saturation is reached and further sampling is
not needed. Secondly, social science methods and techniques from Grounded
Theory are applied to study the computer science understanding of technical
computer security with law-breaking referent objects. Concepts from predom-
inantly microeconomic theory are subsequently used to explain these technical
computer security findings. As such, this study has conceptual density and
explanatory power from a microeconomic perspective, while there is plenty of
room for other academic disciplines to contribute to the development of deviant
security in the future (see Section 9.4). Lastly, research outcomes about de-
viant security practices and subsequent investigative practices are presented in
this study as socio-technical practices in the Information Age that occur within
respectively substantive and procedural legal frameworks.
Whether the model also has durability over time remains the question. Law-
making processes are dynamic, and legislation is subjected to change. As a
result, any alterations in law may affect the normative and empirical findings
of this study. The same goes for the impact of new information technologies
on deviant security practices. No instances are found in which cyber crimi-
nals applied artificial intelligence to protect themselves and their crimes, while
mainstream usage of Internet of Things, IPv6 and quantum computing might
potentially be game changers in the cat and mouse game between the cyber
criminal and the cyber security communities [674][228][675][676]. With respect
to the formulation of investigative responses against deviant security practices,
this study identifies numerous weaknesses of cyber criminals and explains how
LEA could exploit them without revealing current investigative techniques and
as a result harm ongoing investigations. Rather than proposing new far-reaching
investigative powers, the study presents suggestions for investigation approaches
that aim at fixing many existing challenges in law-enforcement agencies while
avoiding securitization and commodification of security. The practical utility of
these suggestions are proven by the implementation of the approaches by the
Central and Regional Criminal Investigations Divisions of the national police
in the Netherlands, and have further been evangelized to the larger interna-
tional law-enforcement community. Thus while the impact of this study on the
academic world remains to be seen, the valorization of knowledge to a legal
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practitioner audience has so far been considerable. Although a first and partial
process evaluation of the suggested approach in Section 8.2 has been conducted
[415], full process and effect evaluations of the other suggested investigative
approaches are still absent.
9.2 A Filled-In Deviant Security Process Cycle
Security is regarded in this study as an ongoing process cycle - a cat and mouse
game - between the cyber criminal and cyber security communities. The in-
terplay between law-breaking and law-abiding entities, and their offensive and
defensive activities, mutually shapes each others security. A security process cy-
cle that captures this interplay has been developed by academics and industry
experts to understand and improve the security of law-abiding referent objects
with law-breaking threat agents. But such a cycle has so far not been applied
vice versa, with the goal to understand the security of law-breaking referent ob-
jects. This section first reiterates how the security cycle is used in the literature
reviews of Part I, and then fills in the components of a deviant security cycle
based on the methodological, normative and empirical findings of respectively
Parts II and III of this study.
Security process cycles reiterated To understand the new security paradigm
with cyber criminals as referent objects in need of security against attacks from
threat agents like law-enforcement agencies, this study first adapted the secu-
rity process cycle of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation and the result is depicted in Figure 9.1. The importance of explicitly
naming the security recipient is promoted by adding referent object as a new
and central component, while existing components - i.e., threat agents, threats
& attacks, vulnerabilities, risks, assets and countermeasures - remain in place.
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Figure 9.1: The relationship between various components of the security process. The cycle
is based on the general model of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation [41, pp.40-43][59, p.27], and adapted by adding the components referent object
and attack, and removing the component exposure.
The adapted cycle helps us i) to structure what the current good guy per-
spective is (i.e., with law-abiding entities as referent objects) on the computer
science understanding of technical computer security, and the social science and
legal/political understanding of cyber security and cyber crimes; ii) to struc-
ture what a bad guy perspective looks like with law-breaking referent objects
(read: computer-focused and computer-assisted criminals) who apply technical
computer security controls, and investigative responses from the cyber security
and cyber crime discourses as depicted in Figure 9.2. The study then uses the
security process cycle in a literature review on computer science, social science
and legal research that touch upon the security controls of cyber criminals. The
cycle shows that there are considerable gaps in our understanding how law-
breaking referent objects protect themselves and their crimes. In other words, a
full picture on deviant security practices is indeed - as stated in the introduction
of this study - absent.
222
Figure 9.2: The components Computer-assisted & computer-focused criminals, Law-
enforcement agencies and Cyber crime investigations are derived from the cyber security and
cyber crime discourses. The components Systems, software, data & their users and Security
policies & mechanisms are derived from the technical computer security discourse. The two
components about weaknesses and risks are derived from both technical computer security
and cyber security and cyber crime discourses.
Filling in a deviant security process cycle As depicted in Figure 9.3, the
methodological, normative and empirical findings of Parts II and III enable us
to fill in the security process cycle for cyber criminals in the Information Age. In
short, referent objects of deviant security and their protective practices are de-
fined and constructed by substantive and procedural law, yet shaped by cultural,
macroeconomic, political and technological dimensions. Threat agents of cyber
criminals - ranging from mandated breachers to criminal competitors - launch
a range of attacks, while referent objects can also breach their own security on
purpose or by accident. These attacks, accidents, failures and mistakes exploit
a large variety of vulnerabilities in both the commission of crime as well as the
protection of crime and the criminal. Absolute deviant security is impossible.
There are always threat agents, while some vulnerabilities are even inherent to
MOs, thus unavoidable. Other situations have iatrogenic effects, in other words,
are vulnerability and countermeasure in one. These weaknesses lead to a num-
ber of risks that are expressed in this study in a qualitatively descriptive and
explanatory manner, with subjective interpretations and beliefs of those who
apply DevSec and those who are confronted by DevSec, and combined with ob-
jectively observable and/or measurable facts. Because of these risks, assets of
the cyber criminal might be damaged. To secure their tangible and intangible
valuables - including assets of a protective nature as deviant security is a scarce
commodity and an asset to protect other assets - cyber criminals apply a range
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of offensive and defensive security policies and mechanisms in compensating
layers. These deviant security practices directly affect the capabilities of threat
agents, including law-enforcement agencies.
The cycle shows that deviant security and investigative responses are indeed
a circular process, a cat and mouse game, with both sides constantly improv-
ing, innovating and implementing lessons learned, while having good reasons to
hide their capabilities. This does not mean, however, that financially and/or
sexually-driven cyber criminals control the game and gained the upper hand.
There are too many external factors that negatively affect MOs, while profits -
respectively money and sexual gratification - must be made. Ultimately, it is the
sheer complexity of DevSec practices that is the enemy of law-breaking referent
objects, but ironically, also of mandated threat agents when law-enforcement
agencies do not understand the nature and extent of deviant security, and chal-
lenges and opportunities for their organizations. The next section zooms further
in on the conclusions of the how and why of DevSec by giving i) a description
of deviant security policies and mechanisms in the Information Age, and ii) an
explanation of these practices using the economics of deviant security - i.e., mi-
croeconomics to understand the technical computer security practices of cyber
criminals.
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Figure 9.3: The picture is a filled in version of the deviant security process cycle. Each com-
ponent contains a selection of conclusions from this study. The two unspecified components
with the magnifying glasses - deviant security policies and mechanisms, and the qualitative
methodology and explanatory concepts of this essentially large-scale deviant security risk as-
sessment - are discussed in more detail in the next Section 9.3.
9.3 Summary of Findings
While the previous section only briefly touches upon methodological, normative
and empirical findings about (researching) the deviant security practices of cy-
ber criminals, this section summarizes the descriptive and explanatory results
based on the central research direction of this study: what are deviant security
practices of cyber criminals?
A description of deviant security practices Grounded Theory was ap-
plied to describe the protective measures of cyber criminals. How cyber crimi-
nals protect crime and the criminal, and related vulnerabilities, are respectively
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described on the base of three research directions.
– The what researches the basic normative and empirical qualities of deviant
security such as its:
◦ Legal definition and further construction by (absence of) substan-
tive and procedural law, and empirically observable appearance and
consequences;
◦ Meaning (i.e., state of being) as a subjective condition which is about
the sense of cyber criminals about their own safety rather than an
objective state which implies a situation of being without any threat;
◦ Provision as a club, common, private and public good, distributed in
either a centralized or decentralized manner;
◦ Function as an asset to protect assets that relates to the criminal and
his/her crimes; and
◦ Form as intangible and tangible, and as dual-use security product
and/or tailor-made deviant security service.
– The who researches the interactive qualities of deviant security such as:
◦ Information asymmetries in intertwined networks;
◦ Deception tactics for the commission of crime with protective side
effects, and deception tactics exclusively deployed for deviant security
purposes. More specifically, a taxonomy that consists of masking,
dazzling, decoying, mimicking, inventing, relabeling and double play;
◦ Trust as a three-step authentication process consisting of establishing
cyber criminal identity (who), establishing (the outcomes of) crimi-
nal conduct (what) and enforcing trustworthiness through extra-legal
governance; and
◦ Seven distrust controls, more precisely a taxonomy that consists
of compartmentalization, data-minimization, regulations, investiga-
tions, labelling, testing and monitoring.
– The when and where researches the temporal-spatial qualities of deviant
security such as:
◦ Controls against data volatility and retention like business continuity
plans; using a single entity, a single time, for a single purpose; and
secure-deletion and encryption of information capital;
◦ Intercultural communication in cyber crime in general and as a coun-
termeasure specifically such as the use of monocultural communica-
tion and argot;
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◦ Distribution as a countermeasure including the importance of a multi-
polar world, points of attack origin, linkage and occurrence, low and
high-risk areas, location and time-boundedness and centralization,
and extension, replacement, rotation and dispersion as distribution
techniques; and
◦ Physical security of cyber criminals including the conversion of the
online to the offline world, limited territorial control, micro external
and internal security zones, physical protective objects (i.e., natural
access control and technical surveillance) and subjects (e.g., violence
by referent objects).
The defense and offense in-depth security layers of the Ponmocup botnet
Throughout this study, examples are given how the operators of the Ponmocup botnet
protected themselves and their crimes. Reports on this botnet by the private security
industry reveal that the sum of their security controls is truly defense and offense in-depth
with multiple layers of security controls placed throughout their MO [391]. More precisely,
the scheme had the following controls:
– Intangible and tangible (protective) products & services: having the human and
organization capital to run a multi-million dollar profit operation for more than nine
years, and rarely being noticed by the cyber security community, let alone experience
arrests and/or takedowns;
– Information asymmetries in intertwined networks: actively collecting intelligence on
the target’s machine about potential law-enforcement activities;
– Deception as a countermeasure: dropping fake payloads on the machines of private
security researchers;
– Trust and distrust mechanisms: trust - being active members of underground fora
and collaborating with various affiliates and business partners; distrust - testing
whether the malware runs on a private security researcher’s machine, and the use of
blacklists for e.g., usernames, computer names, services, drivers and product IDs;
– Countermeasures against data volatility and retention: deploying unique tokens,
keys and encrypted binaries on a unique location per infected host;
– Intercultural communication as a countermeasure: using only a single national lan-
guage - i.e., Russian - to communicate with affiliates and business partners;
– Distribution as a countermeasure: using separate servers for different functionalities,
and avoiding attacks on victims located in former Soviet states.
Explanations for deviant security practices Based on the descriptive
findings of this study, we conclude that referent objects of deviant security have
to protect anything, against anybody, anywhere and at any time. How can we
best explain these normative and empirical findings, and how should we regard
these explanations? To begin with the last question, the sum of this study’s
findings about deviant security practices is a middle-range theory about the
larger cyber criminal community that fits within the macro level paradigm of
the Information Age. While deviant security practices can be explained by a
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range of micro level theories from several academic disciplines, the predominant
focus of this study is on the economics of deviant security. This sub-discipline of
the economics of information security and attacker economics first uses concepts
from the computer science understanding of security to structure and explain the
deviant security controls of cyber criminals. Microeconomic theory is then ap-
plied to subsequently explain the cost-benefit analyses of cyber criminals about
their technical computer security controls. In practice, this means that the sum
of the observed practices represents the full range of technical computer security
controls, more specifically:
– Administrative, physical and technical countermeasures; of a
– Preventive, deterrent, detective, corrective, recovery and compensating
nature; that provide the security goals of
– Confidentiality, availability and integrity; and related attributes of
– Accountability, anonymity, auditability, authenticity, non-repudiation, re-
liability, external and internal secrecy, undetectability, unobservability and
unlinkability.
The observed deviant technical computer security practices are further explained
by microeconomic concepts such as:
– Adverse selections, hidden actions and information, information asymme-
tries, distortions and monopolies, lemon markets, limited resource economies,
moral hazards and (other) market failures;
– Coordination failures, customer data monetization, false accept and reject
rates, free business model, negative externalities, negative and perverse
incentives, and unproductive isolation;
– Taboo, tragic, value and zero-sum tradeoffs, and tradeoffs like deviation
versus conformity, commission versus protection, autarky versus outsourc-
ing, efficiency versus effectiveness, complexity versus accuracy, and secrecy
versus transparency;
– Fixed, opportunity, total and variable costs, intangible and tangible costs,
development and implementation costs, reputation and upfront costs, and
ex-ante and ex-post controls, costs and losses;
– Competitive escalation, destructive, intercultural and value conflicts, ex-
cludability/rivalry, feedback loops, prisoner’s dilemma, snowball effects,
tragedy of the commons, vendor lock-ins, and vicious circles;
– Allocation problems, asset conversions, competitive disadvantages, illusion
of control bias, objective and subjective value, optimism bias and return
on investment;
Lastly, concepts from other disciplines are also used to explain deviant security
practices like anthropology, linguistics, security studies and even medicine:
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– Code switching, convergence, digital divide, dominant and third culture,
iatrogenic effects, interlanguage, language acquisition, multilateral secu-
rity, offensible spaces, political plausible deniability, security theater and
word-sense disambiguation.
Ultimately, the overall result is a rich model on deviant security practices that
has conceptual density, explanatory power and hopefully durability over time.
The identified deviant security policies, mechanisms and related concepts do not
stand on their own, but are interlinked, and should therefore be viewed in close
coherence as shown in Figure 9.4. The nodes and edges in this figure further
help to understand the complexity of the layers of security that cyber criminals
receive and/or apply. Law-breaking referent objects have their own version of
defense and offense security in-depth, aimed at and resulting in the protection
of the criminal and his/her crimes against threat agents.
Investigative responses against deviant security practices Deviant
countermeasures have a direct, negative impact on the responses of law-enforcement
agencies. DevSec not only takes away the incentives to start an investigation,
but also remains a burden for legal practitioners till the very end when a case is
presented in court. Based on the findings of this study, investigative approaches
against deviant security are developed, tested and now in use at the National
High Tech Crime Unit and regional investigative cyber units of the Dutch na-
tional police. The normative framework of these approaches emphasizes the need
for investigations to become security-driven means to provide human security
and respect the Internet as a global public good. The practical implementa-
tion of this approach explains why investigations should be shaped as a public
service with multiple stakeholders and outcomes that go beyond attribution.
This study further sets out different stages for international collaboration and
pleas for technical harmonization between law-enforcement agencies of liberal
democracies. Lastly, evidence is given why proactive public-public investiga-
tions should target protection providers, while reactive public-private investiga-
tions should focus on autarkic/autonomous organized groups and commission
providers.
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Figure 9.4: This network chart represents a selection of the key concepts of deviant secu-
rity that are highlighted in italic throughout this study, and the interconnectedness of these
concepts. Blue nodes depict the basic qualities of DevSec (what), red nodes the interactive
qualities of DevSec (who), yellow nodes the temporal-spatial qualities of DevSec (when &
where) and green nodes the explanatory concepts from predominantly the economics of de-
viant security (why). Although this chart highlights the vast complexity of DevSec, not all
nodes and edges are added. More specifically, the detailed elaborations of specific controls have
been left out such as the seven distrust controls, three steps of the trust process, and the spe-
cific techniques for access control and surveillance, as well as specific DevSec services/products
and their providers, like bulletproof hosting, CAVs or online money laundering. Furthermore,
only relations that have been mentioned in this study are drawn, while more links between
concepts might be possible.
9.4 Moving Forward From Findings
Because the interim conclusion and discussion sections of the previous chapters
give detailed recommendations for future work, this section focuses on the broad
outlines and common threads of these sections on a high level of abstraction.
What emerges from the recommendations of the interim conclusion and discus-
sion sections is that deviant security has the potential to become an academic
field of study on its own. There is a need for research of an interdisciplinary
socio-technical-legal nature that combines the fields of law, science and technol-
ogy studies. The common thread is that: i) there is plenty of room for other
academic disciplines to study and explain deviant security, especially when a ii)
mixed methods approach produces iii) outcomes that benefit legal practitioners.
New academic disciplines to study deviant security Section 3.1 reviews
current computer science research that touched upon the security controls of cy-
ber criminals. Indeed, there is still plenty of room for truly technical studies
on deviant security, especially when such research projects explicitly take cyber
criminals as referent objects. The computer engineering of deviant security, for
example, could take a closer look at (malicious) software and hardware design
used for protective purposes, including technical vulnerabilities and associated
exploits. However, a big win for the new academic field of deviant security are
a number of socio-technical disciplines on deviant security that combine social
science with technical computer security. The psychology of deviant security, for
example, may aim at understanding deviant security related behavior, thoughts
and beliefs of cyber criminals. Cultural and social anthropology may focus on
the security norms and values of specific cyber criminal communities, fora and
autarkic/autonomous organizations, and related issues such as conflict resolu-
tion, taboo tradeoffs and learning processes of enculturation and socialization
of the security culture of these collectives. Linguistics in general, and linguis-
tic anthropology specifically, may further study in detail the role of technical
computer security terminology, argot and national and ethnic languages as a
security practice. Instead of narrowing down and zooming in, future work may
also take a broader stand and go beyond security. The cyber criminals’ depend-
ability on computing and communication systems could be researched which
includes attributes as maintainability, performance and safety [66]. Deviant
security could also be placed within the grand sociological theory of the Risk
Society [312][313][314]. From this perspective, more emphasis would be on risk
as compared to (deviant) security, and the interplay of risk as a source of insecu-
rity and related risk management for both cyber criminals and states. Such an
approach would further research how the offensive capabilities of both key play-
ers create risks and uncertainties for both sides, and fuel each other’s insecurity
that in turn has to, but cannot fully, be governed.
A mixed methods approach to study deviant security Besides multi-
ple disciplines to explain the security of cyber criminals, an interdisciplinary
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outlook may also mean applying a mixed methods approach as methodology.
A first step might be to combine the qualitative findings of this project with
more quantitative approaches to gain a more rich and in-depth multidisciplinary
understanding of deviant security practices. Typologies on deviant security pro-
viders - such as bulletproof hosters and connectivity providers - can be used for
automated role identification and property filtering. Grounded Theory research
on deviant security benefits from using (un)supervised statistical research as
topic modeling on cyber criminal writings to identify the security-related topics
that cyber criminals discuss and as a guidance for new research directions in
deviant security studies. Moreover, there is a need for the development of a
monitor that quantifies the kind and degree of DevSec practices encountered by
law-enforcement agencies in cyber crime investigations [218, p.11]. A monitor
on DevSec will help investigative units to understand the security practices they
face in a particular operation, and to make informed decisions how to exploit
related vulnerabilities and which kind of legal practitioners are needed to suc-
cessfully do so. The filled out monitors will produce statistics that show how
DevSec standards change in time, and thus require the introduction or abolition
of investigative powers. In this way, a DevSec monitor is a product of multi-
disciplinary scholarship on cyber crime that might contribute to evidence-based
procedural law, comprehensive cyber security policies and effective investiga-
tions. Of course, these mixed methods work from two directions. Not only can
qualitative findings be input for quantitative research, but quantitative descrip-
tive findings can also be explained by qualitative research. There is also a world
to win for quantitative descriptive research to identify patterns in deviants se-
curity practices that can subsequently be explained by qualitative research such
as patterns in distribution as a countermeasure. The findings can be used to
identify suspects, and formulate interventions aimed at exploiting especially
unavoidable weaknesses like authorship analysis and native language identifica-
tion. The results of this study also raise a more fundamental question about
current statistical methods and techniques to measure the nature and extent of
traditional and cyber crime. Because of a range of legitimate and illegitimate
services and products that provide deviant security as a common, club, private
and public good, less skilled offenders now have the means to effectively lower
the visibility of themselves and their crimes. This democratization of deviant
technical computer security will have an impact on the volume of unpunished
crimes. While statistics suggest that visible traditional crime with direct vic-
tims is declining in jurisdictions like the Netherlands [677], cyber crime might
equally be on the rise, yet far better protected, and as a result less measurable
for academics that use traditional methods and techniques. Less than 30 pos-
sible instances of breaches via remote desktop protocol and no instances about
providers of RDP were filed by the general public in the Netherlands in the
years 2017 and 2018, although a private security researcher provided evidence
how these suppliers made en masse victims in the Netherlands [678]. If so few
data sources are available about direct victims of cyber crime, how effective are
current data sources, methods and techniques - e.g., frequency counts of official
complaints, self surveys - to gain a full picture on the nature and extent of
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those organized crimes that make indirect victims like bulletproof hosting and
fake documents?
Outcomes that benefit legal practitioners The need for a mixed methods
and multidisciplinary approach brings us to the output of academic research and
its audience, or in other words, to the importance of connecting socio-technical
findings about the security practices of cyber criminals to the normative world
of legal practitioners. Throughout this study, examples are given about the
combined social-technical-legal aspects of DevSec and investigative responses
against deviant protective practices. New multidisciplinary research topics are
diverse and plenty: from assessing the legal feasibility of investigative powers
for disruptive purposes and the usage of statistical results of e.g., native lan-
guage identification in court, to comparative legal studies on deviant security in
substantive and procedural law; and from legal ethics in analytical models that
exploit vulnerabilities and subsequently target suspects, to crime proofing of
laws and policies that unnecessarily work as deviant security controls. As this is
the first structured and systematic research project on deviant security, the long
term outlook - particularly its impact on future research, law, policy and inves-
tigations - remains unknown, yet looks promising if we remember the lessons of
the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry Committee into Criminal Investigation Meth-
ods from 1994 to 1996. While reforming procedural law because of an integrity
crisis within the Dutch national police, they warned legislators and the general
public for the problem of traditional organized criminals who undisturbedly ap-
plied offensive physical countermeasures against legitimate government actions.
Again, investigations are having a hard time but now face an effectiveness cri-
sis because of technical computer security controls of criminals. Investigations
are indeed what states make of it. Time and resources are needed to under-
stand the protection of cyber crime and the cyber criminal, and subsequently
increase the quality of the bureaucratic output of, and the public discussion
about, the attribution process [19, p.33]. Many of the research outcomes of this
project have been implemented by the Central and Regional Criminal Investi-
gations Divisions of the Dutch national police, including recommendations to
closely collaborate with academics to exploit the vulnerabilities in commission
and protection. The research challenges are, however, multifaceted. On the one
hand, we have to avoid that politicians, legislators and policy makers use DevSec
for reasons of securitization and to demand ever-increasing investigative powers.
On the other hand, both academics and legal practitioners have to collaborate
far more intensively than they do now, and have to unlock the enormous po-
tential of academic collaboration with the police instead of solely research on
the police. The academic world needs the data and insights of law-enforcement
agencies about cyber criminals and their crimes, while investigators need the
power of independent thought. They might find each other in the understanding
that more knowledge about deviant security serves the public interest. After
all, deviant security is a conditio sine qua non of serious organized cyber and
traditional crimes that undermine the very well-being of societies at large.
233
9.5 Concluding Remarks
This study introduced a new security paradigm: the technical computer secu-
rity practices of (cyber) criminals. While there is academic, corporate, media
and political attention for attacks by cyber criminals and defences and attacks
by law-abiding entities, the security practices of cyber criminal referent objects
were so far largely known unknowns. When these deviant security practices are
discussed, the debate tends to evolve around encryption usage and anonymity.
The journey of this study to literally and figuratively unravel all layers of deviant
security lets us realize that we have to go beyond the current going dark debate
as cyber criminals have many more deviant security controls at their disposal.
If both academics and legal practitioners grasp the importance of understand-
ing deviant security, than this is not a pessimistic outlook. On the contrary,
the protection of crime and the criminal comes with all kinds of minor, major
and even unavoidable vulnerabilities that the broader cyber security commu-
nity should normatively and empirically explore to confront cyber crime more
effectively. Studying deviant security is exciting as well. Not only because there
are plenty of research opportunities to reveal what essentially does not want
to be revealed, but also because of its significance: research outcomes have the
ability to produce direct and tangible effects on the lives of citizens, especially
the most vulnerable among us.
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